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To the people of Haiti, especially to those who daily resist and struggle to survive, to 
those who dream and struggle for a better future, despite the many forces that conspire 
against it. 
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Abstract 
The thesis examines the legitimacy of the United Nations stabilisation mission present 
in Haiti from 2004 to 2017 to the local population, and how this configuration affected 
the outcomes achieved by the operation, as well as its long-term impact on the social 
and political conditions prevalent in the country. A comparative analysis with the cases 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, East Timor and Somaliland is 
performed in order to contrast the findings of the case study, and to enable more 
generalizable conclusions concerning the question of political legitimacy in postcolonial 
and developing countries affected by violent conflict, political instability and 
international interventions. Beyond the empirical analysis, the thesis aims to bring a 
theoretical contribution, presenting critical points for theory refinement concerning 
political legitimacy, especially in the contexts concerned here. The thesis argues that the 
peace-as-statebuilding paradigm of international interveners have contributed for the 
(re)production of predatory political economies, violent contestation and further social 
and political fragmentation in Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, 
and reflects on how the international humanitarian apparatus can support societies 
affected so endogenous political processes can develop for the achievement of stability 
and democratisation.  
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1. Introduction
While I am concluding this dissertation, I am following the news about the 
situation in Haiti with concern, as the country has a new wave of protests against the 
government of Jovenel Moïse, not only in the capital, but in several other cities. This 
time, protesters are demanding his resignation, making intensive use of physical 
coercion, with barricades, mass demonstrations and arson in rich neighbourhoods. 
People want to scare those in power, those who so often do not care about their 
reputation among the population, who think they can maintain their privileges and 
display their wealth, while the majority of Haitians live in inhuman conditions.1  
Since the end of 2018, the country has witnessed different waves of mass 
protests, which often turn violent, paralyzing and hindering the minimum of normalcy 
that common people try to maintain in their daily lives, worsening the precarious 
conditions prevalent, turning even harder the access to basic goods such as fuel, food 
and medicine, as well as medical services. Right now, there is a stalemate, as a 
government representative affirmed they would only step down with a civil war.2 A 
number of gross human rights violations have been reported, including massacres, and 
according to a number reports, many are being committed by armed civilians and 
militias.3 Beyond the Haitian National Police, who is using live ammunition against 
protesters, with reports that several people have been killed,4 political actors are relying 
on militias to try to control protesters, who are angry,5 and not without reasons. 
1 See: ‘Haitian police use tear gas, live ammunition to break protests,’ Reuters, 27 September 2019; What 
is really behind the crisis in Haiti?, Al Jazeera, 28 September 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/crisis-haiti-190927092336787.html. An important source of 
information and updates on the situation in the country is the Twitter, for instance: 
https://twitter.com/gaetantguevara/status/1177553152259891200; 
https://twitter.com/gaetantguevara/status/1177655815093788672. 
2 “Haïti: » Dialogue ou Guerre Civile « , le nouvel utilmatum lancé par Rosemond Jean,” Kapzy News, 27 
September 2019, https://kapzynews.com/haiti-dialogue-ou-guerre-civile-le-nouvel-utilmatum-lance-par-
rosemond-jean/, Accessed on 28 September 2019.  
3 As Pedro Braum, Viva Rio’s Project coordinator, reported me on 27 September 2019, and according to 
several news accounts. For instance: ‘Men in police uniforms ‘massacre’ unarmed civilians in Haiti’, The 
Independent, 16 January 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/haiti-massacre-port-
au-prince-police-uniforms-gangs-united-nations-a8729876.html; Leader or killer? A day with ‘Barbecue’ 
in Haiti’s capital, AP News, 7 June 2019, 
https://www.apnews.com/ebc2cee089f149309bd73afa07816a63?utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=S
ocialFlow&utm_medium=AP, Accessed on 29 September 2019. The last news has been heavily criticised 
for the way it reports the events and the situation in question (critiques with which I agree). I included it 
here, nonetheless, as it brings important information, in a context of scarce sources.  
4 https://twitter.com/gaetantguevara/status/1178294238540451840.   
5 Angry Protesters in Haiti Call for Resignation of President, The New York Times, 27 September 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/world/americas/haiti-protests-moise.html.  
14 
Haiti is now engulfed in a similar or even worse situation comparing to the crisis 
of 2004, after two years of the departure of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in 
Haiti (Minustah). This dissertation aims to explain how such disastrous outcome came 
into being.  
Since the reproduction of violent contestation, political instability and lack of 
sustainable democratisation is not something exclusive to Haiti, this case study is 
important not only concerning the Caribbean country, but has a fundamental relevance 
for the study of international interventions and the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour in 
general, as well as for the study of legitimacy, violent contestation, instability and crisis 
in developing and postcolonial countries.  
The legitimacy of international humanitarian interventions, UN peace missions, 
regional, NATO operations or otherwise, not only concerning international norms, but 
to populations affected, is receiving increasing attention in the literature on peace-and-
statebuilding (Pouligny 2006; Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014; Sabrow 2017; 
Stollenwerk 2018; Whalan 2013). More broadly, studies with more refined assessments 
on the impacts and interaction of international interveners with local populations and 
local political landscapes are also burgeoning (Autesserre 2010; Barma 2017; de 
Guevara 2012; Veit 2010; Von Trotha 2009; Zanotti 2011). 
This literature brought fundamental contributions for a better understanding of 
the progress of international norms and institutions, as well as the outcomes achieved 
and the consequences for societies affected by civil conflict. Nonetheless, the question 
of international interventions’ legitimacy to populations affected is still an under-
researched and under-theorised topic (Orford 2011; Whalan 2013; Zanotti 2011), as we 
are dealing with an evolving scenario that challenges classical conceptions of political 
sciences around citizenship, sovereignty, political authority and legitimacy (Veit 2010). 
The United Nations was founded after World War II “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”; it played an important role in the process of 
decolonisation (Prashad 2008) and is today a fundamental platform to address other 
existential threats for humanity, such as climate change and ecological degradation. 
Global governance mechanisms were developed, in this way, so as to cope with the 
evolving reality of globalisation, global interdependence and the pressing needs for 
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cooperation and coordination on issues that overpass national borders (Beck 1992; 
2002, Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Held 1997). 
Nonetheless, the possible problems and dangers of the development of these 
mechanisms, and of the international authority, institutional and bureaucratic apparatus 
they entail, have already been indicated in the literature (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; 
Orford 2011; Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte 2016). These problems and dangers are 
especially accurate concerning international peace and security (Orford 2011), as they 
most directly affect the question of national sovereignty and self-determination, as well 
as power, domination and political contestation in postcolonial and developing countries 
affected by civil conflict. 
Contemporary internal conflicts are, on the other hand, almost invariably 
affected by regional and international geopolitics, for which the reversal of the progress 
of international norms and institutions is neither a solution, on the contrary, as the cases 
of Syria and Yemen tragically demonstrate today. Furthermore, internal conflicts are 
today often characterised by decentralised violence and chronic political instability, 
with increasingly complex scenarios, where massive dispossession and 
disenfranchisement (Dolan 2009; Mbembe 2018; Urdal 2006) and predatory political 
economies (Barma 2017; Sharan and Bose 2018) feedback vicious circles, for which 
international interveners’ recipes have often proven ineffective (Autesserre 2010; 
Barma 2017; de Guevara 2012; Veit 2010). 
The present thesis aims to contribute for the understanding of this puzzling 
reality, focusing on the case study of Haiti, which despite being a small country, it has 
been an important and paradigmatic case concerning the international system and its 
evolution, from the period of colonialism and slavery until the present days of 
humanitarian interventions (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1995). Beyond the case study, a 
comparative analysis with the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, 
East Timor and Somaliland is performed in order to contrast the findings of the case 
study, and to enable the development more generalizable conclusions concerning the 
question of political legitimacy in postcolonial and developing countries affected by 
violent conflict, political instability and international interventions. 
I aim to contribute for the existing literature mainly by bridging empirical 
analysis with a political theoretical and conceptual discussion concerning political 
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legitimacy in postcolonial and developing countries affected by internal conflict. I 
consider that such dialogue between empirical research and theoretical reflection can 
bring crucial contributions for the existing literature, for it enables the revision and 
critical assessment of a priori assumptions often taken for granted, not only in the 
policy world (Autesserre 2017), but also in the research field of peace-and-statebuilding 
and international interventions.  
I discuss fundamental questions that affect social and political realities, but that 
are not often taken into account in empirical investigations, such as the question of 
agency (individual, collective and political), which cannot be a variable taken for 
granted, but demands a proper consideration of the prevalent conditions in the contexts 
concerned, and its effects on individuals, communities and countries.  
Although the legitimacy of international interventions to local populations is a 
topic already raised in the literature, it is more often applied from an instrumental 
perspective, so as to identify shortcomings and generate policy recommendations for the 
improvement of the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour (Sabrow 2017; Stollenwerk 
2018; Whalan 2013). While these studies may bring important contributions to 
understand international interventions, their interaction and impacts on local realities, an 
instrumental perspective may fail to grasp how unequal power relations shape the social 
and political outcomes achieved and how the prevalent conditions in these countries 
constrains individuals’ capacity to act and make choices. It may also hinder a proper 
enquire around the foundation of the legitimacy of international interventions 
concerning, again, not international norms, but local societies, what we call in this thesis 
source legitimacy, something that, as we shall see, can have fundamental implications 
and consequences for the outcomes achieved in societies affected.  
The thesis adopts an interpretative and socio-historical approach, analysing the 
historical paths the societies under investigation went through, and highlighting critical 
junctures that enable us to better understand the present conditions, the social and 
political configurations in these contexts (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). We will seek 
to understand why some countries reached more positive outcomes for stability and 
democratisation after civil conflict, and others still experience violent conflict, chronic 
political instability and economic stagnation, studying the prevalent factors that explain 
these different outcomes in the present, and how these factors have been shaped by 
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certain social, economic and political dynamics involving local and external actors 
(Autesserre 2010; Bayart and Ellis 2000; Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990; Veit 2010). 
The dissertation is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 brings the theoretical discussion concerning the concept of political 
legitimacy, especially taking into account the contexts of postcolonial and developing 
countries affected by violent conflict, aiming to highlight puzzling questions that 
emerge while investigating these realities, and especially taking into account the 
position of these societies in the international system. The chapter discusses the 
principle of the Responsibility to Protect, taking into account the theoretical discussion 
presented, as well as its meaning within the international normative development in the 
last decades. Finally, it analyses current debates on the literature around peace and 
statebuilding in light of the theoretical and normative considerations presented.  
Following the theoretical discussion, Chapter 3 brings the case study of Haiti, 
where the thesis aims to bring its main contribution. It presents a historical background 
of the case, so we can understand how the present social and political conditions 
prevalent in Haiti came into being, being able to better grasp the role of the international 
intervention in this context, already marked by long-standing foreign interventionism. 
The chapter then presents an empirical analysis of Haiti under Minustah from 2004 to 
2017, analysing different periods marked by critical junctures that substantially 
changed the social and political conjecture in the country and the role of the 
international intervention on it.  
Chapter 4 develops the comparative analysis with the cases of DR Congo, 
Afghanistan, East Timor and Somaliland. The contrast of the case study of Haiti with 
these other four cases will enable a better understanding of the case of Haiti, while 
locating it on a broader perspective of international interventions, peace and 
statebuilding, and also allowing a broader understanding around the question of the 
legitimacy of international interventions, around global governance mechanisms on 
peace and security and their implications for societies affected.  
The conclusion reviews the puzzling questions developed in the theoretical 
chapter on the concept of political legitimacy in the contexts with which we are 
concerned here, considering the main findings of the case study and the comparative 
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analysis. The conclusion summarises, in this way, the thesis contribution for the 
revision of the concept of political legitimacy, so researchers can cope with the realities 
of postcolonial and developing countries affected by violent conflict, chronic political 
instability, predatory political economies and international interventions.  
In the following sections, I further detail the thesis’ objectives, the methods 
adopted and main assumptions with which we are going to work throughout the 
dissertation; I explain the selection of the case study and the cases of the comparative 
analysis, and describe the field research conducted in Haiti between April and May of 
2016.  
1.1. Objectives 
The research aims to bring an empirical contribution to the study field of 
international interventions and peace-and-statebuilding through the case study of Haiti 
under the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah), and a comparative 
analysis with other four cases: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo), East Timor and Somaliland. It also aims to develop a theoretical contribution, 
presenting a reassessment of the concept of legitimacy, so we can cope with contexts of 
developing and postcolonial countries affected by violent conflict, political instability 
and international interventions.  
More specifically, the research aims to answer the following main research 
questions:  
1. What was the configuration of legitimacy of Minustah to the local
population in different phases of the operation? The research is concerned with the 
legitimacy of the international intervention to its subjects, not according to formal 
procedures regulated by international norms.   
Following Beetham’s conceptualisation (2013), we assume that legitimacy does 
not have a binary logic (presence or absence of legitimacy). Different levels and models 
of legitimacy can be present, change over time, have different effects and create 
complex political configurations, especially in contexts of conflict and chronic political 
instability. For this reason, the research identifies three periods of Haiti under Minustah, 
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marked by certain critical junctures (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) that substantially 
changed the conditions in the country and of the UN mission, its legitimacy and 
outcomes.  
2. How Minustah’s legitimacy configurations impacted the outcomes 
achieved, throughout the period of its operation (2004-2017) and afterwards? The 
assumptions around how to assess legitimacy and its effects are further developed in the 
next section. The research works with existing concepts of legitimacy (Beetham 2013; 
Fossen 2013; Laiz and Schlichte 2015; Schlichte 2018; Weber 1978) and following 
these perspectives, assumes that legitimacy plays a key role in the reproduction of 
power, domination and political order. Power becomes domination, constituting stable 
political authority, with legitimacy (Weber 1978; Schlichte 2018). In other words, 
power requires legitimacy to endure and reproduce over time (Beetham 2013).  
Present day international interventions have, of course, a different claim of 
authority from states, they are most often indirect rulers (Veit 2010), interacting with 
local political actors, often generating unpredicted political outcomes and dynamics 
(Barma 2017; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). While their stated goal is to support the 
creation of liberal state institutions, they often end up strengthening undemocratic and 
unaccountable local political actors (Barma 2017) and local unequal power relations 
(Veit 2010).  
The research aims to understand what are the logics and dynamics around this 
interaction, assessing the legitimacy of Minustah to the local population, its effects and 
implications in the process of statebuilding and legitimation (or not) of local political 
actors and state institutions. Such assessment is based on a field research, on other 
primary sources such as reports, media news and policy documents, as well as on 
existing studies on the case.  
To check what logics and dynamics identified in the case of Haiti can be 
generalized in the broader context of international interventions and statebuilding, what 
conclusions can be assumed as having more general application and validity, beyond the 
case study, the research aims to answer the following and last main research question: 3. 
Comparing the case of Haiti with other cases studied in existing literature, what 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the legitimacy of international interventions 
and its implications in societies affected by violent conflict and political instability? 
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The cases chosen for the comparative analysis, Afghanistan, DR Congo, East Timor and 
Somaliland, have a considerable, although not exhaustive, literature (Autesserre 2009, 
2010; Veit 2010; Richards 2012; Suhrke 2009, 2011; Schwoebel 2018), so the research 
relies on existing works as well as at times on primary resources, such as reports, media 
news and policy documents.  
There are studies on these cases specifically focused on the legitimacy of 
international interventions and of the statebuilding process (in the case of Somaliland, 
without international intervention, see: Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018), or with 
perspectives very close to the study of legitimacy (Autesserre 2009, 2010, 2014; Barma 
2017; Pouligny 2006; Veit 2010). It is less so in the case of Afghanistan, for which the 
research develops more innovative arguments, although also building on existing 
literature on the process of statebuilding and the political dynamics between 
international interveners and local political actors (Barma 2017, Suhrke 2009, 2011), 
but extending the analysis based on available primary sources, so as to develop an 
assessment of this case with the lenses of legitimacy.   
Internal conflicts are characterised by the contestation of the legitimacy of 
incumbent governments, or among different factions when a central authority no longer 
exists (Mitchell 2018, 1-2). That is to say, legitimacy is a contested matter in these 
contexts, where competing factions have divergent legitimacy claims, and individuals 
have very different sets of interests, priorities, incentives and options comparing to 
contexts without violent conflict. A consolidated political authority is absent, and often 
as well a shared sense of what legitimate political authority should be, as we will see in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
It is possible to distinguish between Schmittian and Hobbesian conflicts: the 
former is characterised by different factions fighting for political control, and the latter 
by the absence of clear competing factions, fragmented groups not always fighting for a 
political cause, but often for economic gains, or the ‘spoils of war’ (de Waal 2014). 
Kalyvas, on the other hand, points for the need to go beyond such division, as he points 
that:  
Civil war fosters interaction among actors with distinct identities and interests. It is the 
convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil war with its particular 
character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the 
private, the collective and the individual (Kalyvas 2003, 487).  
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Taking into account Kalyvas assertion, civil conflicts present very challenging 
conditions to investigate, characterise and measure the legitimacy of different actors, 
incumbent governments, armed groups and international interveners, and its effects 
(Mitchell 2018).  
International interventions can have different levels of acceptance among 
populations affected, with fundamental implications, as we shall see, for their 
performance and outcomes achieved (See also: Whalan 2013). They play a key role in 
the development of state institutions they support establishing, as well as on the relation 
between state and society that takes shape, that is to say, on their legitimacy (or absence 
of it) to local populations, and in what this legitimacy relies, even if many dilemmas and 
contradictions exist in this process, and even if international interventions cannot have 
control over the outcomes achieved (Paris and Sisk 2009, Veit 2010). The thesis aims to 
shed light on the complexity of these contexts, identifying key factors that explain the 
political dynamics between international interveners and local political actors, and 
between them and the societies affected. 
To properly answer the research questions proposed above, the thesis first 
develops a theoretical discussion concerning the concept of political legitimacy and its 
use in postcolonial and developing countries affected by civil conflict, as well as 
chronic political instability. I consider this theoretical analysis crucial, since what is 
taken for granted in terms of how systems of domination work and seek legitimation to 
perpetuate themselves over time may suffer an important bias towards the realities of 
Western societies and political systems, where these concepts were developed, as well 
as may not be able to take into account the implications of the position of the societies 
with which we are concerned here in the international system.  
In this way, my goal is to first bring up what I consider as critical questions that 
need to be taken into account while analysing power, authority, legitimacy, or the lack 
of it, as well as acceptance, contestation or conviviality (Mbembe 2001), with which 
subjects may deal with power and domination. This first theoretical reflection will help 
us during the case study and the comparative analysis, with more conscious and revised 
assumptions for the understanding of these realities. The theoretical discussion will also 
enable to better ground the normative considerations presented along the thesis.  
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The concept of political legitimacy is especially prolific for a dialogue between 
empirical research and theoretical and normative analysis. What constitutes legitimate 
political authority is a fundamental question for both political sciences and normative 
political theory (Beetham 2013). The latter is concerned with how political authority is 
ethically justified, or based on certain justified assumptions and beliefs, according to 
logical and reasonable argumentation. Political science and political sociology, on the 
other hand, are concerned with assessing the legitimacy of governments and systems of 
domination to their own subjects, and the consequent social and political implications of 
it (Beetham 2013; Weber 1978).  
Beetham takes into account individuals’ constraints when it comes to consent to 
political authority and systems of power and domination in general. The author points to 
the self-fulfilling qualities of power relations, which (re)produces the material, 
ideological and structural conditions for its own legitimation. The general interest of 
society is structured in a way that to be achieved, the particular interests of the powerful 
need to be fulfilled. He points that: “systems of power themselves structure many of the 
beliefs, interests and conditions of consent that provide for their legitimation” 
(Beetham 2013, 64).  
Following this rationale, the research aims to assess the legitimacy of the UN 
mission in Haiti to the local population and its effects taking into account individuals’ 
constraints and the historical processes that created and reproduced inequalities and 
power imbalances inside the country as well as regarding Haiti in the international 
scenario, that is, internal and international power relations. In this sense, it is important 
to emphasise that because of the historical formation of the country and its location in 
the international scenario, the local dimension is directly affected by external actors and 
international power dynamics, as in other cases of postcolonial and developing 
countries (Bayart and Ellis 2000; Schlichte 2018; Veit 2010).  
In this way, the case study includes a historical background, analysing the 
process of state formation in the country, which traces back to the Haitian revolution, 
and the production of the present social, economic and political conditions in the 
country. This historical background enables a better understanding of the case of Haiti 
from a longue durée perspective, turning possible a proper investigation of the role 
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played by the international intervention, in what conditions it interacted with the local 
population and local political actors.  
Concerning the bridge between empirical investigation, theoretical analysis and 
also normative considerations (the latter presented mainly in Chapter 2 and in the 
Conclusion), I am especially concerned to disentangle the empirical analysis from 
normative bias, a common problem in the study field of peace-and-statebuilding and 
international interventions, which often takes for granted the “imperative of 
statebuilding” (Fukuyama 2004; see also: Paris and Sisk 2009, 314-315; for a similar 
criticism: Von Trotha 2009). If we investigate a problem assuming that there is only one 
way to solve it, there is a high chance that our understanding of the problem will be 
significantly jeopardised. My goal is to overcome this quandary, setting aside the strong 
aprioristic normative assumption of statebuilding and democratisation, in the mode of 
liberal peacebuilding (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam 2011). With it, we will be 
better equipped to understand the social and political realities concerned, as well as 
power dynamics that overpass borders. When the concepts and assumptions with which 
I work may have normative implications, such as the three dimensions of legitimacy 
(source, procedural and substantive, as further detailed), I seek to justify why they make 
sense for the empirical investigation of the realities concerned.  
Especially in the area of peace and security, global governance mechanisms do 
not have means of accountability to people affected by them, and no means of limiting 
their power, except international norms that count on fragile mechanisms of 
enforcement. The question of ‘Who guards the guardians?’ (Caplan 2005) well 
illustrates the condition of global governance mechanisms on peace and security. 
Juridically, UN peace operations and other international interventions approved by the 
UNSC create a sort of abnormal situation, since individuals are not citizens of 
international institutions, nor of an ‘international community,’ which work with and 
through states (Veit 2010). In this sense, we can say that such interventions have 
literally power over ‘bare life’ (Agamben 2010) of their subjects. The aim of the present 
research is to understand how such configuration materialises in practice, and identify 
what are the outcomes for societies affected. 
Other authors in the field of global governance and international interventions 
applied Foucauldian concepts and ideas, emphasising their role as mechanisms of 
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biopolitics, as devices to govern and control populations deemed as dangerous for the 
Western and civilised world (Duffield 2002). Such technologies of government, with 
the exercise of power over societies affected, are implemented while these institutions 
deny their authority (Chandler 2006), with the assumption that they are simply bringing 
an expertise absent in local societies, a neutral and technical support to build peace and 
develop democratic and liberal institutions.  
Veit, on the other hand, points that although this literature elucidates 
fundamental aspects of present day global governance mechanisms and international 
interventions, it fails to address how international interveners interact and impact the 
local social and political landscape. The present thesis aims to shed light on these 
interactions, turning visible social and political dynamics that are often overlooked in 
this field of study.  
What Foucault (2007) named ‘pastoral power,’ the Christian foundations of 
Western political systems, the idea of political authority as the duty of the pastor to 
protect and guide the life of the flock, similarly permeates the development of global 
governance mechanisms and international norms. The thesis seeks to trace the 
continuity between liberal democratic political systems and the liberal peace-and-
statebuilding project taking into account this common foundation, and the practical 
consequences of this structure of ideas and practices in societies affected, taking into 
account the interaction with local political actors, as well as the local coping 
mechanisms, forms of resistance or conviviality (Mbembe 2001).  
Related to it but from another perspective, Arendt (2006) pointed to the 
predominance of the ‘social question’ in politics in modernity, which has undermined 
the political arena, the mediating process through which political decisions are made, 
where individuals act collectively and through which democracy and fundamental 
freedoms can be protected.  
Following this rationale, this de-politicization of politics is predominant not only 
in the progress of global governance mechanisms but also in the scholarly debate 
around it, as technical and managerial perspectives are very common in the study of 
international interventions, with the aim of investigating how they can be more effective 
to promote peace and stability (see, for instance: Sabrow 2017; Whalan 2013), without a 
proper political contextualisation of these mechanisms, of the historical processes that 
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led to their development, of the political structures and power relations in which they 
are embedded, and their implications (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; de Guevara 2012). 
In this sense, the theoretical section aims to somehow contribute to a considerable gap 
in the existing literature, shedding light on this historical process and political 
dimension, in order to enlighten the subsequent empirical analysis.  
In accordance with other authors in the field (Duffield 2001; 2007; Veit, 2010), 
the research assumes that although humanitarianism is a different enterprise then 
colonialism, there are commonalities on the foundations of both, as well as power 
relations, material and technical inequalities that reproduced over time and produced 
continuities that need to be identified so we can cope with contexts of internal conflict 
and chronic political instability in developing and postcolonial countries. The research 
aims to understand how these continuities happen in the case study, as well as, although 
in a more summarised and limited sense, in the cases of the comparative analysis, 
contributing and dialoguing with existing analyses, which already elucidate these 
continuities from different perspectives (Bayart and Ellis 2000; Duffield 2001; 2007; 
Veit 2010; Schlichte 2018).  
In sum, with the theoretical discussion, the empirical case study and the 
comparative analysis, I aim to present critical questions to rethink political legitimacy in 
developing and postcolonial countries affected by violent conflict, chronic political 
instability and international interventions, revising a priori assumptions around this 
concept and its application in these contexts. These critical questions may contribute for 
concept re-evaluation and theory refinement, so we can cope with the evolving scenario 
of global governance mechanisms on peace and security and the increasingly common 
cases of ‘intractable’ conflicts (Mitchell 2018) and chronic political instability. 
1.2. Methods 
I have adopted an interpretative and socio-historical approach to assess the 
legitimacy of Minustah to the local population and the outcomes connected to this 
configuration, and to perform the comparative analysis with the cases of Afghanistan, 
DR Congo, East Timor and Somaliland. I departed from existing conceptualisations of 
legitimacy in political science and political sociology (Beetham 2013; Laiz and 
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Schlichte 2015; Schlichte 2018; Weber 1978), and following the model of interpretative 
case studies, my goal is to contribute for theory evaluation and refinement (Della Porta 
and Keating 2008). As the authors summarise: ‘The outcome of the research then takes 
the form of speciﬁc explanations of cases, but also of reﬁned concepts for the analysis of 
future cases’ (della Porta and Keating 2008, 27). 
The interpretative dimension is mainly based on interviews I conducted in the 
field research in Haiti between April and May of 2016, detailed in the next section, as 
well as on existing literature, mainly ethnographic studies, which bring a deeper 
understanding of the Haitian social reality, and of how individuals deal and cope with 
the condition of permanent crisis prevalent in the country (Beckett 2014; 2017; 2019; 
Braum 2014; 2019; James 2010; Marcelin 2015). The interpretative aspect of the 
methods entails that the analysis of individuals’ understandings of their contexts, 
experiences and the events that marked their lives and the realities which they belong is 
as much relevant as considering facts such as the different elections’ turnouts while 
Minustah was present in the country, reports of violence and unrest during elections, 
presence of mass demonstrations, available data on violence, and so on. 
The research adopts, in this way, the perspective of interpretative sociology, for 
which understanding individuals’ subjectivities is crucial to draw a reliable picture of 
social and political phenomena, turning complex constellations more intelligible (Weber 
1949). The analysis of socio-historical processes, of critical junctures that substantially 
changed the conjectures in different periods, as well as the analysis of evidences such as 
protests, elections’ turnouts and levels of violence, is combined with the interpretation 
of individuals’ understandings of their reality, as further detailed.  
The distinction emphasised by Hannah Arendt between truth and meaning 
(1976, 53-65) is worthwhile mentioning, as it touches a fundamental issue for the 
methods adopted here. While truth is a category that distinguishes presence or absence, 
entailing a binary logic: truth as opposed to false, pertaining to the realm of objective 
facts (as much as they can be subject of subjective interpretation, there are still some 
limits, and some questions that have only two possible answers: yes or no) there is 
another category of questions belonging to the human realm, connected to how humans 
give meaning to their experiences, how they envision their future, their relationship with 
one another, how they conceive things such as a good life, what is fair and good, etc. 
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With an interpretative approach, how people give meaning to their experiences, and not 
only facts and figures, is a fundamental dimension to properly grasp the complex 
context of the society in question and the social and political phenomena under 
investigation; to understand how certain historical processes happened, how certain 
patterns of behaviour, resistance and strategies of survival developed.  
Social and political sciences aim to understand phenomena which are embedded 
in human subjectivity. Pretend to be realist while ignoring this fact may create more 
misunderstanding and confusion than explanation of social and political realities.  For 
sure, we need to find form in the midst of chaos; find logic and reason in what 
sometimes seems illogical at first glance. For that we need to simplify, categorise, 
describe with the limited means and sources we have, put order in this description, and 
find patterns. To recognise the limits of our knowledge and that we can hope, at best, to 
draw a good picture identifying key conditions and processes that explain phenomena 
under investigation is key for academic accuracy, especially in an age when even the 
questions with yes or no answers actually demand the specification of context and 
conditions, when the expansion of knowledge, especially in areas such as quantum 
physics, also expanded our consciousness about the limits of this very knowledge 
(Kratochwil 2008, 83).  
That being said, in the present time I find it essential to reaffirm a commitment 
with truthfulness, that academic investigation must be committed with truth, as much as 
there are important limitations to identify it, being concerning historical or present facts. 
Moreover, theories, concepts and models must work to illuminate and better understand 
reality, and not the other way around.  
There are situations, for instance, where the views and opinions of interviewed 
individuals clash with recognised historical accounts. On some occasions, this problem 
is especially acute in contexts like Haiti, since the conditions in the country are in some 
respects so unbearable, historical, social and political processes so complex, and trauma 
coming from different processes (foreign intervention, totalitarianism, dictatorship, 
natural disasters) still so vivid, that simplified narratives may help one cope with such 
overwhelming conditions. Such contexts demand special sensibility from researchers to 
understand individuals’ coping mechanisms, what they mean in the context under 
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investigation, and at the same time to identify the most accepted, verified and grounded 
version of the unfolding of events.  
The context of Haiti also presents especially important challenges, since the 
underdevelopment of the country imposes important limitations for the access of basic 
information, including population data, levels of violence and criminality, information 
on the elections, and so on. The fact that estimates on the death toll of the 2010 
earthquake vary between 80.000 and 316.000 well illustrates such limitations.6 Data like 
the number of homicides during the peak of violence, between 2004 and 2006, as well 
as differentiation between conflict related deaths and common crimes, rely on 
household surveys, having, evidently, less accuracy comparing to official data (Kolbe 
2011).   
Other key factors such as the involvement of political actors with gangs, drug 
trafficking and criminal activity come to light from time to time. The systematic and 
structural characteristic of such involvement depends, nonetheless, on further 
extrapolation, which depends on some reasonableness and less strong evidences such as 
testimonials and experts’ opinions.   
Furthermore, assuming a socio-historical perspective means taking into account 
how historical processes shaped the formation of present social and political conditions. 
It is fundamental, in this sense, to trace back the evolution of systems of power and 
domination, and in the case of the Haitian society, it was firstly forged by slavery and 
the plantation system, of which it is not possible to talk about legitimacy by definition 
(Beetham 2013, 32). It was a system that denied the humanity of slaves, that meant for 
them the “loss of a ‘home,’ loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political 
status,” a “condition of absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death,” where 
slaves were shadows or “a form of death-in-life” (Mbembe 2003, 21). 
The formation of Haitian society was marked by the resistance to this 
illegitimate system by definition, which, as we shall see, was disrupted by the Haitian 
Revolution. Nonetheless, exclusionary politics still prevailed in the country after it, 
                                                          
6 Two Years Later, Haitian Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute, Maura R. O’Connor, Columbia Journalism 
Review, January 12, 2012, https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php, 
Accessed 31 August 2018.  
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dominated not only by the local political and economic elite, but also with heavy 
foreign interventionism (Trouillot 1990; Dubois 2012).  
In this sense, to understand present day Haiti, it is fundamental to take into 
account this radical negation of slaves’ humanity, with a system designed to destroy 
individuals’ sense of personhood, identity, social bounds and culture – that is, essential 
elements of the human condition, and that the resistance to such all-encompassing 
system of domination forged Haitian society. This point of departure has been 
determinant for the unfolding of Haitian history (Dubois 2012). From this point, the 
thesis seeks to highlight other determinant critical junctures that help us understand 
present day social and political conditions prevalent in the country, and how the UN 
mission, as well as the broader context of foreign and international intervention 
connected to it, influenced in this context.  
1.2.1. How to assess legitimacy? 
According to the Weberian theory, the legitimacy of a government depends on 
people’s belief on its legitimacy (Weber 1978), and legitimacy is an essential element of 
political authority. As summarised by Schlichte: 
States work and are capable when a critical mass of officials and citizens think that state 
institutions exist for goods reasons and that state action is based on justified institutions. Then, 
state power is not just repression, but state policies are enacted because institutions are deemed 
to be legitimate – power becomes domination (Schlichte 2018, 48).    
Beetham, in turn, criticises the Weberian theory, since for the author ‘it 
misrepresents the relationship between legitimacy and people's beliefs. A given power 
relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can 
be justified in terms of their beliefs’ (Beetham 2013, 11). He still points that:  
This may seem a fine distinction, but it is a fundamental one. When we seek to assess the 
legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other power relation, one thing we are doing 
is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people's beliefs, how far it conforms to their 
values or standards, how far it satisfies the normative expectations they have of it. We are 
making an assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of 
power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making a 
report on people's ‘belief in its legitimacy’ (Beetham 2013, 11).  
For the author, in this way, this difference has important implications on how we 
can assess the legitimacy of a government or other authority or system of domination. 
While people’s beliefs is a difficult thing to measure, people’s acceptance and 
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adherence to a political authority can be assessed through, for instance, performative 
acts that ‘serve the enhance the legitimacy of power holders through the public 
recognition or acknowledgement of their position.’ (Beetham 2013, xiv). Beetham 
points, in this way, that rule conformity and normative validity are fundamental 
elements of legitimate power. He recognises, nonetheless, more complex aspects around 
legitimacy, as the reasons why individuals consent to a political authority or system of 
domination are intertwined in systems of beliefs and systems of domination with 
cumulative effects over time.  
In this sense, to cope with the complexity of assessing legitimacy, especially in 
the context of Haiti, which, as already stated, has scarce sources of reliable data, and 
presents especially challenging conditions for performing qualitative research, for the 
precariousness of everyday life and permanent crisis in which the country is engulfed 
(Braum 2014; Beckett 2019), I combined the examination of in-depth interviews 
conducted in Haiti, with the analysis of evidences such as protests, elections’ turnouts 
and levels of violence during the period, to draw a reliable picture of the levels of 
acceptance of the establishment of Minustah in the country, its performance and 
outcomes achieved over time, as well as of the state institutions and governments the 
mission supported establishing, as detailed below.  
 Three dimensions of legitimacy were considered: 1) Source legitimacy, what 
are the grounds of authorities’ legitimacy claims, here understood not in a broad sense 
such as tradition but, more practically, what is the normative foundation of these claims, 
such as a peace agreement, a political settlement, or a constitution established through a 
democratic process;7 2) Procedural legitimacy, which is provided by the existence of 
mechanisms that ensure that decisions and actions taken by political authorities are in 
accordance with the valid norms; 3) Substantive legitimacy, finally, concerns the 
7 I assume here somehow a normative perspective, as I presume that authorities’ legitimacy must be 
grounded in an inclusive political process. I believe this is, nonetheless, a reasonable assumption, since, 
as developed in Chapter 2, local traditions and social institutions have been often eroded in contexts of 
postcolonial countries affected by conflict and instability, certainly in the case of Haiti, and as further 
elaborated in the next chapter, it is a reasonable assumption to adopt in these contexts, since exclusionary 
politics have been and still are one of the main reasons for the reproduction of decentralised violence and 
chronic political instability.  
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results and common goods delivered and provided by the government or other 
authority.8 
The interviews followed these three dimensions, so the analysis of the views and 
opinions of individuals interviewed take them into account, as well as the analysis of the 
evidences available around the legitimacy of the UN intervention and the statebuilding 
process it supported. The following table summarises the questions and search for 
evidences for each dimension. 
Dimensions of legitimacy How to assess 
Source  Questions around the political process that culminated
in the establishment of the UN intervention
 Analysis of this process through existing literature,
reports, policy documents and media coverage, in the
light of political theoretical debates (global governance
and Responsibility to Protect).
Procedural  Questions around dialogue/ grievance and participation
mechanisms of the UN mission; on how the UN
mission reacted to criticism and their unintended
impacts (mainly in the cases of cholera contamination
and sexual violence and exploitation); their role in
elections and interaction with the local political actors
 Reports, policy documents and media coverage
concerning:
o Answer to cholera epidemic (data on policies
and discourses)
o Cases of sexual exploitation and violence
o Role in elections (data on policies and
discourses)
o Role in critical political moments (data on
policies, discourses and moments of inertia)
o Mechanisms of accountability of the UN
8 These three dimensions of legitimacy are inspired by the work of Whalan (2013), which is an empirical 
study. They resonate, of course, with democratic principles, but we assume that they also have 
fundamental empirical implications, as developed by Whalan, and as argued throughout the dissertation. 
We can also say that a minimalist understanding of these three dimensions of legitimacy may also fit 
political models beyond the democratic one, as they ensure the coherence and sustainability of a system 
of rule.   
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mission 
o Mass protests
Substantive  Questions on the results achieved by the UN mission
and intended and unintended impacts
 Existing research (especially based on household
surveys),  reports, policy documents and media
coverage, focusing on:
o Elections
o Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration Programs and projects under the
umbrella of the Community Violence
Reduction section
o Security Sector Reform
o Data on crime and violence
o Data on gang presence and recruitment
o Mass protests
o Other qualitative research and opinion surveys
on the improvement of the security apparatus,
the role of Minustah on it and Minustah’s
performance in general
I am especially careful to contextualise the assessment of Minustah’s legitimacy 
to the local population, taking into consideration the prevalent social and political 
conditions in the country, especially the conditions of chronic instability, insecurity and 
crisis that prevails and its effects on individuals and communities (Braum 2014; James 
2010; Beckett 2019). I take into account, as already emphasised, the cumulative effects 
of power inequalities, as well as the continuous dialectic of power and resistance, as the 
case study will demonstrate. These conditions are not merely considered as background, 
but make part and intertwine with the analysis of the UN mission and its outcomes, 
going beyond, in this sense, of an instrumental analysis concerning the opinions of 
locals about the intervention and its possible consequences for its performance.  
1.2.2. Legitimacy and its social and political effects – some assumptions 
The research departs from the assumption that legitimacy plays a fundamental 
role for the stability of governments, regimes or other systems of domination (Weber 
33 
1979; Schlichte 2018; Beetham 2013). Although certain systems of domination lasted 
for considerable periods of time in which the chief mechanism of domination was sheer 
terror and violence, such as slavery and the plantation system in Haiti, it is reasonable to 
assume that stable social and political institutions count on the legitimation of 
authorities, even if the ways in which such legitimation occurs vary considerably 
throughout history and among different societies (Beetham 2013).  
Racism, the basis of the colonialist endeavour and of the Atlantic slave traffic, 
while denying the humanity of enslaved people and casting them out of the human 
realm, of the social and political, the spaces built by human craft (Arendt 1979; 
Mbembe 2003), created a system in which, as already stated, it makes no sense speaking 
of legitimacy (Beetham 2013, 32). As emphasised by Mbembe, colonialism and slavery 
created states of exception with which, instead of biopolitics, or power techniques for 
the management of populations (Foucault 2007), they brought about necropolitics, 
spaces of social death, where ultimately, slaves’ agency could only be exercised through 
suicide (Mbembe 2003, 39).9  
While colonialism and slavery did not succeed in annihilating its victims 
(physically and spiritually), on the contrary, as they developed strategies of survival, 
and their resistance, in the case of Haiti, ultimately succeeded, with the defeat of the 
slavery system by the Haitian revolution, they established, nonetheless, considerably 
harsh conditions for the development of new forms of social and political organisation. 
These harsh conditions led to the eventful and tumultuous process of social, economic 
and political formation of Haiti.  
In this sense, postcolonial countries present considerably different conditions for 
the study of the evolution of political institutions, of power and its need for legitimation, 
comparing with countries that did not experience these systems of domination based on 
racism and on the massive negation of individuals’ humanity and personhood, that is, 
the rule through state of exception and necropower. This foundational question had 
fundamental implications for the development of these societies and political systems, 
but these societies and their institutions are often studied with the assumptions and 
mindset of the socio-historical experience of Western countries. The next chapter seeks 
to highlight, in this sense, critical questions that one should bear in mind while 
9 A similar point is made by Spivak concerning the sati in India (Spivak 1988, 95-97). 
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investigating postcolonial societies affected by violent conflict and chronic political 
instability, taking into account these foundational questions and the position of these 
societies in the international system.  
As the thesis adopts an interpretative and socio-historical approach, I do not seek 
to explain social and political phenomena through the categories of causes and effects, 
of independent and dependent variables, as the interpretative approach undertakes, 
rather, ‘an effort to understand the principles by which the parts consistently fit 
together’ (della Porta 2008, 205). I seek to identify, in this sense, prevalent conditions 
that combined help explain the observed outcomes; critical junctures that substantially 
change social and political reality, assuming that historical contingency, as well as 
individuals’ agency (in Machiavellian terms, virtu and fortuna), play a key role for the 
unfolding of events and production of present conditions (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012).  
My goal, in this sense, is to present a reasonable understanding of the case study, 
to highlight a set of conditions that, combined and relating to one another in a certain 
way, explain the outcomes observed. Through the description of the case study, I aim to 
make intelligible and explain ‘complex set of relationships,’ (della Porta 2008, 207) and 
how determinant factors and conditions interact and explain the social and political 
phenomena under study. I still use the word ‘effect,’ not implying an exclusive causal 
relation between an independent and dependent variables, but meaning that certain 
conditions combined have shaped, influenced and constituted the outcomes observed.  
In this way, the present research recognises and considers complexity, with a 
transdisciplinary perspective (Morin 2007), benefiting from historical and 
anthropological accounts, beyond the literature in political sciences, political theory, 
comparative politics and international relations, identifying key analysis and concepts 
that help us in the task of reassessing the concept of political legitimacy concerning the 
contexts with which we are concerned here.  
As a qualitative and interpretative researcher, I am very careful with 
generalisations. The main concept with which we are working, legitimacy, has a strong 
universalist claim (Beetham 2013, 5), but as it is defined by the study of the conformity 
of rule systems with prevalent systems of beliefs, it is able, in this sense, to be adapted 
to different cultures and social and political realities. As a concept and category that 
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helps us understand political stability, or, on the other hand, contestation, as well as 
makes part of the lexicon of those who contest power (Fossen 2013), and taking into 
account the process of globalisation and its effects, we assume that it is reasonable to 
adopt the concept of legitimacy as applicable to diverse realities, inasmuch as it counts 
on proper social, political and historical contextualisation.  
Furthermore, since Beetham takes into account power inequalities and their 
cumulative effects over time, I believe his conceptualisation is especially suitable for 
the contexts with which we are concerned here.  
There is one dimension of legitimacy that is not our focus here, but as we work 
with the question of state violence, it is important mention and bear in mind. It concerns 
what we can call the dark side of legitimacy, or the dark side of democracy (Mann 
2005). The fact that genocides were most often committed by legitimate governments 
makes this point clear – genocide is a phenomenon strictly connected to modernity and 
the process of rationalisation and bureaucratisation promoted with the consolidation of 
the modern state (Arendt 1979; 1999; Bauman 2000; Mann 2005).  
Genocides very often depended, in this sense, on governments and regimes with 
the support of their subjects for the accomplishment of mass murder of minority groups. 
Mbembe’s definition of necropolitics helps us understand how the worst crime, the 
erase of entire communities of people, is not distant from present realities, but still 
haunts the contemporary world and world politics (Mbembe 2003), as vast populations 
are still considered as disposable life, where bombs are dropped and killings are 
committed without being considered murder by the political establishment (Evangelista 
and Shue 2014; Malešević 2013; Mbembe 2003).  
For our purposes, it is reasonable to assume that in contemporary world, 
democratic mechanisms to avoid the tyranny of the majority, a fundamental issue for 
political theory and political sciences (Berlin 1971; Pettit 2002), can remedy this danger 
of modern political institutions and of modernity, although further reflexion may be 
needed in order to properly assess this question. While in the cases of Haiti and DR 
Congo, the foreign sponsorship of the totalitarian regimes these countries had is a main 
factor that explains their endurance for around three decades (Autesserre 2010; Dubois 
2012; Trouillot 1990), in several other cases this factor do not explain regime survival. 
Tradition, ideology, religion, long historical processes with the reproduction of systems 
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of power and domination are often main explanations (Beetham 2013). The tyranny of 
the majority has also worked, and is still a prevailing reality in contemporary world.   
These complex and troubling questions concerning political legitimacy do not 
invalidate, I believe, the relevance of the concept, its usefulness to study social and 
political phenomena, political stability, instability, disruption and change, as well as its 
potential to bridge empirical research, theoretical discussion and normative 
considerations and aspirations. In this sense, the pragmatic turn on political legitimacy 
seems especially fruitful (Fossen 2013), as it allows us to understand the judgment of 
legitimacy of political authorities not only as a concept applied by experts, but as a key 
notion for political contestation and action among social and political agents – a notion 
that is actually widely applied in social interactions and political practice (Fossen 2013), 
if not with the word ‘legitimacy,’ with equivalents such as “they have no right,” “they 
are all bandits,” or even “The Haitian state has no moral authority to kill people” 
(Beckett 2019, 176). This perspective may help researchers to perform more careful 
empirical analysis, while assuming a more inclusive and self-reflexive normative 
perspective, with which we can better understand the realities under investigation and 
seek to contribute for meaningful change.  
1.2.3. Selection of the case study and comparative analysis 
The case of Haiti is considered, for a number of reasons, an exception among the 
UN peace operations. Minustah was the only UN peacekeeping operation, with a 
military and a police component, in the history of the American continent. Its 
geographical and geopolitical location bring a series of characteristics that substantially 
differentiates this case from another UN missions and international interventions, as 
further analysed in the case study and the comparative analysis.  
For this reason, Haiti can bring important and novel contributions for the study 
of the progress of global governance mechanisms on peace and security, on the 
principle of Responsibility to Protect and their implications. The comparative analysis 
with other cases may also help us better understand how international interventions help 
shape social and political outcomes in societies affected, and how decentralised violence 
and chronic political instability reproduce over time. Furthermore, the fact that 
unconventional settings of violent conflict, in urban scenarios and connected to chronic 
political instability and clientelist politics, are becoming increasingly common 
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(Schuberth 2017) makes Haiti an important case to understand the predominance of 
these conditions and their policy implications.  
Weak states with chronic legitimacy deficit, endemic corruption, and presence of 
non-state armed groups are common in Central America (Schuberth 2017), beyond the 
common history of US interference. Although the research is focused on the UN 
mission and the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour, the case study may bring relevant 
insights for the region in general. Haitian history, social and political formation present 
important differences comparing to other countries in the region, mainly because of the 
Haitian Revolution (Dubois 2012). Still, this case study can be useful for scholars 
studying other countries in the region, as source of comparison as well as for the 
analytical lenses and theoretical debate developed here.  
Concerning the comparative analysis, I selected the cases working with the 
model of most-similar systems design (della Porta 2008, 214-217), with the ceteris 
paribus rule – that is, with certain conditions remaining the same, what is/ are the 
condition(s) varying that possibly explain different outcomes. The structural features 
common to all cases consist on the fact that they are developing (low-income), 
postcolonial countries affected by internal conflict. Beyond this, there are features that 
differentiate them individually, and features shared among more than one case.  
Haiti and DR Congo have other similar fundamental characteristics, such as past 
authoritarian regimes supported by foreign countries in the context of the Cold War, 
during similar periods, and a history somehow connected, since a portion of the victims 
of the Atlantic slave trade came from what is today the DR Congo (Dubois 2012); both 
countries also suffer from chronic political instability and chronic legitimacy deficit of 
state institutions, although in the case of the DR Congo, violent conflict connected to 
such political configuration is much more severe.  
In the case of Somaliland, it has been selected as a counterfactual case 
concerning international interventions and the question of political legitimacy, since the 
country did not receive a UN mission or other kind of international intervention. For 
this reasons, this case counts on studies that investigate the alternative path of 
statebuilding and democratisation followed in the country, and the different outcomes 
achieved (Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018), for which is has a fundamental relevance to 
answer our research questions. 
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East Timor is another case that helps us better understand the social and political 
phenomena with which we are concerned, through the ceteris paribus logic. There are 
structural and determinant similar conditions, and the variations may help us understand 
the different outcomes achieved in the country. While East Timor received a UN 
mission, other conditions that differentiate this case from Haiti and DR Congo may help 
us understand the different outcomes achieved.  
The case of Afghanistan works in an opposite direction of the ceteris paribus 
rule: a fundamental different condition does not change the outcomes, which are similar 
to those ones observed in Haiti and the DR Congo. Afghanistan did not receive a UN 
peacekeeping operation (the UN has an assistance mission in the country, the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, but not a peacekeeping mission), but a US-
led military intervention, with its NATO allies. Reasons often claimed for the failure of 
UN peace operations: time and budget limitations, as well as of military capacity, do not 
hold in the case of Afghanistan. In this sense, it is also a fundamental case to answer our 
research questions.  
1.2.4. Field research in Haiti  
I conducted a field research in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, between April and May of 
2016, interviewing 37 individuals, including Haitian citizens and foreigners, members 
of human rights, humanitarian and development NGOs, politicians, journalists, 
academics, members of cultural organizations and social and communitarian leaders, 
Minustah employees, including military personnel, employees of international NGOs, 
diplomats and representatives of regional organisations. They were in-depth, semi-
structured interviews that lasted on average one hour. I also observed a cultural activity 
promoted by Minustah with young people, with whom I had the opportunity to talk, and 
discussions with students of the public university (Université d'Etat d'Haïti) about 
Minustah and the present situation in the country. 
I adopted the snowball sampling method, recurring to contacts I had and their 
social networks. Most of the interviewees seemed willing and glad to concede the 
interview and talk about the UN mission and the problems that affect the country, but it 
has been important to build trust to reach them and schedule the interviews.  
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The most challenging has been to reach Minustah employees, and some of them 
I could not interview, despite my insistence, among them the director of the Community 
Violence Reduction section (CVR), a fundamental area and dimension for me to 
investigate. I could remedy somehow this gap since I interviewed representatives of 
organisations supported by the CVR; one of them actually complained about the 
absence of the Minustah’s department in the activities of the project.  
The communications department of Minustah was very reticent and 
uncooperative, sought to control all the contact I had with Minustah’s employees, and 
did not answer the questions they asked me to send. The same happened when I 
contacted representatives of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti 
(Minujusth) this year.  
Other Minustah employees, on the other hand, were very willing to talk and the 
interviews were conducted smoothly, including with military personnel. The person 
responsible for projects of arts and communication with local communities was also 
very friendly and invited me to participate of a cultural activity, a project called 
‘Chanter pour la Paix,’ where I had the precious opportunity to talk with young people, 
not following my normal script but asking them about their views on the present 
situation of the country, what were their thoughts about the UN mission, about their 
worries and hopes for the future. 
For the interviews in general, the process of building trust was not only to reach 
the person and make the appointment, but also, of course, along the interview itself. I 
followed scripts I elaborated to each different group (Haitian civil society groups, 
international NGOs, Minustah employees), which were structured following the three 
dimensions of legitimacy taken into consideration, as well as the three periods marked 
by different critical junctures: from 2004 to 3006 (source legitimacy), 2006 to 2010 
(procedural and substantive legitimacy) and 2010 to 2017 (questions mainly concerning 
substantive legitimacy). 
I followed the script, but was careful to let the interviewees speak an introduce 
different topics, with which it was possible to get to know important issues I did not 
have previously in mind, such as, for instance, the question of rumours, its role and 
effects in politics in the country. I also sought to prepare myself in order to be careful in 
the interviews concerning recent traumatic events, the periods of political violence and 
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mainly 2010’s earthquake. But the field research itself was an intense and irreplaceable 
learning experience. 
The extreme poverty present in the country, as well as the general precarious and 
chaotic situation in the capital, are poignant. Basic public services such as energy 
supply, sanitation and garbage collection are almost non-existent, something that brings 
a negative first impression to visitors. This extreme precariousness imposes certain 
permanent tension in everyday life, but slowly one learns to deal with it, especially with 
the interaction with locals. It has been a challenge to get used and to digest the realities, 
the events and the transformation of paradigms and assumptions that happened during 
my stay in Haiti. But I am grateful for this intense learning process, with which I not 
only got to know about Haiti, but which also changed my world view.  
Although comprising mainly individuals belonging to civil society organisations, 
there was a considerable diversity of opinions, political position and social and class 
origin in the group of people I interviewed, as well as people that benefited directly 
from the UN mission, and people that have not. Beyond the young people of the project 
supported by Minustah and the students of the public university, I was able to interview 
dwellers of the ‘ghettos,’ the neighbourhoods more affected by military and police 
interventions, during my interviews with participants of the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio, 
which the coordinator supported me in the translation from creole (an invaluable 
support) and another local NGO that works with victims of sexual violence, whose 
coordinator also helped me in the translation from creole, of one of their employees who 
lives in Cité Soleil. Viva Rio headquarters is located in Bel Air, one of the areas 
affected by the conflict in 2004.  
I had planned a second field research in Haiti for March this year (2019) in order 
to do a follow-up of the previous research, better understand how locals understood the 
end of Minustah in 2017 and its substitution for Minujusth, without a military 
component and with less civilian personnel, and how the social and political situation 
evolved in the country. I needed to cancel this second field research, though, since 
before my departure the situation in Haiti seriously aggravated. International personnel 
with family in the country were evacuated, and aid workers left, not only for the 
security situation, but because access to fuel and food was very restricted; some of them 
needed to pay large sums of bribes in ‘road patrols’ performed by armed civilians, and a 
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diplomatic delegation from Chile has been attacked, with one person killed.10 Since 
October of 2018, Haiti undergoes a wave of protests that paralysed the country, the 
commerce, schools and transportation, several times.  
10 As reported by Pedro Braum, as well as in the news. See: Haiti is once again on edge, and humanitarian 
aid groups debate whether to go or cancel, Miami Herald, 15 November 2018, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article226169345.html; Alberta 
missionaries stranded by unrest in Haiti to be evacuated by helicopter Saturday, CBC News, 15 February 
2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-haiti-rescue-missionaries-1.5022252; Haiti: Civil 
Unrest (MDRHT016) DREF Operations Update no. 1, Report from the International Federation of Red 
Cross And Red Crescent Societies, 17 May 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-civil-unrest-
mdrht016-dref-operations-update-no-1;  
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2. Puzzling out political legitimacy in the postcolonial era and in the context of
international interventions 
Of all civilizations, the Christian West has undoubtedly been, at the same time, the most creative, 
the most conquering, the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody.  At any rate, it has 
certainly been one of the civilizations that has deployed the greatest violence.  But, at the same 
time, and this is the paradox I would like to stress, over millennia Western man has learned to 
see himself as a sheep in a flock, something that assuredly no Greek would have been prepared 
to accept.  Over millennia he has learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd (pasteur) who 
sacrifices himself for him. The strangest form of power, the form of power that is most typical of 
the West, and that will also have the greatest and most durable fortune, was not born in the 
steppe or in the towns.  This form of power so typical of the West, and unique, I think, in the 
entire history of civilizations, was born, or at least took its model from the fold, from politics 
seen as a matter of the sheepfold (Foucault 2007, 174).  
The reasons why individuals consent or acquiesce to political regimes and 
authority, as well as why they cease to do so on certain occasions, generating disruption, 
change or political turmoil and instability, the latter being the case of a number of 
contemporary societies in developing countries, is a fundamental question in political 
sciences, and defy common sense or simplistic utilitarian answers (Beetham 2013, p. 
27-29). It is not rare that groups of people keep supporting governments even if they are
delivering few or no public goods at all, even if they are corrupt, incompetent, and even 
if they make use of arbitrary violence (Herreros 2006). 
Given the complexity of contemporary world, in which local, national and 
international factors interact and are determinant for domestic political configurations 
(Schlichte 2017), the predominance of the state as unit of analysis, and its understanding 
as independent variable (Trouillot 1990) entail important limitations to understand 
social and political realities today, especially in developing and postcolonial countries 
heavily affected by foreign policies and international regimes. Understanding the state 
as independent variable means considering it as an ahistorical institutional apparatus 
that is above and independent from society (Trouillot 1990), and from the international 
political-economic scenario and history.  
In this sense, Schlichte idea of international states, cases in which the domestic 
political space is heavily influenced by foreign actors and international regimes, helps 
us reflect on ontological and epistemological barriers we need to overcome in order to 
properly investigate postcolonial societies. As he puts it:  
These states are international arenas, fields of power that are inserted in international webs of 
administration, of claims of authority, of transfers and institutions. Lines of power run through 
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such arenas that we call states, many bypass them, and it is less and less clear how national the 
boundaries of such international states are (Schlichte 2017, 117).  
In cases of postcolonial countries affected by violent conflict, chronic political 
instability and international interventions, such as Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan, 
the definition of international arena is a suitable one, from which we can depart and 
better take into account how relations of power and domination involve local, national, 
regional and international political actors, and how these relations shape the social, 
economic and political conditions prevalent in these countries. 
If domestic political spaces are intensely permeated by regional and international 
economic and political forces, the legitimacy of domestic political authorities to their 
subjects, as well as the ability of subjects to protest and act politically in case they find 
that the political authorities in question are not legitimate,11 is fundamentally affected. 
This question is not only pertinent, of course, to cases such as Haiti, DR Congo and 
Afghanistan, as the intense debates around political legitimacy concerning the European 
Union, for instance, demonstrate (Beetham and Lord 2014; Follesdal 2006; Murdoch, 
Connolly and Kassim 2018). Globalisation has continuously deepened global 
interdependency, and subjects and citizens are increasingly affected by decisions made 
outside their borders, for which they have little ability to control and influence (Beck 
1992; 2002; Held 1995, 1997). From a democratic normative perspective, the 
democratic deficit generated by this reality points to the need for the advancement of 
democratisation at the international level (Beck 1992; 2002; Held 1995, 1997). 
In the realities with which we are concerned here, populations are much more 
intensely affected by power structures and decisions they have little capacity to 
influence or control. In countries like Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, and further developed in this one, individuals face much more 
extreme restraints to their political agency. The socio-historical paths their countries 
went through created certain conditions leading to these more severe restraints, as 
Chapters 3 and 4 seek to demonstrate. In this sense, this chapter aims to reflect on the 
concept of political legitimacy and its application in these contexts.  
11 Following the pragmatic turn on political legitimacy, for which the attribution of legitimacy is not only 
a theoretical concept, but a category used by political actors to contest, as well as act and engage 
politically (Fossen 2013), to deliberate and construct collectively a common understanding of a legitimate 
political order.  
45 
 
The Weberian theory on political legitimacy, the most commonly applied, and 
with which this thesis dialogue (Weber 1978; Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte 2015; 
Schlichte 2018), was developed focusing on the social, economic and political 
developments of Western countries, on their historical paths and processes. Such 
developments had often as counterpart, and in key periods relied on processes of 
economic accumulation which connected Western countries with what today are 
developing countries, postcolonial societies, or the ‘Global South’ (Kapoor 2008; 
Mbembe 2001, 2003; Prashad 2008). These connections had fundamental implications 
for both colonisers and colonised (Mbembe 2001; 2003; Arendt 1979, p. 218-227), on 
the way societies and political structures developed and evolved over time, on both 
sides (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).  
In this sense, with a longue durée perspective, we can identify determinant 
critical junctures in these historical processes and have a better understanding of these 
realities, as well as investigate how power and domination, as well as acceptance, 
consent or resistance and contestation take shape, being able to review the common a 
priori assumptions concerning political legitimacy and the phenomenon of power, 
domination as well as acquiescence or resistance in these realities.  
To this end, the chapter first presents key considerations concerning the process 
of decolonisation and spread of Western political institutions, concomitant to the 
international normative and institutional development after the Second World War. The 
second section develops a theoretical discussion, raising what I consider major critical 
issues for the question of political legitimacy in postcolonial, developing countries 
affected by violent conflict, chronic political instability and international interventions. 
The third section reflects on the implications of the theoretical questions raised to the 
principle of the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001). Finally, the forth section reflects 
on the practical and policy implications of these theoretical and normative questions and 
considerations, analysing current debates on the literature around peace and 
statebuilding, and how the theoretical discussion presented here can contribute for these 
debates.   
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2.1. International normative development and the process of decolonisation 
The development of global governance mechanisms after the Second World 
War, with the foundation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, 
happened concomitantly to the process of decolonization, mainly in the Asian and 
African continents, and in a number of situations, the UN played an important role in 
this process and in conflicts and disputes arising from it (Orford 2011, Prashad 2007).  
The UN role grew beyond mere diplomatic and global multilateral mechanism, 
holding executive tasks and responsibilities. As with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), a rationalisation and bureaucratisation process led to the development of an 
international authority, based on the concerted decisions of its members, but also 
increasingly on a technical-rational power, in the case of the UN, including of its 
agencies and funds (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Orford 2011).  
The geopolitics of the Cold War played, of course, an important role in this 
process of development of international norms and institutions (Hobsbawm 1998; 
Prashad 2008). But the process of rationalisation and bureaucratisation was, at some 
points, in tension with this geopolitical scenario, as the United Nations worked not only 
following geopolitical dynamics, but as institutional apparatus aiming to fulfil the 
principles for which it has been created, as demonstrated by Orford, who analyses in 
depth the cases of the conflict over the Suez Canal and in the Congo (Orford 2011, p. 
30). Orford points out, however, that the impartial and neutral position sought by 
international civil servants for this purpose was often not something really feasible, and, 
mainly in the case of Congo, it meant favouring certain parts of the conflict and 
influencing the outcomes of it (Orford 2011, p. 84-87).12  
Politically, a space of neutrality vis-à-vis the Cold War was most notably 
symbolised by the Non-Aligned Movement, for which the UN represented an important 
platform for political action, with landmarks such as the struggle against the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa and Israeli policies and ethnic cleansing against Palestinians, 
through resolutions by the UN General Assembly (Prashad 2008, p. 102-103). As stated 
12 Orford analyses in detail (and criticises) Dag Hammarskjöld (the second UN secretary-general) ideals 
for a technical and neutral role by the UN, aiming to address the political situation of decolonised 
countries, for which he possibly paid with his life, as his death, in a plane crash, is investigated up to the 
present (Rick Gladstone, ‘U.N. Renews Push to Solve Its Biggest Mystery: Hammarskjold’s Death’, 
March 27, 2018, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/africa/un-
hammarskjold-death.html).   
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by Prashad: ‘…the United Nations provided a  crucial forum for the Third World to 
raise issues of colonial barbarity and use the General  Assembly  as  the medium  to 
broadcast  previously  hidden atrocities before the world’ (Prashad 2008, p. 103). The 
author also mentions the work developed by UNESCO against racism and 
ethnocentrism, with the participation of intellectuals such as Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(Prashad 2008, p. 6). During this period, a number of Third World countries embraced 
an ‘ecumenical’ cultural position and progressive political and economic ideas, as hopes 
for a world free from the scourge of colonialism inspired the struggle of peoples all over 
the world (Prashad 2008, p. 163-164).  
The capacity of the United Nations to deal with the situations emerging from the 
process of decolonisation, and consolidation of the political model of Nation-state was, 
and is, nonetheless, very limited, and its decisions and actions were and are, of course, 
highly influenced by political dynamics and interests (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Falk 
2004). The international organisation neither could counter the wide negative 
consequences of the Cold War geopolitics for the Third World (Dubois 2012, p. 334-
335, Hobsbawm 1998, Prashad 2007, Power 2013, Robinson 2017, Trouillot 1990, p. 
211-220), as illustrated by extreme cases such as of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and more indirectly, Indonesia) and Central America (notably Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala and Nicaragua).  
The level of direct and structural violence these processes entailed has probably 
no precedent in history, with the disruption of social, economic, political and cultural 
systems which started from colonialism (Davis 2002; Fanthorpe 2001; Mann 2005), and 
continued with the consolidation of Nation-state as hegemonic political model, making 
the twentieth century a bloody period (Mann 2005; Power 2013), not only for the two 
world wars, but also because of colonialism, the struggles and wars for independence, 
and these deep and wide transformations all over the globe.  
The way different places, countries and regions underwent such deep and 
structural chances greatly varies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), but from a macro 
perspective, massive dispossession and disenfranchisement of large populations, the rise 
and support of predatory elites and ethnic and religious conflict are main factors present 
in most countries that experienced conflicts and authoritarian regimes during this 
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troubled period (Autesserre 2010; Dubois 2012; Hobsbawm 1998; Kapoor 2008; 
Prashad 2008; Trouillot 1990; Veit 2010). 
At the same time, according to official data, in the last decades, overall, there 
has been an improvement in standards such as life expectancy13 and literacy,14 with 
decrease of infant15 and maternal mortality (WHO, UNICEF 2012) and extreme 
poverty.16 There is room for debate concerning these data, on how such indicators are 
measured, with contradictions that per se indicate serious problems, such as the rise in 
the number of malnourished people concomitant to the decrease of people living in 
extreme poverty. These contradictions are at the heart of the question of the benefits 
versus damage brought by modernisation, and of the winners and losers of the global 
economic system, for which climate change and ecological collapse are, today, the main 
questions posed (Levene and Conversi 2014). Foucault’s quote at the beginning of the 
chapter somehow elucidates the direct and structural violence mentioned above, as well 
as these seeming paradoxes.17  
In this context, the development of international norms and institutions, that is, 
mechanisms of global governance, also implies deep contradictions and conflicts. As a 
step forward from the Westphalian system, aiming to avoid the great dangers of 
international confrontations with the advance of technology and nuclear power, and to 
address the countless problems and risks of technological development and the social, 
economic and political transformations engendered with globalisation (Beck 1992), one 
can actually reason that it is impossible to imagine today’s world without these 
13 The World Bank, Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.  
14 The World Bank, Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS  
15 Unicef, The under-five mortality rate has fallen by more than half since 1990 
https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-five-mortality/  
16 The World Bank, Poverty & Equity Data Portal http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/home/; The 
report ‘Rethinking Poverty - Report on the World Social Situation 2010’, of the UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs reports an overall decline on the levels of poverty and extreme poverty 
(2009: 14), but an increase in the number of undernourished people from 1990 to 2008.  
17 I am presenting a macro analysis here aiming to bring a general historical background that is related 
with the theoretical discussion, and important to my perspective concerning the case study and the 
comparative analysis, but it is not my goal to go in depth in macro and quantitative data on conflicts, 
poverty and political regimes (that certainly present fundamental research topics). Cases like Afghanistan, 
DR Cong and Haiti may be outliers in this macro dimension, with the continuation of violent conflict and 
chronic political instability, which certainly compromised the improvement of human development 
indicators in these countries. I believe Foucault’s quote still make sense in this macro perspective, since a 
considerable number of postcolonial countries experienced the rise of neopatrimonial politics, civil 
conflict and authoritarian regimes, and at the same time somehow benefited from, so to say, the 
advantages of modernity.  
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international mechanisms. At the same time, the dangers entailed with their 
development, bureaucratisation, power concentration and authoritarian inclinations were 
already evidenced (Orford 2011), markedly concerning developing and postcolonial 
countries, targets of most international policies and interventions to ensure 
‘international peace and security’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  
International institutions end up actually reinforcing the structural power of 
hegemonic countries (Barnett and Duval 2005), as these institutions reflect existing 
power imbalances, the most obvious example being the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). But at the same time, the UN offers political spaces and normative 
tools for the less powerful people, beyond enabling multilateral cooperation to tackle 
problems such as climate change, for which poor countries are more vulnerable than the 
rich ones – it creates spaces to address the injustice of climate change (Klein 2014, 
Levene and Conversi 2014), where the voices of small countries mostly affected by it 
can be, at least, heard. Theoretically speaking, if moving, somehow, beyond the 
condition of bellum omnium contra omnes means moving beyond the law of the 
strongest, the less powerful countries would have advantages with the development of 
international norms and global governance mechanisms. As we shall see, nonetheless, 
this is not always the case.  
I suggest that this tension between the advancement of norms and rights and the 
reinforcement of the structural power of dominant actors in the international arena is 
similar or analogous to the progress of democratic regimes domestically. What is named 
in the literature as ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam 2011; 
Chandler 2006; Mac Ginty 2010) reflects the questions, tensions and contradictions of 
liberal democracy, the model once praised as the peak of human social, economic and 
political organisation, with the famous Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis.18  
There are foundational problems which pertain to the domestic as much as the 
international level, although with different characteristics, dynamics and factors 
involved. There is no room here to go in depth on the debates around liberal democracy 
and its crisis (or not, as some may argue). My aim is to develop a theoretical discussion 
18 That Francis Fukuyama himself seems to have reviewed (See: Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of 
History, Louis Menand, 27 August 2018, The New Yorker 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/03/francis-fukuyama-postpones-the-end-of-history, 
Accessed on 06 April 2019).  
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that is relevant for the investigation of countries with which we are concerned here, as 
well as to reflect on the normative and institutional development at the international 
level and its implications for these countries. Besides, existing literature on state and 
peacebuilding has already presented the ideas and principles of deliberative democracy 
(Hancock 2018) and republican democracy (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2012a, 2012b; 
Barma 2017; Barnett 2006) as alternative to the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and the 
dilemmas and conundrums this model entails, with its emphasis on institution building 
detached from society, as analysed in the last section of this chapter. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, UN peace operations were deployed 
in a geopolitical context where the process of decolonisation met the interests of the two 
poles of power, United States and USSR (Hobsbawm 1998), although European 
countries were often active to defend their interests, such as the bloody war France 
waged against Algerians in their process of independence (Fanon 1963), in the case of 
the Suez crisis and Congo, the latter also subject to US interference, not exactly in 
favour of Congo (Orford 2011). The neutral, impartial and professional support of an 
international civil and bureaucratic apparatus to assist the process of rationalisation and 
state formation in developing and postcolonial countries proved to be a hard task from 
the beginning (Orford 2011), as already mentioned, and in the years to come.  
After the end of the Cold War, the ambitions of UN peace operations widened, 
with the development of the concept of ‘human security’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992) with 
which security issues were integrated with development, good governance and 
democratisation, as underdevelopment and political instability were pointed as sources 
of violent conflict and threats to international peace and stability (Duffield 2001). As we 
shall see with the case study and the comparative analysis, nonetheless, as much as 
these discourses are grounded on the realities of conflict and violence in developing and 
postcolonial societies, the policies and practices derived from them have often harmful 
consequences for societies affected, contributing for the reproduction of the very 
conditions that lead to the reproduction of violence and political instability (Barma 
2017, Shah 2009, Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009; Parra 2019).  
At the same time that global governance mechanisms for peace and security 
progressed, as well as international law, with the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the neoliberal hegemony and austerity brought important 
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setbacks for most developing countries (Bayart and Ellis 2000; Evans 1992; Fanthorpe 
2001; Mbembe 2012; Prashad 2008); such setbacks also reflected at the UN as a 
political space for the less powerful countries (Prashad 2008), and the international 
organisation did not progress in ways to cope with the consequences of austerity, 
marketization and the increasing power of transnational corporations.19  
The flow of resources to authoritarian regimes from the contesting powers of the 
Cold War ceased in this period. Nonetheless, many developing countries experienced 
troubled political transitions and civil conflict, often characterised by much more 
complex conditions (Duffield 2001), as well as complicated regional and global 
political-economic webs, where the extraction of resources, drug trafficking and other 
criminal activities (Autesserre 2010; Barma 2012; 2017; Cockayne 2009, 2014; Sharan 
and Bose 2018) filled the void of external aid of the Cold War.  
This background characterised most of the UN peace operations deployed in this 
period – while their ambitions increased, the conditions on the ground got often even 
more complex or ‘intractable’ (Mitchell 2018). UN peace operations and 
humanitarianism in general were in face of even more challenges and dilemmas 
(Duffield 2001; Ferris 2011; Paris and Sisk 2009). 
In the area of international peace and security, the Report of The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’, launched in 2001, aiming to bring clarifications to international norms and 
their application, in face of the constant use of the humanitarian discourse for military 
interventions - a kind of proposition to regulate this aspect of international law - 
resonated very little in the following years, the intervention in Libya in 2011 being a 
paradigmatic example, as it bypassed fundamental points of the ICISS document, 
notably concerning regime change (Payandeh 2011) and destruction of civilian 
infrastructure.20 
The intervention in Libya, approved by the UNSC, demonstrated that not only 
unilateral and aggressive foreign policies like George W. Bush administration (Barnett 
                                                          
19 Attempts to develop mechanisms of monitoring and accountability for transnational corporations 
internationally have not been very successful, with backlashes by these corporations and governments 
(see Feeney 2009). 
20 ‘In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll,’The New York Times, 17 December 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-
libya.html.  
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and Duval 2005; Falk 2013), with the invasion of Iraq, pose a threat to regional and 
global stability, but that interventions supported by international law can also have the 
same effect (Barnett and Duval 2005; Falk 2013). The UN intervention in Haiti seven 
years earlier, despite not having the same proportion and regional impact as in the case 
of Libya, also demonstrates, as further analysed, that global governance mechanisms for 
peace and security are not exempted of the influence of hegemonic politics, despite the 
increasing divergence among the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council.  
This last factor and the rise of populism and more isolationist policies may 
decrease the number of international interventions in developing and postcolonial 
countries  (O’Byrne 2019). The long-term effects of colonialism, of the structural 
changes brought by the predominance of the Nation-state, globalisation and 
marketization, the years of Cold War geopolitics and continuous external 
interventionism will be felt, nonetheless, in the decades to come in several developing 
and postcolonial countries affected by violent conflict and chronic political instability, 
whatever changes occur among the most powerful and wealthy countries. As pointed by 
Mbembe:  
New forms of social apartheid and structural destitution have replaced the old colonial 
divisions. As a result of global processes of accumulation by dispossession, deep inequities are 
being entrenched by an ever more brutal economic system. The ability of many to remain 
masters of their own lives is once again tested to the limits. The question of self-determination 
has perhaps changed face, but it continues to be posed in terms that are as fundamental as those 
in Fanon’s time (Mbembe 2012, 26).  
2.2. Political legitimacy – rethinking the concept and its need for contextualisation 
in the postcolony  
The prevalent social and political conditions in postcolonial countries, especially 
those heavily influenced by foreign actors and international regimes, which we can 
consider, as already mentioned, international states (Schlichte 2017), and especially 
those affected by violent conflict, chronic political instability and international 
interventions, bring us puzzling questions for which prevailing conceptualisations on 
political legitimacy need to be critically revised. This section presents what I consider 
critical questions to consider while investigating political legitimacy in these contexts, 
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analysing how existing concepts need to be critically reviewed so as we can cope with 
the complex realities on the ground in these countries.  
Before presenting these critical questions, I present some considerations 
concerning political legitimacy in postcolonial societies, establishing basic assumptions 
with which we can work throughout the next sections.  
First, as I work with the concept of political legitimacy, I understand that 
individuals not only make self-interested calculations and respond to the threat and the 
use of violence, but are also moral agents, embedded in social contexts where certain 
rules prevail, certain behaviours are accepted while others condemned. Individuals 
“recognise the validity of rules, have some notion of a common interest, and 
acknowledge the binding force of promises they have made - all elements involved in 
legitimate power” (Beetham 2013, 27). In this sense, according to Beetham, 
consolidated and stable political regimes constitute a system of domination where the 
exercise of political power is considered appropriate according to the prevalent system 
of beliefs among its subjects (Beetham 2013). For him, so called realist theories of 
power fail to grasp this fundamental immaterial dimension of power, for which they fail 
to explain disruptive events such as the demise of the Soviet Union (Beetham 2013, p. 
28). 
Taking Beetham’s assumption to investigate postcolonial countries, especially 
those affected by chronic crisis, political instability and violent conflict, entails take into 
consideration that the social and cultural infrastructures in these societies (that is, their 
prevalent system of beliefs) have been often deeply damaged by the processes of 
colonisation, slavery, military occupation, sponsorship of dictatorships during the Cold 
War, as well as more recent forms of foreign interventionism. This is not to deny the 
ability of these societies to resist such processes, as well as reconstruct and recreate 
their cultural and social infrastructures. Also, one may argue that most societies in the 
world and their systems of beliefs have been affected, in different levels, by 
globalisation and its effects (Castells 2006), and that culture and tradition is something 
dynamic and change over time in all societies.  
In cases of postcolonial societies affected by chronic political instability and 
violence with which we are concerned, nonetheless, the violence and extreme material 
inequalities that marked these exchanges with foreign actors made such impact on local 
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social and cultural infrastructures much more destructive and detrimental to social 
cohesion, as well as for local capacities to act politically and collectively (Mbembe 
2001, 2003, 2018).  
For Weber, similarly, more than mere coercion and immediate self-interested 
calculations are required so systems of domination can exist and endure over time 
(Weber 1978; Schlichte 2018). He analysed the transformations in Western social and 
political institutions based on tradition and religion, to the process of modernisation 
through rationalisation, with the progress of capitalism and the development of state 
institutions. In postcolonial societies, on the other hand, traditional political systems 
have often been eroded by the processes of colonisation and slavery (Mbembe 2001, 
2003). Many of these peoples were incorporated into modernity in a subaltern position, 
under much less favourable conditions comparing to the Western world, that is to say, 
they were less equipped to encounter this process of modernisation and to take 
advantage from it (Kapoor 2008; Prashad 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).  
In this respect, Beetham brings yet another reflection that is especially 
instrumental to investigate the realities with which we are concerned here: unequal 
power structures create favourable conditions for their own legitimation, facilitating 
their reproduction and maintenance (Beetham 2013). This aspect of the legitimation of 
power and its endurance over time is fundamental to understand domination and 
legitimation of unequal power structures not only domestically, but also in the 
international arena. Unequal power relations in societies create, for instance, deep 
educational inequalities and, consequently, deep inequalities in the capacity to occupy 
positions of power. Those with power, in this sense, can claim they occupy power 
positions because they are more apt to do so. It is easy to see how such process has 
cumulative effects over time, as these inequalities grow through generations, to a point 
in which they may seem natural (Beetham 2013, 77).  
Furthermore, systems of domination work in such a way that for the common 
interest of society to be fulfilled, the particular interests of the dominant class need to be 
attended (Beetham 2013, 46-47). In the domestic dimension, these common interests are 
mainly economic development and opportunities, basic services such as health and 
education (when they are considered basic public services), infrastructure (transports, 
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telecommunications, cities’ administration, etc.) and technological development in all 
domains.21  
In the international arena, poor countries maintain exchanges in very unequal 
terms and remain in a subaltern position to access, as it were, the benefits of modernity, 
and it is not an easy task to get out of this economic subaltern position, as demonstrated 
by the economist Ha-Joon Chang (2003). To be precise, local elites of less developed 
countries play a key role in the maintenance of such unequal relations and of their 
dependency, and even these societies are not merely passive in such process, developing 
coping mechanisms and strategies to extract benefits from external exchanges (Bayart 
and Ellis 2000). But it would not be wise to deny the unequal terms of such exchanges, 
which developed and reproduced over time not only with unequal levels of technical 
development, but also with considerable violence and coercion, as colonialism and 
slavery were main features of the world economy from the 16th to the middle of the 20th 
century. As educational inequalities within societies, economic and technological 
inequalities at the international level accumulate over time, turning the task of catching-
up with those ahead a very hard one, even more if one follows the liberal prescriptions 
(Chang 2003). 
Having emphasised the importance of systems of values and the immaterial 
dimension of systems of domination, as well as how unequal power structures create 
conditions for their own legitimation and, consequently, for their endurance over time, 
we now turn to puzzling questions that emerge while investigating the question of 
political legitimacy in the contexts concerned here, with which we can critically assess 
assumptions around legitimacy, power and domination.  
2.2.1. How civil conflict and chronic instability constrain and shape individuals’ 
choices and behaviour? 
How decentralised violence, widespread insecurity and unpredictability, 
prevalent in Haiti and other countries, influence individuals’ behaviour, as well as their 
ability to contest power and authority and act politically? 
                                                          
11 The development and delivery of these public goods are highly influenced by the systems of 
domination in question, and some countries, of course, progressed more than others in the socialisation 
and distribution of these goods. 
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This critical question to investigate Haiti, as well as other countries affected by 
similar conditions, is not often taken into account on the existing literature on 
international interventions and their relation with local political actors and local 
populations. It is, nonetheless, a fundamental one to understand how chronic political 
instability, economic stagnation and violence reproduce or evolve over time, while 
sustainable peacebuilding, peacebuilding and democratisation remain elusive.  
Contexts of widespread violence, insecurity and unpredictability impose 
different kinds of constraints to individuals’ agency and choices available comparing to 
contexts of civil order, especially in cases where these conditions have become chronic, 
such as in the case of Haiti, and also DR Congo and Afghanistan. Individuals often need 
to find strategies of survival and coexistence with armed groups, for instance, even if 
they do not necessarily support these groups (Beckett 2019; Braum 2014; Hancock 
2018; Masullo 2018). They may need to choose to support a ‘less evil,’ or less predatory 
and more predictable group, such as in the case of Afghanistan, where villagers fall 
under protection of the Taliban, which has a less predatory behaviour, allowing them to 
keep their share of formal or informal economies, comparing to strongmen and violent 
entrepreneurs with more predatory behaviour (Sharan and Bose 2018).  
In Haiti, in turn, individuals may cooperate with urban armed groups, who 
charge, for instance, street vendors (Braum 2014), without necessarily agreeing or 
supporting them by their free will. Recently, communities in Colombia who 
experienced the end of FARC present a telling example in this sense: some individuals 
reported they ‘missed’ when FARC controlled their territories, since at that time at least 
they knew what to expect – there were curfews, limits of where they could sell their 
products, etc., but now they are facing security threats from diverse sources, with 
criminal and decentralised violence, and their daily life became much harder with such 
unpredictability (Masullo 2017).22  
In this sense, Popitz thesis of basic legitimacy (2017) is instrumental so we can 
understand the implications of these constraints to individuals’ behaviour for the social 
and political configurations present in these contexts. Although the author develops it 
22 See also: Special Report: A fractured peace – violent rivals rush into FARC void in Colombia, Reuters, 
26 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-special-report/special-report-a-
fractured-peace-violent-rivals-rush-into-farc-void-in-colombia-idUSKBN1HX2BD, Accessed on 07 April 
2019. 
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considering contexts of stable political regimes, I argue that it can also be crucial to 
understand contexts of civil conflict, violent contestation and chronic political 
instability. According to him:  
The power system of the institutional group we are considering will attain recognition if it 
affords order over a longer stretch of time, or more precisely if continuity and order can 
maintain their significance in shaping consciousness. In this context, affording order must 
mean in the first place to afford the security of order. Those involved are assured of order 
when they can safely know what they and what others are allowed to do, and must do; 
when they attain a certainty that all those involved can be fairly reliably expected to 
actually behave in the way they are expected to do; when they can count on transgressions 
being as a rule punished;  when  they  can  foresee  what  one must  do  in  order  to  gain 
advantages, to obtain recognition. In one word, one must know how to conduct oneself. 
Now, security of order so understood can also obviously be attained in a despotic regime. It 
can be perfectly associated with oppression and exploitation. The credit enjoyed by 
energetic, all-present power centers is usually indeed grounded exactly in the fact that they 
have “made order” and maintain it (Popitz 2017, p 158-159).  
The author emphasises, in this sense, the value of order certain authority creates, 
something that is reinforced over time with the stability of the regime (Popitz 2017, 
187-188).
Contexts of civil conflict and chronic political instability present very different 
conditions comparing to contexts of civil order, under democratic or despotic regimes. 
It is reasonable to extrapolate, nonetheless, Popitz argumentation to the former contexts, 
as individuals may seek, in these situations, to support groups that bring more 
predictability and security in their daily lives. Besides, such choice may be influenced 
by factors such as identity, ethnicity, religion and social class, for instance. The Taliban 
in Afghanistan, for instance, somehow represents a group that suffered political 
exclusion, the Pashtuns, and claim representing a pure version of the Islam, something 
that may influence the social support they still have.23 Urban armed groups in Port-au-
Prince, in turn, often claim to represent the ‘ghetto,’ territories that suffer extreme social 
exclusion, and work for their interests (Braum 2014). In any case, under very 
constrained circumstances, as individuals need to choose between two (or more) evils, it 
23 As a research have shown that villagers preferred traditional forms of conflict resolution (Braithwaite 
and Wardak 2013b, 205-207) over the Taliban, it is important to put into perspective the social support 
they still may hold, again, taking into account the severe constraints decentralised and widespread 
violence, as well as dispossession and disenfranchisement, impose to individuals.  
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is reasonable to assume they will choose the one which brings at least a feeling of 
predictability and security to their daily lives.  
The concept of basic legitimacy is instrumental, in this sense, so we can 
understand why individuals collaborate, support or acquiesce to one part of the conflict 
and not other(s), and why armed groups are able to hold power over certain territories 
and populations. The Taliban is again an illustrative case, as the group was able to rise 
to power in the midst of the bloody Afghan Civil War in the 1990’s, as it represented 
the possibility of re-establishing some level of order and security, in the midst of an 
anarchical violence, with the proliferation of violent entrepreneurs , as analysed in 
Chapter 4.  
It is also instrumental to understand, in this sense, why in contexts of chronic 
political instability, decentralised violence and widespread insecurity and instability, 
such as in Haiti, individuals may express opinions in favour of authoritarian political 
orders (as further analysed in Chapter 3). In face of widespread insecurity and 
unpredictability, individuals may want to re-establish some sense of order and security, 
even if past authoritarian regimes have perpetrated massive human rights violations, 
arbitrary violence and been actually responsible for the present conditions of insecurity.  
Finally, extrapolating the concept of basic legitimacy to situations of chronic 
political instability and widespread insecurity helps us understand why social cohesion, 
trust and political agency are jeopardised in these situations, as they lead individuals to 
be more prone to security-driven behaviour. Social cohesion, trust and political agency 
are corroded and undermined by chronic instability and widespread insecurity, 
something that feeds a vicious circle, as individuals have less and less capacity to 
change the circumstances around them the more these situations endure over time. 
2.2.2. Legitimacy and human agency under chronic instability and civil conflict 
The question of individuals’ agency is a fundamental one in the study of political 
legitimacy and power legitimation, not only from a normative but also empirical 
perspective, since it is a relevant factor for the shaping of political systems. 
Nonetheless, it received little attention in the literature on international interventions 
and peace-and-statebuilding. In the contexts with which we are concerned here, 
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individuals’ agency is not only constrained by violent conflict and chronic instability, 
but also massive disenfranchisement, social and economic exclusion.  
In this sense, Spivak seminal article ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ which generated 
important and heat debates after its publication,24 brings important insights concerning 
our question around political legitimacy, consent and individuals’ agency. Spivak 
described the ‘subaltern’ as those individuals ‘removed from all lines of social mobility,’ 
individuals without a proper identity and a social space where they can act, make 
difference, fundamentally, have their voices heard (Spivak 2012, p. 430). Structures of 
power and domination that reproduce over time can lead excluded groups of individuals 
to such situation where they are, in practice, unable raise their voices and articulate their 
interests. Spivak mentions Marx’s Eighteenth of Brumaire, where Marx comments on 
French peasants as a class unable to represent their own interests, as well as Gramsci 
considerations on poverty in the south of Italy (Spivak 2012, p. 431-433). 
In several postcolonial countries affected by violence and chronic political 
instability, the majority of the population fit Spivak’s definition – certainly in the case 
of Haiti, as further demonstrated, something that has fundamental political implications 
for these societies and the possibility of sustainable political change.  
From a normative perspective, legitimate political authority implies that 
individuals have the ability to consent to it, to its decisions and actions taken in their 
name (Canovan 1994, 185; Pitkin 1966a, 1966b; Pettit 2002). For it, there must be 
mechanisms and procedures that ensure that subjects can have a say on these decisions 
and actions, as well as to ensure that this political authority is accountable to them – 
what we can call procedural legitimacy (Hancock 2018; Whalan 2013).  
Although there is no room here to fully develop the theoretical or philosophical 
debate around individuals’ agency and ability to consent,25 I believe it is reasonable to 
assume that: a) in the presence of massive disenfranchisement, social, economic and 
political exclusion, especially with considerable rates of extreme poverty (marked by a 
hand-to-mouth existence), individuals’ agency, in the broad sense of human agency 
(including political), is deeply undermined; b) in the absence of institutional 
mechanisms to ensure procedural legitimacy, which provide individuals with the 
                                                          
24 See: Morris 2010; and it stills generate, see: Darder and Griffiths 2018; Faist 2018; Jain 2018.  
25 See, for instance: Pettit 2002.  
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opportunity to have a say on decisions that affect their lives and to hold authorities 
accountable, their political agency is hindered; c) the ability of individuals to consent to 
political authority and hold it accountable depends on their level of agency. In this 
sense, although there might be an extensive philosophical and metaphysical debate 
about agency, we are more concerned here with the very practical and visible reality 
that massive disenfranchisement and dispossession, as well as chronic instability and 
insecurity, impose severe constraints on individuals’ agency.   
Having these, so to say, pragmatic assumptions concerning political consent and 
agency, we turn to the question of how these questions have not only normative but also 
empirical implications.  
The connection between a political order’s legitimacy – if it stands and works in 
accordance with prevalent values and beliefs – and its stability is well established in 
political science (Beetham 2013); or in Weberian terms, the difference between power 
and domination (Schlichte 2018), that is, an institutionalised system of power that is 
connected with social norms and beliefs and endures over time. One may rightfully 
argue that the legitimation of political authorities may come not from the idea of 
consent as established by democratic theorists, but from tradition (religious or 
otherwise), as indeed many, if not most, of the political systems worked throughout 
history (Beetham 2013).26  
Nonetheless, postcolonial countries affected by chronic political instability and 
violent conflict, as we have seen, often had their social institutions and cultural 
infrastructures deeply fractured by processes of colonisation, slavery, military 
occupations, external sponsorship of dictatorships during the Cold War, as well as more 
recent versions of foreign and international interventionism (Mbembe 2003, 2012). The 
next chapter details how this process of deterioration happened in the case of Haiti, and 
how it has been a key factor for the reproduction of violent conflict and chronic political 
instability in the country.  
In this sense, I argue that it is hard to talk about political stability – that is, 
institutionalised and legitimate political order – without referring to the discussion of 
26 Indigenous societies were, and are, often characterised by more egalitarian social and political 
structures (see, for instance: Clastres 1989). Although there is no room here to further develop this debate, 
it is worth mentioning it so we can avoid a Eurocentric historical perspective.  
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the development of more inclusive political institutions in the contexts with which we 
are concerned here.  
It is not my goal to ‘force others to be free,’ neither to develop the debate around 
the universality and desirability of democracy, as there is no room here for it.27 
Nonetheless, taking into account that economic and political exclusion and massive 
disenfranchisement are main factors on the equation for the reproduction of 
decentralised violence in these and other countries (Dolan 2009; Mbembe 2018; Urdal 
2006), the question of individuals’ agency, and legitimacy taking into account inclusive 
political models, seems unavoidable so we can talk about political stability. So my 
argument that individuals’ agency and consent have not only normative but also 
empirical implications in these contexts. Next section, which considers the question of 
violence, brings further elements that we need to take into account on this equation.  
Hancock’s analysis of local peacebuilding and legitimacy may help us further 
clarify these considerations. On the chapter  ‘Legitimate agents of peacebuilding – 
Deliberative governance in zones of peace’ (2018), he points that locally driven 
peacebuilding efforts that include public participation, procedural justice and 
accountability (tenets of deliberative democracy) can engender and build spaces for 
individuals’ agency, enabling legitimate processes and turning productive peacebuilding 
possible. The author examines three case studies of ‘Zones of Peace,’ in Colombia, 
Philippines and El Salvador, arguing that local agency has been a key element for the 
positive outcomes achieved in these cases.  
On the other hand, if a significant part of populations affected have opinions in 
favour of authoritarian regimes, or in favour of institutions that were historically 
destructive to democracy and connected to or responsible for authoritarian regimes, 
such as in Haiti concerning the Haitian army,28 I emphasise the importance of 
understanding these opinions with socio-historical perspective, taking into account the 
considerations presented in the last chapter concerning how widespread and long-term 
insecurity affects individuals behaviour and choices, through the lenses of the concept 
of basic legitimacy.  
                                                          
27 The perspective adopted here is in accordance with the literature that points to the virtuous circle of 
inclusive political institutions, social and economic development and prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; Olson 1993; Sen 2000; Weingast 1997). To fully develop this point would require, nonetheless, 
further analytical steps, for which there is no room here.  
28 As further detailed and analysed in Chapter 3.   
62 
 
Simplistic interpretations around individuals behaviour and opinions in these 
contexts, without careful consideration of the paths these societies underwent, their 
recent history of civil war, authoritarianism and failed transitions to democracy, which 
led to the reproduction of violent conflict and chronic political instability, can not only 
lead to inaccurate conclusions, but also to bad policy recommendations. Furthermore, 
individuals may also have ambiguous and idiosyncratic opinions concerning the ideal 
government and political authority in societies torn by conflict and political instability, 
something that should not be ignored or downplayed. In Haiti, the tension between 
hierarchy and egalitarianism is something well recognised in the sociology of and on the 
country (Dubois 2012; Smucker and White 1998; Trouillot 1990). This tension has 
endured over time, despite the authoritarian experiences and political turmoil 
experienced in the country (Braum 2014).   
Of course, in any case, the recovery of local social cohesion, of social and 
cultural infrastructures, may also be as important as the progress of more inclusive 
political institutions in these contexts, something the next two chapters take into 
consideration. The comparative analysis on Chapter 4 considers the cases of East Timor 
and Somaliland, in which autochthonous social institutions and cultural infrastructures 
survived the process of colonisation for a series of factors, something that played a key 
role for more productive and sustainable processes of peace and statebuilding in these 
countries. In cases where colonialism, slavery and foreign interventionism had a more 
destructive effect, nonetheless, nationalist and ethnic discourses often carry fundamental 
problems, with the danger of being manipulated by local elites for the perpetuation of 
their predatory and exclusionary politics.  
In this respect, Prashad have pointed that the ‘ecumenical’ cultural position and 
progressive political and economic ideas characteristic of Third World countries’ 
politics with the struggles for independence have in several places been replaced by 
chauvinistic and religious fundamentalist movements, after the failure of these 
movements to bring about the emancipation, social and economic development they 
professed (Prashad 2008).  
The author’s warning against this dangerous path is fundamental to take into 
consideration in the contexts with which we are concerned, as ethnic and nationalist 
discourses are often instrumentalized by local actors to maintain their predatory politics 
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(Autesserre 2010; Bayart and Ellis 2000; Veit 2010), including while they extract 
benefits from exchanges with foreign and international actors and deepen exploitation 
and exclusion and dispossession internally, imperialist in their discourses (often when it 
concerns human rights). This is not strange to Haiti and DR Congo, where regimes had 
strong ethnic and nationalist discourses, despite the fact that they depended on external 
sponsorship to survive (Autesserre 2010; Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990).  
I sought to introduce here, in this sense, how the question of agency needs to be 
better taken into account in the field of international interventions and peace-and-
statebuilding, as it is a fundamental dimension for theoretical and normative, as well as 
empirical investigation.  
Individuals from the lower strata of the countries with which we are concerned 
have very limited conditions of agency, often struggling to access basic livelihoods, as 
well as to keep, build and maintain a sense of community, cultural activities, political 
engagement. They face extremely challenging conditions and hardship for it, in contexts 
that impede the fulfilment of these basic human needs, leading to a feeling of frustration 
– or in Haitian creole, fristrasyon (Braum 2019), which, as we will see, is the triggering
element for the development and engagement in violent behaviour, which becomes a 
mean to retake some level of agency, of power to change one’s own circumstances and 
affirm his will and presence in the world (Braum 2019; Fanthorpe 2001).  
2.2.3. Power, violence and legitimacy – between contestation and maintenance of 
the status quo and reproduction of violent conflict  
The differentiation established by Hannah Arendt (1970) between power and 
violence is enlightening concerning the limits of the use of force to ensure obedience 
and compliance, as well as a mean to contest established power holders and, even more, 
to build new political orders (Arendt 1970; 2006). Arendt proposes that power and 
violence actually oppose each other, as power holders need to recur to violence when 
their subjects don’t comply with their orders. For Arendt, power and action are only 
enacted collectively, and such enactment requires individuals’ coordination and 
cooperation, collective and concerted enterprise, for which violent means are 
detrimental by definition.  
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She criticises authors such as Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon, who emphasised 
violence as an essential element for political action and change, and as basis for the 
bonding among individuals for political action. For her, as much as violence is indeed a 
powerful element that unites people for a common purpose, the kind of fraternal bond it 
creates is detrimental for more long term political action and organisation, especially 
beyond revolutionary periods (Arendt 2006).  
Her considerations on violence bring fundamental insights for the contemporary 
world, as violence in postcolonial and developing countries, result of socio-historical 
processes that are further analysed in the thesis, turned out to be one of the factors that 
hinder political action and transformation in these contexts (Mbembe 2003, 2012, 
2018).  
In this sense, to understand the limits of the use of violence for political power is 
essential for the investigation of systems of domination, their reproduction or 
disruption, as well as, on the other hand, why subaltern groups fail to build political 
alternatives and resist to systems of domination. 
This understanding of power and violence as opposite phenomena, arguably, is 
not strange for political thought. In Hobbes, the political space can only be established 
when individuals agree to give up their ‘right’ to use violence, receiving in return the 
protection by the commonwealth against the violence of their fellow humans. For 
Hobbes, in his allegorical state of nature, when violence is widespread and unlimited, 
human beings are hopeless and powerless creatures, always fearful of being murdered.  
In the Weberian political sociology, in turn, violence can only have effect in a 
context of political domination, that is, it can only work as a coercive mean to guarantee 
subjects’ compliance if it is in a context where a set of factors are present and ensure 
coherence and the reproduction of this system of domination, with the three ideal types 
of authority representing different bases for this domination – traditional, charismatic or 
rational-legal (Weber 1978). The classical Weberian definition of the modern state, by 
the monopoly of the use of legitimate violence it detains in a certain territory, entails, in 
this sense, that the state eventual use of violence relies on its legitimate authority to 
have the expected effect over its subjects.  
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In this way, violence is indeed a fundamental element in politics, in the internal 
affairs of a political community and for its protection against external threats; but it is 
an element that requires limitation so political power can have effect, and so political 
action – and human action in general – can become possible (Arendt 1970; Olson 1993). 
And it is indeed an element often present (and, for some authors and political actors and 
groups, needed) in processes of political change – and here lies a fundamental trouble of 
global governance mechanisms for the maintenance of peace, stability and for the 
protection of humanitarian principles, as one may argue that they can systematically 
work to obstruct political change.  
Although this is a fundamental question, already raised in the literature (Orford 
2011), it is a very complex one, especially in the contemporary world. Most 
contemporary internal conflicts are heavily influenced by external actors, by regional 
and global geopolitics and political economies (Schlichte 2018, p. 56). Groups with less 
power and resources often need to recur to external sponsors to counterbalance other 
foreign interests, and political change can easily spill out of control of actors involved, 
as demonstrated by the case of Syria today (Saleh 2017).  
As further analysed in this chapter, during the Cold War, this external 
interference was determinant for several postcolonial and developing countries, during 
the crucial period of independence and foundation of newly independent states. In the 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, the first UN intervention in the 
country was deployed by request of the then Prime Minister and leader of the 
independence Patrice Lumumba, to support the recently independent nation to resist the 
interference of Belgium. Beyond the occupation of Congo by Belgian troops, the former 
colonial master was supporting separatist and other groups against Lumumba (Orford 
2010).  
Although Orford recollect these historical facts, the author’s conclusion – that 
political change should be at the hands of people affected, instead of global governance 
mechanisms and international interventions – seems to ignore the fact that the fate of the 
Congolese people was taken off their hands to begin with, through a long process 
starting from colonialism and its brutal violence, in which the terms of the relation 
between colonisers and colonised were marked by a large economic and technological 
inequality. 
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This episode illustrates the complexity of the relation between violence and 
political change in contemporary world, where globalisation, interdependence and an 
immense economic and technological inequality require that the analysis of social and 
political change take into account how different arenas interact and intertwine, in some 
cases generating the perpetuation of crisis, political instability, violent conflict and 
economic stagnation. 
Besides, if the threat and the use of violence for the assertion of political 
authority and the enforcement of its norms need to be legitimate and limited in the 
logics of the system of domination in question to achieve the expected results, it is 
reasonable to expect that the systematic use of indiscriminate violence, that is, beyond 
what is validated by the norms and prevalent system of beliefs, will erode political 
authority and undermine it in the long term.29  
There are actually cases where regimes make use of indiscriminate violence and 
are still able to endure over a considerable period of time. In the seminal article ‘The 
Full Weight of State,’ Herreros (2006) analyses the case of the ‘Great Terror’ campaign 
in the Soviet Union between 1937-38, arguing that when states are able to make 
indiscriminate violence appear as legal, it can actually be effective to ensure obedience 
to the regime. In this case, people not only accepted the repressive campaign that made 
extensive use of indiscriminate violence (over 1.565.000 people were arrested, and 
about 700.000 executed) but many people also actively participated in the campaign and 
praised it, since its stated purpose was to protect them against the ‘enemies of the 
people’ (Herreros 2006, p. 681).  
If states have the possibility of making indiscriminate violence appear as legal, 
foreign interventions can hardly perform in a similar way. States count (of course, in 
different degrees) on consolidated systems of domination, on tradition, religion, 
ideologies and propaganda machines, on narratives of glorious past and of a common 
destiny; they can choose enemies to blame for their failures and use ideologies or 
nationalist discourses to justify the use of indiscriminate violence. Foreign and 
international interventions, on the other hand, face, to begin with, a natural resentment 
29 In this respect, existing literature on civil wars already pointed to the counterproductive effects of the 
use of arbitrary violence in counterinsurgency campaigns (Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas 2006).  
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of local populations – even if when they are welcomed at the beginning, such support 
often erodes over time (Etcheson 2005; Paris and Sisk 2009).  
If an occupation force or a foreign intervention make use of indiscriminate 
violence, it is reasonable to expect that a reaction will be more regularly present and 
stronger, comparing to the use of indiscriminate violence by states. States with very 
superior material and technical power often confronted with difficulty rebel groups with 
less resources but with willing fighters, as indiscriminate violence has a decisive impact 
to strengthen insurgent groups (Goodwin 2001). Vietnam is the paradigmatic example 
in this sense, as the US bombardments only increased and strengthened the lines of the 
National Liberation Front (Goodwin 2001). In Cambodia, something similar happened, 
as the US campaign of bombardment in the country, one of the worst in history, was a 
fundamental element for the growing and rise of Khmer Rouge to power (Etcheson 
2005; Power 2013).  
Today, the use of indiscriminate violence has a similar effect in Afghanistan,30 
where the Taliban, being able to keep recruiting young and disenfranchised males, still 
controls an important part of the country’s territory.31 The fact that they were included 
in peace talks (despite their unpredictability)  attest the strength of the group,32 as the 
current government in the US is less willing to remain indefinitely engaged in wars. The 
case study of Haiti and the comparative analysis further develop the question of the use 
of indiscriminate violence by external interventions (and by the governments they 
support) and its consequences, further developing the differences between the use of 
indiscriminate violence in the context of external interventions and within states and 
political communities, that is, domestically.  
In sum, there are 3 dimensions concerning the phenomenon of violence that need 
to be taken into consideration in the study of countries affected by civil conflict, chronic 
political instability and international interventions: 1) violence as means to achieve 
social and political ends often end up being destructive for political change, contributing 
30 See, for instance: C.I.A.ʼs Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger, The New York Times, 31 
December 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/world/asia/cia-afghanistan-strike-force.html  
31 Afghan Government Control Over Country Falters, U.S. Report Says, The New York Times, 31 
January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-territory-
control.html; Why Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever, BBC News, 14 September 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45507560, Accessed on 16 May 2019.  
32 In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government, The New York Times, 4 February 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-russia-talks-russia.html, 
Accessed on 16 May 2019.  
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for the maintenance of the status quo instead of bringing about change; 2) states, and 
also insurgent armed groups (as demonstrated by the case of Taliban) can make use of 
arbitrary violence and even though ensure obedience or acquiescence by their subjects; 
3) it is reasonable to assume that foreign and international interventions’ use of arbitrary 
violence, on the other hand, will more often fuel counterinsurgency, and other sources 
of decentralised violence, than when it is used by domestic political actors.33 
2.2.4. Exchanges with external actors through dynamics of extraversion and its 
social and political effects  
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, many postcolonial and developing 
countries have their political spaces heavily influenced by foreign actors and 
international institutions and regimes, what Schlichte (2017) named as international 
states. We can say that the wider the dependency of developing countries on foreign aid, 
the more intense is the influence of these external actors within their domestic political 
spaces.  
In this sense, Bayart and Ellis’ analysis in the article ‘Africa in the World: A 
History of Extraversion’ is instrumental to understand not only political realities in 
Africa, but also elsewhere, certainly in Haiti, where, as further analysed in Chapter 3, 
local political actors and social actors in general relate with foreign actors so as to 
extract benefits from this interaction, even if these exchanges are marked by power 
inequalities. The authors named this behaviour as ‘strategies of extraversion’ (Bayart 
and Ellis 2000, 219) with which not only local elites seek to take advantage from 
unequal exchanges with foreign actors, aggravating inequalities, oppression and 
dispossession in these countries, but also populations concerned in general seek to 
extract benefits from these unequal power relations.  
These dynamics of exchange with the external world have fundamental 
consequences for the social and political reality in these societies, often being 
detrimental to social cohesion and the progress of political institutions, since the 
inclination to the extraction of benefits from external exchanges jeopardises the local 
economic development, as well as the accountability of state institutions and political 
authorities to their subjects. The wave of liberalisation and marketization in the 1980’s 
                                                          
33 The comparative analysis with the case of Afghanistan, on Chapter 4, brings evidence for this last 
point.  
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and 1990’s did not contribute to transform these dynamics that, we can say, produce 
vicious circles with the reproduction of dependency, economic stagnation and 
unaccountable and predatory political elites. As pointed by the authors:  
The same decade [1980] has, on the other hand, witnessed an exacerbation and a radicalization 
of strategies of extraversion as the failure of the structural adjustment programmes which have 
been in vogue since 1980 has become increasingly evident, and as this failure has destroyed the 
perspective of primitive capital accumulation through the extreme exploitation of local 
productive forces, most notably through labour. (Bayart and Ellis 2000).  
A similar process happened in Haiti in the 1990’s, with the continuous decline of 
the rural economy after the fall of Duvaliers’ regime, and increase of dependency on 
foreign aid, as analysed in Chapter 2.  
The political dynamics Bayart and Ellis helped elucidate are fundamental to take 
into account in contexts of societies affected by violent conflict and chronic political 
instability, not only concerning the behaviour and political dynamics already present in 
these contexts, but also those that international interventions end up reproducing or even 
creating. If international interventions create more space and opportunities for the 
reproduction of strategies of extraversion, they will fatally hinder the development of 
accountable and legitimate state institutions and democratic political equilibriums in 
these societies, no matter how many years and dollars they might spend with elections 
and technical support for the development of state institutions.  
What Bayart and Ellis called strategies of extraversion can be compared to what 
Mbembe named as conviviality (Mbembe 2001, 128), the coping mechanisms of 
individuals to deal with unequal power relations, to extract benefits from modernity 
despite the barriers and hardship, strategies of survival that reproduced from 
colonialism to the present, often for individuals to deal with direct or structural forms of 
violence.  
The dynamics of extraversion are at the core centre of the difficulty of these 
societies to achieve a political situation where wealth and the benefits of modernity, so 
to say, are more justly shared, where rules of the game can be established so as to turn 
possible more predictable and secure social and economic exchanges, so as violence 
ceases to be a mean to express one’s will and agency in the world. In this sense, what 
some characterise as ‘failed modernity’ is nothing but a way of accessing modernity 
without proper means to reach its more privileged positions.  
Although Bayart and Ellis emphasise the role and agency of local actors for the
reproduction of such unequal relations and de
already mentioned, the cumulative effects of power inequalities and systems of power,
with their capacity to create conditions for their own legitimation, making inequalities
built through historical processes seem
certainly elsewhere, individuals often recur to strategies of
means of survival. How foreign actors who are really willing to support these societies
can help to ‘break the moul
such long standing and negative political dynamics, is an important question, for which
this thesis aims to bring some insight.
In the two diagrams below, I summarise the major critical issues pres
this section for the study of political legitimacy and its implications in postcolonial,
developing countries affected by violent conflict, chronic political instability and
international interventions. We assume, as already mentioned, that legiti
order and political stability are dependent on the development of inclusive political
institutions, taking as reference existing literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Sen
2000; Olson 1993; Weingast 1997) and as argued in this section.
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In the international political realm, alternative power poles to the UNSC 
permanent members made political moves to bring alternative interpretations to the 
norm and avoid its misuse by the main hegemonic countries. In this sense, the meeting 
‘The Responsibility to Protect –– Views from South Africa, Brazil, India and Germany’, 
held in Pretoria in 2012, gathered high ranking representatives of the foreign ministries 
of these countries (Brosig et al, 2012), aiming to advance a more cautious and self-
restrained use of the concept. Brazil was a leading voice in this camp; Celso Amorim, 
Brazilian Foreign Minister during Lula’s administration, proposed an interpretation of 
the responsibility to protect as ‘non-indifference,’ while promoting a discourse of 
solidarity among developing countries (Seitenfus 2014: pos. 2185), in the context where 
the country was the main troops’ contributor of Minustah, holding the military 
command of the mission during all its duration. Such concept of ‘non-indifference’ has 
also been applied in the context of the development of security policies and governance 
by the African Union (Williams 2007). Other concept developed by Brazil’s foreign 
policy was ‘Responsibility While Protecting,’ aiming to emphasise the need for 
responsible intervention (Patriota 2017, p. 25).  
Normatively speaking, a radical denounce of the responsibility to protect as a 
tool for hegemonic politics, which usually comes with a radical criticism of 
humanitarianism in general, beyond ignoring the pluralism of perspectives supporting 
the norm, and the fact that the ICISS report aimed to develop an interpretation of it to 
actually avoid the manipulation of humanitarian discourses, would fail to account for 
the historical processes which often led to the creation of the conditions with which the 
norm is concerned – humanitarian crises, mass human rights violations and violent civil 
conflict.  
The contexts concerned are often marked by the existence of populations 
unprotected by states’ social policies and dispossessed of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political mechanisms of security (in the broad sense of human security). In 
this sense, it is important to remind that the ICISS report and other efforts to bring 
clarification to the norm have emphasised other means for the protection of human 
rights of populations affected, while military intervention should remain the last option.  
Liberal enthusiasts, on the other hand, in some cases strongly connected to the 
political status quo, also fail to take into account facts and evidences, for example, as 
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already mentioned, concerning the intervention in Libya, praised by some as a positive 
case of the application of the responsibility to protect doctrine (Weiss 2011), while there 
is a strong case to question the application of the doctrine, and, more clearly, the means 
used in the intervention, with bombardment of civilian infrastructure, and if it was the 
case to support regime change as diplomatic efforts were not exhausted (Payandeh 
2011); the present situation of the country, in this sense, also speaks for itself.  
The questions and dilemmas of the concept and doctrine of responsibility to 
protect are not only connected to its manipulation and instrumentalization in the 
discourses and politics of hegemonic countries. There are foundational questions that 
demand close attention from political theorists. Orford (2011) analysed these 
foundational questions, pointing to the authoritarian dangers that lay on the global 
governance mechanisms on peace and security. The principle of sovereignty as power to 
determine the presence of a state of exception, and to act with discretionary power to 
address this state of exception, to maintain order and avoid the worst case scenario: to 
fall into anarchy and lawlessness, is a main characteristic of Thomas Hobbes and, more 
significantly, Carl Schmitt’s political thought.34 The UNSC, although incorporating 
diverse and (often strongly) divergent members, concentrates the power in global 
governance mechanisms on security to decide where and when to intervene to maintain 
‘international peace and security’, resonating this authoritarian political principle in the 
domestic realm. 
Beardsworth, in turn, in the article ‘From Moral to Political Responsibility in a 
Globalized Age’ (2015) proposes a republican model to the concept of responsibility to 
protect, in which states’ responsibilities to address globalised problems such as climate 
change and nuclear arms are connected to their responsibilities to fulfil their domestic 
duties, their obligations to their citizens, since these global problems have an important 
impact to their own constituencies. The author includes among these global issues 
34 There is a discussion about whether Hobbes is indeed an ideologist of absolutism, since subjects retain 
the right to self defense, including against the state if it threats their lives (Weber 2012); it is actually 
reasonable to understand the thinker as a precursor of liberalism, since the sovereign needs to have a 
commitment to protect its subjects’ physical integrity, and owes it to them (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Liberalism, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/, Accessed on 06 April 2019). In this 
respect, the context in which the author wrote Leviathan needs to be taken into consideration; and his 
‘state of nature’ is better understood as an allegory for the sake of argumentation, rather than some 
essentialist understanding of human nature (Kratochwil 2008, p. 86-87). The same cannot be said about 
Carl Schmitt, a theorist of absolutism, and of the power over the state of exception as the very constituent 
element of state’s sovereign power.   
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‘undue human suffering’ and ‘global poverty’, arguing that developed countries have 
not only a moral, but a political responsibility to tackle these problems, as they often 
spill over and directly affect them, for instance with the influx of migrants and refugees.  
On his model, legitimate political authority is secondary, as he emphasises the 
hierarchy of duty to govern as firstly the duty of effective government (task-efficacy in 
the management of needs), and secondly as a republican political authority, that is, an 
authority legitimated by accountability and subjects’ participation. According to the 
conceptual framework of the thesis, we can say that the author privileges what we name 
output legitimacy, although for the perspective adopted here, output legitimacy is 
interconnected and interdependent concerning the other dimensions, source and 
procedural legitimacy, as it is argued below.  
Beardsworth recognises that ‘Efficacy is related to the common good, and this 
good is not empirically given, but normatively constructed’ (Beardsworth 2015, p. 80), 
creating, I suggest, a paradox on his reasoning. If the common good is normatively 
constructed, legitimate government should be a first and foremost requirement, at least 
on the same level of efficacy, since governments can be efficient in producing a lot of 
harm, as, for instance, massive human rights violations, pollution and destruction of the 
environment.  
If governments are not accountable to their subjects, and in the absence of public 
control, of a public space of debate where the most pressing issues can be addressed by 
people affected – and not only a privileged group that can avoid the consequences of the 
socialisation of ‘externalities’ while profiting with the damage of the common good, 
these dangers are logically potentiated. It is a fundamental question if such primacy of 
efficiency above legitimacy can ultimately result on a Schmittian understanding of 
politics as the sovereign power to determine and act under the state of exception 
(Agamben 2004; Orford 2011).  
Although Beardsworth proposes a republican model for the responsibility to 
protect, his propositions can be criticised from a republican standpoint. Hannah Arendt, 
who brought important contributions concerning democratic and republican 
government, identified an authoritarian tendency in Rousseau’s thought, mainly 
concerning his conceptualisation of the ‘volonté générale’ or ‘volonté de tous’, 
something that, according to him, should be more than the sum of individual interests, 
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and above them. The problem, according to Arendt, is the absence of a mediating 
process to reach such general will. She notes that:  
…the very word 'consent', with its overtones of deliberate choice and considered opinion, 
was replaced by the word 'will', which essentially excludes all processes of exchange of 
opinions and an eventual agreement between them. The will, if it is to function at all, must 
indeed be one and indivisible, 'a divided will would be inconceivable'; there is no possible 
mediation between wills as there is between opinions. (Arendt 2006: 66).  
Analogously, I suggest, the idea of efficient government for the management of 
‘needs’ and creation of the common good, before legitimate authority, may derive the 
same dangers Arendt identified. As she notes (concerning Rousseau and Robespierre) 
‘At least we can learn from them that absolute goodness is hardly any less dangerous 
than absolute evil…’ (2006, p. 72) – a quote that is very suitable to critically assess 
humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals and practices.  
Historically, these dangers were consistently evidenced. Before the progress of 
an international humanitarian apparatus, colonialism was often based on paternalist 
discourses to bring development and economic efficiency to colonised countries, where 
the ‘fittest’ had a responsibility to improve lives of ‘lower races’ (Duffield 2007). The 
case of Haiti is emblematic in this sense, as the United States occupied the country from 
1915 to 1934 with this colonial-paternalistic discourse (Renda 2001), leaving behind a 
negative legacy that affected the social, economic and political conditions of Haiti 
structurally, with a political and economic centralization in Port-au-Prince and a 
profound transformation in the Haitian army, contributing to pave the way for the rising 
of the totalitarian regime of the Duvaliers (Trouillot 1990), as analysed in more depth in 
Chapter 3. 
If internally such metaphysical understanding of the ‘common good’ may give 
rise to unidimensional and undemocratic politics, actually detrimental to the common 
good, such as ecological degradation and violation of minorities’ rights, internationally, 
huge power, economic and technological imbalances and, consequently, a much greater 
difficulty to impose resistance, can turn such republican model into a source of 
violence, and not protection, where affected populations can be, instead of protected by 
the ‘fittest’, managed so as to be contained, not rarely resulting in unintended 
consequences, or the worsening of the ‘undue human suffering’ and ‘global poverty.’  
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The thesis’ case study is an illustrative example in this sense. US policies to 
Haiti over the last years professedly aimed to address the problem of the massive arrival 
of Haitian refugees and migrants in boats in the country, escaping the conditions that the 
US fundamentally contributed to create, notably with the support of Duvaliers’ regime 
during the Cold War, without which this regime could have hardly survived for almost 
three decades (Dubois 2012, Trouillot 1990, Shah 2009). Such policies neither brought 
effective results, and the US ‘solves’ the problem forbidding Haitians to enter the 
country and deporting thousands.35  
The political paradigm hierarchizing efficiency above republican and legitimate 
government can be also criticized in the light of Foucault’s and Agamben’s thought 
(Agamben 1998, Foucault 2007, 2008), as efficiency above legitimacy means that the 
sovereign, in Agamben’s words, has power over ‘bare’ life, as the priority is for 
decisions to be taken to ensure an overall ‘common good,’ and government has the rule 
of managing populations, of caring for biological human life from birth to death, with 
an increasing technical power over these decisions. 
The precursor, as it were, of biopolitics and governmentality, is what Foucault 
named ‘pastoral power,’ the peculiar and foundational characteristic of Christianity, the 
duty of the shepherd to care for the flock, to ensure its safety and wellbeing, to protect 
and guide (and discipline) it, and where the ‘duty of obedience’ exists for its own sake, 
without an external justification for it, beyond a general idea of salvation (Foucault 
2007, p. 169-174). This foundational characteristic of Christianity well resonates with 
the spirit, the principles and practices of humanitarianism, broadly speaking.  
Today, discourses and practices of empowerment, ‘local ownership’ and 
autonomy are gaining ground in the humanitarian and development fields, in part 
answering to the consistent and numerous criticism, as well as the dilemmas and 
limitations that emerge from humanitarian practices that merely support life, without the 
causes being addressed, mainly for prolonged periods and portrayed situations 
(Anderson 1999; Ferris 2011).  
It is important to note that the preponderance of efficient government in 
Beardsworth propositions, in some way, reflects the reality of today’s world, since 
                                                          
35 See for instance: Trump Administration Ends Temporary Protection for Haitians, The New York 
Times, 20 November 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/haitians-temporary-status.html  
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modernisation, the massification brought by the industrial revolution, capitalism and 
globalisation, as well as the increasing economic interdependence, turned government 
efficiency literally a matter of survival for an important part of today’s world 
population, who depend on governments’ ability to regulate the economy, with the 
provision of jobs or economic opportunities, and to manage or regulate basic services 
and infrastructure.36 
In the societies with which we are concerned here, of postcolonial and 
underdeveloped countries, this process of modernisation has, evidently, not been 
completely accomplished. As already stated, part of these societies extract the benefits 
of this modern world, as noted by Bayart and Ellis (2000), through strategies of 
extraversion, but many are the losers in this game, one of the main sources of today’s 
conflicts and violence in developing countries (Fanthorpe 2001; Mbembe 2018).  
In the case of Haiti, it is interesting to note, in this sense, that while the capital, 
Port-au-Prince, follows this logic of insertion in modernity, with the predominance of 
predatory politics and neopatrimonial or clientelist networks (as further analysed in 
Chapter 3), in the countryside many people live dependent mainly on subsistence 
agriculture, and although they often have low incomes from small surplus production 
and other activities such as craftwork, many of them live quite independently from these 
predatory politics in the capital and the violence resultant of it. Of course, they are 
directly affected by the lack of investment in infrastructure and basic services, a 
consequence of such predatory politics; they need to pay for health and education, 
something that definitely increases their hardship. As Haiti is highly vulnerable to 
severe weather phenomena, something that is certainly getting worse with climate 
change, the rural population becomes especially vulnerable with the lack of proper 
investment in infrastructure, disaster response and prevention, often depending on 
humanitarian aid to cope with these events (Braum 2014; James 2010). 
In a macro outlook, autonomous and subsistence societies, although having even 
advantages in terms of possibilities of survival in extreme scenarios of climate 
36 The case of Venezuela today is a paradigmatic one in this sense, as it demonstrates that government’s 
total inefficiency in a modernised society can create a massive humanitarian crisis. See: ‘Five Things You 
Need to Know to Understand Venezuela’s Crisis,’ The New York Times, 3 May 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-facts.html?auth=login-
email&login=email; 'New York Times' Journalist Describes An 'Almost Unimaginable' Crisis In 
Venezuela,’ NPR, 2 April 2019, 
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=709055837&t=1569346014177.   
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catastrophe, because of their economic autonomy (Levene and Conversi 2014), on the 
other hand will probably also increasingly depend (as modern societies) on the efficacy 
of policies for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, there is, as things stand, on 
efficient government, being in the domestic or in the global level.  
The question of climate change demonstrates that even the caveat presented here 
concerning efficient government in the end also confirms the thesis’ overall 
argumentation, since it is mainly citizen and grassroots mobilisation that is pushing the 
agenda to tackle climate change globally.37 Despite the numerous global initiatives and 
conferences held to fight the problem for the last almost three decades, real results and 
policies adopted by states fall short by far of achieving the minimum goals established 
by experts and even as agreed in the periodic conferences. In this sense, it is evidenced 
that efficient government can be mostly indispensable in today’s modern world, but 
without citizen participation, it can also be deadly.  
The question of climate change is also illustrative of the increasing global 
interdependence that renders obsolete the government limited to territorial boundaries. 
Regional and global issues need to be addressed through the still considerably 
precarious multilateral channels and mechanisms of global governance, as pointed by 
Beardsworth and many others, with a whole literature dedicated to it (For instance: 
Beck 1992, Held1995).  
The question of international security and stability is, of course, among the core 
issues of the intensification of globalisation and interdependence, and it is where the 
legitimacy gaps of global governance mechanisms can have the most serious 
consequences for populations affected.  
Arendt (2006, 2013), Foucault (2007, 2008) and Agamben (1998) pointed to 
authoritarian dangers inside liberal democratic political systems. Such dangers also 
reflect on the developments as well as propositions concerning global governance 
mechanisms that aim to fulfil cosmopolitan ideals and, more practically, deal with 
pressing issues and problems that arise from globalisation and consequent increasing 
global interdependence. There are actually aggravating factors in the international arena, 
37 See: O’Brien, Selboe and Hayward 2018; ‘The Kids Are Taking Charge of Climate Change,’ Foreign 
Policy, 10 April 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/10/the-kids-are-taking-charge-of-climate-
change/.  
79 
 
since, as already mentioned, space for resistance is scarcer, and such global governance 
mechanisms, mainly on peace and security, can decide for the life and death, or what 
lives are disposable, without much consequence. 
These foundational questions concerning the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’, as well as concerning the mechanisms of global governance that can put it into 
practice, are essential to take into account so we can better understand the constant 
problems and dilemmas of these ideas and norms when put into practice, as analysed 
next.   
 
2.4. The peace as statebuilding paradigm, political legitimacy and the foundation 
of the polity  
The reasons why international interventions so often fail to deliver their stated 
goals, not rarely actually contributing, in the long term, to the opposite outcomes from 
their stated objectives (Barma 2012, 2017; de Guevara 2012; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 
2009; Suhrke 2011) have been the subject of investigation of much of the literature on 
peace and statebuilding. When we don’t see the resurgence of conflicts, post-conflict 
societies are often characterised by political instability and high levels of violence, in 
some cases higher than during the conflict itself (Paris 2004; Pouligny 2006, 257-259).  
There are actually problems and contradictions inherent to the exogenous 
characteristic of the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour (de Guevara, 2012; Jones 2013; 
Schlichte 2003; Suhrke 2011). Economic and military support, instead of helping to 
strengthen recipient states, can actually weaken them even further, creating dependency 
and clientelist relations (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Suhrke 2011). Local actors are not, 
of course, merely recipients of external aid and advice, and are not rarely capable of 
using these external resources (material or immaterial, such as legitimation) to further 
their own interests (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Veit 2010), ‘co-opting’ peacebuilding 
processes. 
Concerning the long-term political-economic outcomes, the result is often 
neopatrimonialism and predatory political economies (Barma 2017). The understanding, 
in the policy world, that statebuilding and democratisation are interdependent and 
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mutually reinforcing, proved to be wrong in practice, as they actually ‘act at cross-
purposes’ (Barma 2017, 61), contributing to the above mentioned outcomes.  
Earlier solutions proposed in the literature for such conundrums, such as 
‘institutionalisation before democratisation,’ (Paris 2002; 2004)) resonate with 
technical and managerial approaches already criticised in the literature, as they 
disregard that state institutions are socially embedded and cannot develop independently 
from society (Lemay-Hébert 2015). It is also, by definition, depoliticised, ignoring that 
the process of state formation is always profoundly political, with the contest between 
different groups for power, resources and hegemony (Jones 2013).  
This problematic understanding of the state, viewed as independent from 
society, existed before the emergence of the peace-and-statebuilding agenda. As pointed 
by Trouillot: 
The state is not an independent variable – neither the Duvalierist state nor any other. State 
forms are constantly created, reproduced, maintained, and modified. Moreover, these processes 
of reproduction and change are intertwined with the historical evolution of the particular 
society and culture within which the state functions; their understanding requires an 
examination of the relationship between state and civil society (Trouillot 1990, p. 18).  
Moreover, the Haitian scholar underlined that this understanding of the state comes 
from paternalistic and elitist perspectives: 
Paternalistic theories view the state as an independent and supernatant entity, one that ideally 
calms the transient tensions of the social organism and intervenes to promote justice on the 
basis of Reason, understood to be absolute and universal.  
This paternalistic conception underpins most theories of the state as an independent variable 
and is preferred by elites the world over because it gives them a choice role. In Haiti's case, this 
view rationalizes and reinforces obvious inequalities: politics becomes a reserved domain, a 
preserve to which the urban elites alone have access thanks to their education and moral values. 
They are to represent the interests of the people, defined, by them, according to the universal 
principles of Justice and Reason (Trouillot 1990, p. 20).  
Trouillot noted in this way that “contrary to the assessment of many foreign 
observers, Haitian elites do not lack a Western vision of the purpose of government 
(Trouillot 1990, p. 20).”  
In this sense, the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour, or the idea of 
peacebuilding as statebuilding, with the belief that technical support for the 
development of state institutions and capacities, as well as the formal democratic 
procedures, will support the creation of conditions for peace and democratisation, does 
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not only have as real-world outcome the empowerment of local predatory elites – it is 
by definition a paternalist and elitist model. Practitioners and policymakers may try to 
develop projects and actions focusing on the support of local capacities, but the 
backdrop of the peace-as-statebuilding endeavour, its models and procedures, are elitist 
and paternalist by definition. The outcomes achieved, as we shall see in the case study 
and comparative analysis, are consistent with these foundations.  
In this sense, although international interveners’ stated goal is to support the 
creation of liberal state institutions, they often end up strengthening undemocratic and 
unaccountable local political actors (Autesserre 2010; Barma 2017; de Guevara 2012) 
and unequal local power relations (Shah 2009; Veit 2010).  
The statebuilding paradigm also disregards the relationship between state 
formation and violence and oppression. Newman (2013), in this sense, already pointed 
to the contradiction that implies to equate statebuilding with peacebuilding, when 
historically state formation was very often a violent process, involving wars, imposition 
of the will and identity of certain ethnic and political groups, suppression of minorities’ 
rights, and even genocides. Mann’s ‘The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic 
cleansing’ (2005) is also very telling in this sense, as the author demonstrates that 
modern genocide and ethnic cleansing have necessarily as background the ideology and 
formation of the nation-state. 
The connection between modernity and the rationalisation and bureaucratisation 
it entails and events such as the Holocaust have already been established (Bauman 
2000; Arendt 2006), and contemporary societies are not free from such danger (Murray 
1991, p. 86). In post-conflict contexts, of societies traumatised by civil conflict, mass 
violence and authoritarian regimes, with large portions of people in conditions of 
extreme disenfranchisement, to expect that such rationalisation and bureaucratisation, 
with the empowerment of local elites, can support democratisation, seems, from this 
perspective, indeed quite unreasonable.  
Although Max Weber is occasionally blamed for the absence of ethical 
considerations on his theory concerning the implications of rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation, as Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte (2015) point, Weber:  
...had a particular interest in explaining how certain forms of rationality had contributed to the 
rise of modern capitalism in Europe and North America and, with this economic form, to the 
82 
 
culture of modernity. However, he remained at a critical distance from the institutions and 
achievements they brought about during his lifetime. (Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte 2016, 180). 
Following this scepticism, the authors conclude that the process of 
rationalisation and bureaucratisation in the international arena should not be seen as a 
necessarily positive development, but potentially entailing risks, taking into account the 
increasing global inequalities (Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte 2016, 181). They point that 
despite the fact that Weberian concepts are applied in the field of international relations, 
the Weberian methods and theoretical foundations are often not properly taken into 
account. Their proper application could favour a more accurate identification of 
constellations involved in the contemporary statebuilding endeavour, taking into 
account social, political, cultural and economic contexts where this project is embedded. 
They also emphasise that for Weber, the bureaucratisation process was not apolitical.38  
In this sense, if one simply inverts the logic of the statebuilding paradigm, doing 
what political scientists often do – analyse the conditions under which certain 
institutions and political equilibria develop (for instance: Olson 1993; Przeworski 1991; 
Weingast 1997), the unidimensional normative perspective behind this paradigm can be 
called into question. These conditions developed in long historical processes in 
countries with consolidated state institutions, involving struggles among different 
groups and interests. Taking into account the subaltern and disadvantageous position of 
developing countries in the global economy, especially of countries affected by conflicts 
and prolonged political instability, it is not reasonable to assume that minimal 
conditions are present for these countries to repeat the Western experience of 
rationalisation and state formation (Schlichte 2003, 39). Even more so concerning the 
process of democratisation, which happened under certain conditions regarding the 
power balance within Western countries (Schlichte 2003) and their position in the 
global economic and political system (Cox 1983).  
There is an important critical literature to modernisation theories (for instance: 
Escobar 2011), of the teleological assumption that ‘progress’ and modernisation are 
unavoidable and can be reached by poor and developing countries as they advance 
stages similarly to developed countries. Dependentist theories are today substantially 
                                                          
38 There is no room here, and neither is it my goal to develop a discussion about Weber and ethical 
considerations. Although this can be a very fruitful debate, including for the areas of conflicts, 
international interventions and peace-and-statebuilding, considering, in general, the relation between 
empirical analysis and ethical reflection and elaboration, I briefly brought this question for the sake of my 
argumentation concerning the statebuilding paradigm and its implications.  
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outdated, despite of still representing an important theoretical contribution and political 
moment (Kapoor 2008; Prashad 2008). More contemporary contributions in the area of 
economics (Chang 2003) as well as politics and globalisation (Kapoor 2009) renewed 
the critical reflection to think about unequal economic and political international 
exchanges, a literature that can certainly be very helpful to better understand the context 
of international interventions and the peace-and-statebuilding endeavour, as well as 
their outcomes.  
In an earlier contribution to this debate, Evans (1992) seminal article ‘The state 
as problem and solution’ investigates the conditions under which the state can support 
economic development, instead of working as a mean for local elites to maintain 
predatory and rentier political economies, rebutting neoliberal arguments of the ‘second 
wave,’ for which the solution for such problems was minimum state. Evans argues that, 
on the contrary, these countries would need more and more efficient state institutions, 
strategically working to promote economic development.  
He points, on the other hand, to the social conditions underlying functional state 
institutions, evoking the Durkheimian idea of the non-contractual elements of the 
contract, and analysing an archetypal case of predatory state, the then Zaire (now the 
DRC), considers how external support was fundamental for regime survival, a 
predominant element along the history of other cases, such as already emphasised, 
including Haiti (Trouillot 1990; Dubois 2012). Here, it is important to highlight that the 
already mentioned social and political configuration denominated by Bayart and Ellis 
(2001) as extraversion, the subaltern position of many postcolonial and poor countries 
(Mbembe 2003; 2012; 2018) hinders a properly endogenous process that could lead to a 
certain political configuration conductive to democratisation and economic 
development. 
As already mentioned, during the Cold War, dictatorial regimes received large 
sums of external resources, mainly from the United States, in the game to protect the 
areas of influence of the two contesting powers, enabling many of these regimes to keep 
in power while being totally unaccountable to their own people. After the end of the 
Cold War, in several cases, these predatory elites were (and are) able to keep extracting 
wealth from external sources, local predatory political economies (Barma 2012; 2017) 
and even with criminal activity (Cockayne 2009), while the majority of the population 
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remain socially, economically and politically excluded. The present situation in Haiti 
and in the DRC demonstrate that external technical support aiming to support the 
development of the ‘rule of law,’ without the causes of these predatory political 
economies being addressed (Cockayne 2009), can actually support the reproduction and 
maintenance of simulations (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2013) instead of the 
development of state institutions. 
In this way, although the statebuilding paradigm is still dominant in the scholarly 
debate and in the policy world, concerning conflict and post-conflict societies but also 
developing and postcolonial countries in general (Fukuyama 2004), there is a growing 
scepticism around the assumptions behind it and on the viability of this project 
(Guevara 2012; Bhuta 2008; Von Trotha 2009). The belief that these countries can 
solve their social, economic and political problems building state institutions while 
following certain technical prescriptions and steps, holding ‘free and fair elections,’ can 
be challenged by theoretical reflection, as well as by existing empirical research.  
Autesserre, for instance, on her landmark works about the DR Congo, 
demonstrates that the holding of elections with the aim to solve violent conflict proved 
to be a goal doomed to fail, or even doomed to provoke collateral damage, while micro 
and local causes of violent conflict go unaddressed by international interveners 
(Autesserre 2009; 2010). The holding of elections without basic and minimum 
conditions for it, such as freedom of expression, access to information and 
communication among voters, can also actually reinforce a sense of alienation and 
dispossession among an important part of the population, as millions of dollars are 
spend to organise elections in a country with an extensive territory and without 
infrastructure, while the basic needs of most of its population remain unattended 
(Autesserre 2014).   
As further analysed in depth in the case study of Haiti, the causes of the 
reproduction of violent conflict, chronic political instability and underdevelopment are 
complex, diverse and deep-rooted, so my aim is not to point the politics of the Cold War 
and the post-Cold War humanitarianism as the only, and nor even the main factors that 
explain these outcomes in societies affected.39 Fanthorpe’s (2001) analysis on the social 
                                                          
39 As I assume a socio-historical and interpretative approach, my aim is to present a reasonable 
understanding of the contexts with which I am concerned here, indicating a combination of conditions 
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processes that explain the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, for instance, pointed the 
disenfranchisement of large portions of rural populations through the practices of the 
colonial administration as a main explanation for the conflict, something then 
overlooked in the literature, more often prone to point to more simplistic explanations 
such as warlordism and sectarian politics.  
Fanthorpe’s article demonstrates how the pre-colonial social and political 
infrastructures in Sierra Leone were transformed by colonialism, which used these local 
infrastructures to establish and maintain colonial domination and administration, and 
how this process was determinant for post-independent Sierra Leone, its social, 
economic and political formation marked by predatory and exclusionary politics. The 
policies and practices of international interventions, of the peace-and-statebuilding 
endeavour, often lack proper knowledge of local societies to address these deep-rooted 
causes of violent conflict (Autesserre 2014) and their standardised practices are neither 
designed to address them. 
At this point, one may question: What are then, the possible solutions for 
societies affected by protracted violent conflict and chronic political instability? 
Although the first goal (and for some the only) of a political scientist is to present an 
explanation or reasonable understanding of the problem and research questions 
proposed, as stated in Methods, the thesis also contemplates and dialogues with a 
normative dimension.  
Taking many of these challenges into account, some authors already suggested 
possible alternatives to the dominant policies and practices of the peace-as-statebuilding 
endeavour: the need to address micro and local causes of violent conflict (Autesserre 
2009; 2010); a possible democratisation before the consolidation of the state, resonating 
historical experiences such as of the United States, a state that developed more from the 
local, from the regions, that is, from the bottom-up – in this sense, a republican model 
(Barma 2017, p. 204-205); and the belief that, indeed, only endogenous political 
processes, leaving local actors to manage their conflicts, until some sort of local 
hegemony (or political equilibrium) is reached and stabilisation is finally achieved 
(Jones 2013).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
and the socio-political processes that led to the production of the observed outcomes, taking into account 
the contingencies that permeate these processes, and not simplified causal explanations.  
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The first two propositions are in line with the perspective adopted in this thesis. 
In order for sustainable peace to become possible, peace processes and political 
transitions need to build up legitimate processes and institutions. As stated by Beetham: 
“Disorder and insecurity are as much the product of inadequate legitimacy as they are 
its cause” (Beetham 2013, p. 139).  
As to the third position, I believe it can be questioned, from an empirical and 
normative point of view. Taking into account nowadays global interconnectedness and 
interdependency, and the subaltern position of postcolonial and developing countries 
affected by protracted conflicts and chronic political instability in the international 
system, we can reasonably say that this proposition is unfeasible. Today, local actors 
are, in any case, heavily influenced by foreign countries and regional and global 
political economies.  
As much as international interventions and humanitarianism have provoked 
serious and comprehensive collateral damage to societies affected in the last decades, 
after the damage provoked by the processes of colonisation, globalisation, marketization 
and foreign interventionism, the other extreme, that is, to let these societies deal with 
their own problems by themselves, is neither a plausible or ethically grounded option. 
After such level of direct and structural violence were perpetrated, and taking into 
account the arbitrariness of a world system whose main winners were the ones who 
settled the rules of the game, humanitarianism and the question of international justice 
are key dimensions for a minimum ethical ground.  
The complexity of contemporary world requires us to review old 
conceptualisations and boundaries, as the state is often one more player, instead of a 
unitary and most determinant player in domestic and global affairs; phenomena such as 
heavy migration and large diasporas bring new fundamental research agendas, such as 
the role of the diasporas in countries’ politics and conflicts, as well as what roles they 
could play, and new structures and policies to deal with these diverse groups, often full 
of potential.  
As developed earlier, violence (and the threat of violence) is often a key element 
in the foundation of the polity, and domestically, its limitation and regulation (being 
social, cultural, religious or political) is a fundamental step for the creation of the 
political community. This process certainly requires a fundamentally endogenous force 
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to occur. Taking into account that the international system is marked by enormous 
technical and economic inequalities, forged by a past of injustice and mass violence, 
which brought populations of postcolonial and developing countries to a condition of 
extreme disenfranchisement, the improvement of international mechanisms to support 
these populations, as well as local agents so this endogenous force can arise, is a 
fundamental ethical question for our time, and as most of the main contemporary ethical 
question, a very complex one and full of dilemmas, for which respect for alterity as 
much as truthfulness are fundamental.  
In the following chapters, the puzzling questions presented here concerning 
political legitimacy in postcolonial and developing countries affected by civil conflict 
will be further clarified, as the case study and the comparative analysis bring the 
contexts and evidences that make them relevant.  
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3. Haiti under Minustah – political legitimacy amid international intervention and
the liberal statebuilding project 
The presence and role of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti 
(Minustah) received considerable criticism among Haitian citizens,40 as well as by 
international observers and media coverage,41 for the circumstances in which the 
mission was established, as well as the negative impacts it brought to the country. It was 
very common to find messages of disapproval and criticism in protests and graffiti in 
the streets of Port-au-Prince; demonstrations against the mission were also often held, as 
in other contexts of UN peace operations, such as in Kosovo (Lemay-Hébert 2013), 
mainly after the cholera contamination brought to the country by blue helmets from 
Nepal.42  
The UN intervention in the country in 2004 first happened with the 
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), established with a UNSC Resolution on February 
29, the day President Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country (Dubois 2012; Dupuy 
2007, Seitenfus 2014). In the following, an interim government was established, 
remaining in power for the next two turbulent years. In this period, armed groups 
supporters of Aristide violently contested the interruption of his second administration. 
Added to the violence perpetrated by armed groups opposing Aristide, as well as an 
increase in common criminality, Haiti experienced between 2004 and 2006 the worst 
period of violence, social and political conflict after the first coup against Aristide in 
40 A critical view around the circumstances in which Minustah was established in Haiti, as well as its 
performance over time, was consensual among Haitians I interviewed who belonged to an educated 
middle/ upper class. Interviewees who were dwellers of Bel Air, and beneficiaries of the NGO Viva Rio, 
established in Haiti by invitation of Minustah, had a more positive view on Minustah’s work after 2006, 
something I analyse further (Interviews performed in Port-au-Prince between April and May of 2016). 
See also: Edwidge Danticat, A New Chapter for the Disastrous United Nations Mission in Haiti?, The 
New Yorker, 19 October 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-chapter-for-the-
disastrous-united-nations-mission-in-haiti.  
41 See, for instance: Nicolas Lemay-Hebert and Rosa Freedman, Taking the ‘Unintended Consequences’ 
of Peacekeeping Seriously – How Haiti Has the Potential to Revolutionize World Politics, Again, 
Birmingham Blogs, 29 February 2016, https://blog.bham.ac.uk/idd/2016/02/taking-the-unintended-
consequences-of-peacekeeping-seriously-how-haiti-has-the-potential-to-revolutionize-world-politics-
again-2/; UN peacekeepers leave Haiti: What is their legacy?, 6 October 2017, AlJazeera,  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/peacekeepers-leave-haiti-legacy-171004144515853.html; U.N. 
Brought Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone, The New York Times, 26 June 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nations-peacekeepers-
yemen.html; The U.N.’s Legacy in Haiti: Stability, but for whom?, The World Politics Review, 18 July 
2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/22736/the-u-n-s-legacy-in-haiti-stability-but-for-
whom.   
42 For instance: UN appeals for calm after cholera riots in Haiti, BBC News, 17 November 2010, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11772283; Haiti police battle anti-UN protesters, BBC 
News, 14 September 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-14923617. 
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1992 (Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013). Instead of addressing the political conflict and 
bringing stability, the establishment of the UN mission coincided with the outbreak of 
violent conflict between different factions.  
Beyond the economic elite and political class connected to the previous 
authoritarian governments, in his second administration, Aristide also gained the 
opposition of an important part of the Haitian civil society, the educated middle class 
and students, mainly for his increasing authoritarianism and connection with armed 
groups responsible for violent crimes (Dupuy 2009; Dubois 2012). But this social group 
neither properly welcomed the UN intervention, questioning how it was established, the 
resources spent on it and, increasingly, the outcomes of the operation.43  
With this background, with which it may seem clear that Minustah’s disapproval 
was widespread, and reasons to question its legitimacy numerous, one may even 
question the validity of the main enquire of this research, as one of my interviewees, a 
Haitian representative of a civil society organisation, did.44 Nonetheless, the research 
aims to investigate what is beyond this apparent background, which is way more 
complex than it appears at first glance. Some contradictions illustrate this complexity. 
Brazil was the main troops’ contributor for Minustah’s military component, which was 
also commanded by Brazilian generals the whole period of the operation,45 and the 
country became very popular in Haiti, especially through the Brazilian football (popular 
in many developing countries),46 and many Haitians sought a better life in the South 
American country.47  
43 Interviews conducted in Haiti between April and May of 2016 with Haitians representatives of civil 
society; See also: Dupuy 2007; Edwidge Danticat, A New Chapter for the Disastrous United Nations 
Mission in Haiti?, The New Yorker, 19 October 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-
new-chapter-for-the-disastrous-united-nations-mission-in-haiti.  
44 Interview with Camille Chalmers, coordinator of the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un 
Développement Alternatif’ (PAPDA), on 11 May 2016. He was very critical of the UN mission and a 
leading voice of campaigns for its departure from Haiti, affirming that there was no point in analysing the 
legitimacy of Minustah and the consequences of it, since it was not legitimate from the beginning. The 
lack of a local source of legitimacy for the operation and the consequent implications will are analysed in 
this chapter. 
45 Except when the commander Lieutenant-General Urano Bacellar committed suicide (as further 
commented), when he was substituted by a Chilean commander, but for a short period (Seitenfus 2014).    
46 When Brazil lost the World Cup in 2014, in a match with Germany, which final result was the 
humiliating 7x1, many people in Haiti were very sad, some people even cried, according to reports of 
most individuals I interviewed who were in Haiti at that moment. It is possible that Haitians lamented this 
result more than many Brazilians, as demonstrations against the corruption and the expenses for hosting 
the World Cup (while basic services were deficient, public servants were not receiving their salaries, etc.) 
were happening in most cities where matches were happening in Brazil. The streets of Port-au-Prince 
were decorated with flags and the colours of Brazil, something common in Brazilian suburbs. There were 
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Another puzzling development is that the social and political group most 
affected by the UN intervention, the universe of armed and non armed groups that 
opposed President Aristide oust, was in the end the group that more intensively worked 
with the mission (although mostly indirectly), through the DDR and Violence 
Reduction programmes. During my field research, I could attest that the UN mission 
had an important level of approval among members of this group. To work with them, 
the UN needed to recognise them as social and even as political actors, something that 
most of the rest of Haitian society did not. The reciprocal effect of recognition and 
legitimacy (Mitchell 2018) contributed to this significant transformation in the relation 
of Minustah with these groups. This same development created one more reason for 
criticism and disapproval of the operation by part of the Haitian civil society and middle 
class, who understood that the DDR was rewarding ‘bandits’ and making crime pay 
(Schuberth 2017). 
This chapter aims to shed light on these puzzling developments, and better 
understand the social and political configurations of Haiti under international 
intervention from 2004 to 2017; how the UN mission’s legitimacy evolved in this 
period, the consequences of this evolution, as well as the long term impacts of the 
intervention in Haitian society and politics.  
The chapter begins with a historical background of the case of Haiti, which will 
enable us to understand the social and political processes that created the present 
conditions in Haiti, and to properly sift what was the UN mission’s role, among a 
context of constant political instability and turmoil and heavy external interventionism 
in the small Caribbean nation, of which Minustah was part and inextricably related with. 
The chapter then presents the case study of Haiti under Minustah, with the 
analysis of different phases marked by critical junctures (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; 
Mahoney 2015; della Porta 2008) that substantially changed the social and political 
conditions in the country and the role of the UN mission it. These changes had a 
still some of these decorations, mainly walls painted with Brazilian colours and motives, when I went to 
Haiti in 2016.  
47 Mainly after the 2010 earthquake, there was always a queue in front of the Brazilian embassy in Port-
au-Prince of Haitians asking for visa to migrate to the country (as reported by members of the Brazilian 
Embassy in Port-au-Prince, as well as other foreigners and Haitians alike during my field research); 
President Lula da Silva conceded a special humanitarian visa for Haitians after the 2010 earthquake. See: 
Haitianos no Brasil – 1,6 mil receberam visto para trabalhar e estudar no país em 2011, Fundação 
Palmares, 10 January 2012, http://www.palmares.gov.br/?p=17191.   
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decisive impact on the legitimacy of Minustah, and of the Haitian governments it 
supported establish. I analyse how Minustah influenced and impacted on the relation of 
the Haitian state with the Haitian population, investigating how different political arenas 
interact and intertwine, and how relations of power, domination, and resistance, 
acquiescence and extraction of benefits (and for some, means of subsistence) permeate 
these arenas.  
The chapter concludes reflecting on the long-term outcomes the UN mission 
helped to shape, considering the present situation in Haiti, still marked by chronic 
political instability, economic stagnation and humanitarian crisis.  
 
3.1. Historical background: Haitian society and politics between the struggle for 
independence, authoritarianism and foreign interventionism  
The Haitian history is a very present topic in everyday conversations about 
politics and the chronic crisis Haiti faces, something most Haitians are very conscious 
and constantly talk about, independently from the social and economic strata (Beckett 
2019; Braum 2014; Dubois 2012). Explanations for the present state of affairs are often 
sought in the history of the country. There is an important common and shared historical 
consciousness concerning the more distant past, around the grand narrative of the 
revolution and independence. Concerning more recent events, especially after the 
second interrupted administration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the divergences are 
multiple and very deep, marked by ideological, but mainly class divisions. 
The historical account presented here relies on the existing literature on the 
history of Haiti (Dubois 2012; Renda 2001; Trouillot 1990, 1995; Dupuy 2007), with 
the aim to identify the main factors, conditions and critical junctures that shaped the 
formation of the Haitian society, state and politics. It pretends, in this way, to be as 
much accurate as possible concerning these historical events, while at the same time it 
takes into account how different historical interpretations and dispute of narratives are 
means for social and political action in the present. This dimension of disputed 
narratives, something crucial in the investigation of political legitimacy, is taken into 
consideration along the analysis of the case study. The present section is mainly 
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dedicated, in turn, to the analysis of the unfolding of the history of Haiti and its 
reverberations up to the present.  
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, one of the main Haitian scholars, explained how the 
condition of chronic political instability came into being in Haiti, through an 
unsustainable dichotomy between the productive forces of the country, the peasants, and 
a rentier and predatory economic and political elite that drained the productive 
capabilities of the formers, something worsened by the interference and exploitative 
practices of foreign powers, from the independence of the country, the US military 
occupation that lasted from 1915 to 1934, until the US support to the Duvalierist 
regimes during the Cold War (Trouillot 1990).  
If this dichotomy marked most of the Haitian history, present day Haitian society 
and politics are characterised by a deep fragmentation and a general distrust, not only in 
the institutions but also a social distrust, something that has been fed and reinforced by 
foreign interventionism and often also foreign aid (James 2010; Braum 2014; Zanotti 
2010), including by the UN stabilisation mission, as we shall see. This historical 
account sets the ground from which we can understand how this condition of 
fragmentation and erosion of social and political institutions emerged in Haiti, and how 
political legitimacy remains essentially contested in the country.   
3.1.1. The Haitian Revolution and the process of State formation in Haiti  
The history of independent Haiti and the process of state formation in the 
country trace back to the Haitian Revolution, which took place between 1791 and 1804. 
The revolution happened among internal struggles and the assaults of Haiti’s colonial 
master, France, which has been followed by attacks and interferences of other colonial 
and powerful countries (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990). The independence of Haiti was 
an ‘unthinkable’ event to the Western world of that time (Trouillot 1995), something 
that trembled its very foundations and of the international order marked by colonialism 
and slavery, hence the hostility and isolation the second independent country of the 
American continent faced after its liberation.  
Haiti was the most profitable colony in the world, result of a limitless system of 
exploitation of the slave labour from the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Dubois 2012; 
Trouillot 1990). 5 to 10 percent of the slaves died each year, few children born in the 
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slave plantation system survived, so death outpaced births; colonialists preferred to 
import more slaves each year, as for them it resulted cheaper than providing minimum 
conditions so the slave population could have better surviving rates and have children 
(Dubois 2012, 21). This panorama synthesises the dehumanization in which the colonial 
and slave system were fundamentally based (Arendt 1979; Fanon 1963; Mbembe 2001, 
2003) something that would have important repercussions in the unfolding of the 
history and in the formation of the Haitian society, class structure and politics. 
In Laurent Dubois’ account of the history of the Haitian Revolution, the author 
emphasises how the grassroots struggle of the former slaves was determinant for the 
maintenance and ultimately victory of the revolution, in face of the intents by France to 
co-opt its leaders for a compromised ‘solution,’ with which they would benefit, but 
certainly not the mass of workers (Dubois 2012, 39). Haitian peasants kept resisting the 
policies of the burgeoning economic and political elite, which mostly grew at the 
expense of the formers (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990). The peasants’ grassroots struggle 
and resistance shaped the development of the Haitian culture and agrarian society, 
organised around the lakou, a system of kinship, cooperation and solidarity organised 
around the extended family (Braum 2014; Dubois 2012, p. 107-114; Trouillot 1990).  
In this sense, the political process that followed the Haitian Revolution was 
characterised by a struggle over what the independent Haiti should be, between different 
elite and political groups and the permanent ‘threat’ of upheaval by the former slaves 
that rebelled and freed themselves by the force of arms.48  
Although Haitians managed to ensure their independence, successfully 
defending the country against a French attack led by the Napoleonic army, this constant 
fear of external attacks prompted the creation of a militaristic culture, which also shaped 
the development of the Haitian culture and society. The efforts to defend the country 
dragged its already scarce resources, as the level of destruction and human and 
48 As reflected by Arendt (2006), revolutions are not always (or are rarely) followed by the ‘foundation of 
freedom’, for which collective action and achievement of a minimal political consensus among those 
liberated with the revolutionary process are fundamental, something that did not happen in Haiti. In 
Arendt’s understanding, even when such ‘foundation of freedom’ took place, the case of the United 
States, the essential features of this foundation faded away with time. She states that ‘...while it is true 
that freedom can only come to those whose needs have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it will escape 
those who are bent upon living for their desires’ (Arendt 2006, 130), in a clear reference to the United 
States. 
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economic losses during the revolution was considerable. In addition, having struggled 
for years to have international political recognition, the Haitian government paid a large 
sum of indemnity to France. The Haitian political elite, seeing no other alternative to 
fulfil the country’s sovereignty, made the former slaves pay for their liberation (Dubois 
2012; Trouillot 1990). 
The process that followed was one in which a profound division tear apart the 
Haitian society, between a rent-seeking economic and political elite and the mass of 
peasants which formed the backbone of the Haitian agrarian economy and culture. As 
analysed by Trouillot (1990), such opposition has deepened and aggravated over time, 
culminating in the Duvalierist regime, which represented a totalitarian ‘solution’ for the 
deep and structural problems of the country.  
Hence, the process of state formation in Haiti has been marked by deep internal 
conflicts and a very hostile international context. The title of Trouillot’s seminal book, 
‘State Against Nation,’ well synthesises it from a longue durée perspective. An 
exploitative taxation system, with lack of investment and social policies (with few 
exceptions49) benefited not only the local elite, but also foreign merchants acting with 
the support of their hegemonic countries, making systematic use of ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ and the market of indemnities, fuelling and creating conflicts, and 
afterwards asking for compensations for property loss (Dubois 2012, 196-197). These 
conditions hindered a minimum development of the country’s economy, political 
system and state institutions, as the agricultural productivity continuously dropped with 
the lack of investment and over-taxation (Trouillot 1990, 80).  
3.1.2. The US military occupation 
United States established a military occupation in Haiti in 1915 pointing to such 
precarious conditions and characteristic of the Haitian elite as reasons for their 
interventionist paternalism (Renda 2001). Before the occupation the US in fact greatly 
contributed to such situation, funding and arming different political factions (Dubois 
2012; Trouillot 1990). The US marines invaded Haiti in the midst of an intense political 
turmoil, ‘picking the fruit’ after years ‘ripping’ political conflict in the country (Dubois 
49 Among the few exceptions regarding this predatory behaviour were policies implemented by Alexandre 
Pétion of land distribution among his army, something that contributed for the development of the lakou 
culture (Dubois 2012, 322). 
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2012, 210-211). The US military occupation marked an important critical juncture in 
the development of Haitian society, economy and politics, with structural 
transformations and long-term consequences.  
Despite the civilisational discourse, similar to European colonialism of that time, 
the occupation established a forced labour system in which many perished, and 
massacred the rural guerrilla that resisted the occupation (known as ‘Cacos’) (Dubois 
2012; Renda 2001). US marines acted brutally with total impunity, raping and killing 
people at random, including women and children (Dubois 2012, 225-235; Renda 2001).  
Trouillot (1990) highlights three dimensions that are relevant to understand how 
the US occupation impacted the process of state formation in Haiti: (1) the intense 
economic and political centralisation it has promoted, ending the counterbalance 
enabled by economic and political poles other than Port-au-Prince, which used to limit 
the arbitrariness of the political elite in the capital, also worsening the rural-urban 
divide; (2) a profound transformation in the Haitian army, which became essentially a 
mean to suppress dissidence and control the population;50 (3) the deepening of racial 
cleavages, something that already existed before, but that has been qualitatively 
transformed and reinforced by the occupation. Besides that, after the US occupation and 
‘modernisation’ policies, the Haitian economy became more connected to the 
international market, beginning a process that would lead the country from food 
producer to dependant on imports of agricultural goods (Renda 2001; Shamsie and 
Thompson 2006).51 
These structural transformations played an important role in the production of 
the conditions for the rise and consolidation of the Duvalierist regime (Trouillot 1990, 
                                                          
50 The army had a more ambiguous role in Haitian politics and society before the US occupation. It was 
already an important tool for the Haitian rentier elite to extract wealth from peasants, and source of 
political instability before the US occupation, since even when winning with more democratic processes, 
most Haitian political leaders needed to consolidate their power through military authority. Nonetheless, 
it has been an important mean of land distribution, as already mentioned, it used to represent the ethos of 
the Haitian revolution, and the different poles of power, other than Port-au-Prince, also comprised 
different poles of military power, enabling, in this way, certain checks and balances against tyranny 
(Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990). The US occupation established the Gendarmerie, an institution that 
remained after the end of the occupation, which, according to Trouillot, “indeed never fought anyone but 
Haitians” (Trouillot 1990, 106). 
51 It is relevant to mention that the US occupation had an interesting effect concerning the Haitian mulatto 
elite, since it affected the sense of pride of some of its members, and stimulated the emergence of a 
Haitian intellectual elite dedicated to study the popular culture of the country and to valorise it (Dubois 
2012; Trouillot 1990).   
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103-107) that ‘formalised the crisis,’ turning instability a chronic characteristic of
Haitian politics and life (Trouillot 1990, 83).  
3.1.3. Duvalierism: totalitarian legacy and dependency 
François Duvalier was elected in 1957 with the support of the Haitian army and 
in contested elections. Duvalier already counted on hired thugs to disrupt the electoral 
process. The army forced the leftist candidate, Daniel Fignolé, into exile, and repressed 
his supporters who went to the streets to protest, killing as many as five hundred people 
(Dubois 2012, 324-325; Dupuy 2007). Duvalier won the support of the United States 
with his anticommunist discourse, despite the clear evidences of the totalitarian nature 
of his leadership (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990).  
Beyond the civil pacific resistance that was massacred by Duvalier, there were 
armed attempts to overthrow him, which were promptly suppressed with US military 
support. The US massive economic and military aid to the regime in the context of the 
Cold War ensured its consolidation and survival, despite its very low level of internal 
legitimacy. The Duvalierist regime relied on random violence to suppress dissent and 
enforce its totalitarian domination, and limited traditional institutions with power in the 
country, including the army, the Catholic Church and the traditional economic and 
political elite. To enforce his personal power, Duvalier created a paramilitary force, the 
tonton macoutes, which outnumbered the army. He constantly changed the leadership in 
the army and fed divisions, to avoid the growing of its power and a possible coup 
(Dubois 2012, 328).  
As the regime counted on the flow of US support, it did not properly care for the 
country’s economy, implementing random development and social projects. Such 
situation, in which the country’s revenue was detached from fiscal contribution, 
promoted a profound deterioration of the Haitian economy, leading peasants to 
continually migrate to the capital, Port-au-Prince. Haitians from all social strata also 
massively left the country. Dubois points that: “Although a precise count is difficult to 
come by, it is estimated that up to a million of Haitians – about 15 percent of the 
country’s population – fled during the thirty years of Duvalier rule” (Dubois 2012, 
354). 
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The flow of US assistance was continuous, with two exceptions, during 
Kennedy’s and Carter’s administrations (Dubois 2012). In the second case, Jean-Claude 
Duvalier was in power, and to ensure the maintenance of aid flow, he promoted 
liberalisation measures, allowing some freedom of expression and press and political 
opposition. With Reagan’s election, such liberalisation was promptly reversed, and 
government critics were arrested, tortured and killed (Dubois 2012, 355).  
Haiti went to the brink of collapse. Although the second Duvalier attracted 
foreign capital interested in abundant and cheap labour force, with the creation of 
thousands of manufactory jobs, the economic liberalisation increased the internal debt 
and the trade deficit, with almost no fiscal contribution, for which Haitian peasants 
again, paid the price (Shamsie and Thompson 2006). The complete negligence and 
overburden of Haitian peasants worsened even further the economic situation and led to 
a food crisis, one of the main factors for Jean-Claude Duvalier’s fall (Shamsie and 
Thompson 2006, 41; Trouillot 1990, 217; Dubois 2012, 356-359).  
At the same time, the influx of US aid increased, and hundreds of aid and 
religious organisations entered the country, mainly from the US, from which the 
dependency of Haiti on foreign aid would only grow over time, to the point that the 
country gained the nickname of ‘Republic of NGOs’ (Zanotti 2010; Beckett 2017).  
From the period of liberalisation during Carter’s government, Haitian civil 
society kept organising and mobilising against the Duvalierist regime and for political 
change and democratisation, despite the brutal repression. Between 1985 and 1986, they 
protested throughout the country, in the capital and countryside. The US ultimately 
suspended its support to the regime.  
The end of the regime, nonetheless, did not mean the end of Duvalierism, as it 
deeply contaminated Haitian society and its institutions. There has been no truth, justice 
and reconciliation up to the present (Dubois 2012). The estimate death toll of the 
Duvalierist period varies from twenty to sixty thousand, but no systematic work has 
been done to ascertain such estimative, and a set of factors suggest that the toll can be 
even higher (Dubois 2012, 326), mainly because of the indiscriminate and random 
violence the regime used to completely subjugate its subjects and affirm its 
omnipotence. 
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3.1.4. Struggle for democratisation amidst a totalitarian legacy 
The political transition that followed the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier has been 
marked by a permanent tension between the rising democratic voices fighting against a 
totalitarian legacy, and the Duvalierist forces that were still present in the army and in a 
portion of the Haitian economic and political elite (Danticat 2007; Dubois 2012; Dupuy 
2007). Between 1986 and 1990, there were different attempts of establishment of a 
military dictatorship. Even so, the popular democratic movement achieved important 
results, as a transitional government was established, a progressive constitution 
promulgated, and free and fair elections were held, with the victory of Jean Bertrand 
Aristide, a former priest with a social justice discourse, with the majority of votes 
(Dubois 2012; Dupuy 2007).  
His victory materialised all the hope Haitians had at that moment for a radical 
change in the country, with which they would finally achieve freedom and 
democratisation. But this hope, unfortunately, did not last. Eight months after his 
election, in September 1991, he suffered a military coup d’état. Thousands of people 
were arrested, tortured and killed in the following years in the dictatorship of a military 
junta (Danticat 2007; Dubois 2012; Dupuy 2007).   
This period brought yet again a serious impact on Haitian politics and economy. 
Haitians were facing again very harsh conditions of physical and economic insecurity. 
An international embargo was established against the military junta, something that 
ended up worsening the economic hardship for the majority of the Haitian population. 
The formal economy shrunk, and Haiti entered in regional criminal networks, becoming 
a spot for international drug trafficking (Cockayne 2009, 80), with the involvement of 
the political and business elite. Since then, a political economy involving criminal 
activity, drug trafficking and political instability emerged, fuelled by high levels of 
unemployment, economic and social frustration (Cockayne 2009; 2014; Braum 2019; 
Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013).  
Aristide’s government was restored in 1994 with the ‘Operation Uphold 
Democracy’, brought about by 20.000 US marines, with the UN Security Council 
approval. The US marines were substituted by blue-helmets with the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in the following year, remaining in the country until 1996. 
With his return, Aristide dissolved the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FAdH). The process of 
100 
 
demobilisation of the army, even counting on US and UN support, was still deficient, 
something that would turn out to be, later on, another key source of political instability 
(Cockayne 2009, 80; Schuberth 2017, 416). Aristide invested in a police force to sustain 
his government and the security of the country, creating the Police Nationale d’Haïti 
(PNH) in 1995, but ended up also funding armed groups, or ‘gangs,’ to support his 
government (Dubois 2012; Dupuy 2007; Beckett 2019). An important part of Aristide’s 
base was already disillusioned with him at this point (Beckett 2019; Dupuy 2007, 
2009)52; some criticised the fact that he asked the help of the United States, while many 
of his supporters were willing to resist the coup in 1992; others criticised his increasing 
populist discourse (Beckett 2019).   
Aristide remained in power only up to the end of his mandate, and René Préval, 
of Aristide’s party, Lavalas, was elected in 1995, the first democratic transition of 
power in Haitian history (Dubois 2012; Dupuy 2007; Seitenfus 2014). The condition for 
Aristide’s return, ultimately fulfilled by Préval, was the implementation of neoliberal 
measures, with privatisations and wide liberalisation of the Haitian economy, something 
that further worsened the situation of Haitian farmers and peasants (Shah 2009; Shamsie 
and Thompson 2006).  
The US project for Haiti, to invest in manufactory industries, benefiting from 
abundant and cheap labour force, leading the Haitian agricultural sector to transit to 
monocultures valued in the external market and opening the Haitian market for the more 
productive and efficient US agriculture, once again damaged the Haitian economy 
(Dubois 2012; Shah 2009; Shamsie and Thompson 2006). In this period, Haiti became 
the main importer of US rice in the world, and the national rice production ended up 
destroyed, impoverishing thousands of farmers, something for which Bill Clinton 
publicly regretted.53   
Haitian peasants entered, in this way, a new cycle of impoverishment, leaving 
the countryside to seek employment in the capital, Port-au-Prince, which became more 
and more unsustainably overpopulated, with precarious and informal settlements and 
                                                          
52 Most Haitians belonging to the educated middle class I interviewed also expressed that the disillusion 
with Aristide happened at this moment.  
53 Subsidizing Starvation, Foreign Policy, 11 January 2013, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/11/subsidizing-starvation/. Recently, civil society pressure was able to 
halt a similar process in the peanuts sector (see: “Dumping peanuts on Haiti,” Oxfam America, 6 April 
2016 https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/04/dumping-peanuts-on-haiti/ Accessed 7 
September 2018).   
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without enough economic opportunities or access to proper housing, education, 
sanitation and health.54 It was one more cycle of migration from the countryside, like 
the one that happened under Jean-Claude Duvalier, leading to the ‘explosion of the city’ 
(Beckett 2019, 26), to the worsening of its precariousness, lack of planning and basic 
infrastructure and services, a process that in turn fuelled the political instability in the 
country (Beckett 2019), as further analysed.  
3.1.5. Aristide’s second government and the context of the establishment of 
Minustah 
Aristide’s second election in 2001 marked another period of social and political 
instability in the country. With only 10% of turnout, his election was contested by the 
opposition.55 This time, Aristide gained strong opposition not only from the Haitian 
business elite for his populist rhetoric, but also from an important part of the country’s 
working and middle class, from civil society groups and students, of diverse ideologies, 
including leftist and progressive sectors and many former allies (Dubois 2012, 365), and 
some of these groups asked for his resignation.56  
There are numerous denounces of human rights abuses by Aristide’s armed 
supporters; protests were also violently repressed in the period from 2003 to 2004.57 An 
episode at the state university in Port-au-Prince marked this phase, when gang members 
attacked a protest of students against the interference of Aristide’s government in the 
university, injuring dozens of people (Braum, 2014).  
Aristide’s government also increasingly lost its international legitimacy. One of 
the reasons is that he insisted that France should pay back the indemnity for the Haitian 
                                                          
54 Haiti also suffers from an ecological collapse, being one of the most deforested countries in the world 
(Beckett 2019, 40; Williams 2011), something also determinant for the impoverishment of Haitian 
peasants, the collapse of the Haitian agrarian economy, and for the intense migration to the capital. 
55 Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, 16 April 2004, S 2004/300. 
56 ‘Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif’ (PAPDA), and the feminist 
‘Coordination nationale de plaidoyer pour les droits des femmes’ (CONAP) are examples of 
organisations that opposed Aristide’s government, and also denounced the conditions of the external 
intervention in 2004. See: PAPDA, ‘Les causes de la chute d’Aristide en 2004’, 12 September 2004 
http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=44, Accessed 7 June 2018. 
57 PAPDA,‘Forces vives d’Haiti décrétent le Gouvernement Lavalas hors la loi’, 2 February 2004 
(http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=48, Accessed 7 June 2018; Human Rights Watch, Events 
of 2004 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2005/country-chapters/haiti, Accessed 12 June 2018.  
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independence.58 But in the end he also lost the support from Latin American countries, 
several of them at that time with leftist governments, who understood that he chose a 
wrong path (Seitenfus 2014). 
In the beginning of 2004, forces led by former FAdH members undertook a 
decisive violent assault against the government of Aristide, entering the country from 
the Dominican Republic. Part of Aristide’s armed supporters turned against him in this 
moment, joining the offensive to end his government (Braum, 2014, 81; Shamsie and 
Thompson, 2006; Kolbe 2013, 4). On 29 February Aristide left Haiti on an American 
airplane. According to him, he was kidnapped, something the US government denied, 
alleging they were protecting Aristide’s physical integrity (Dubois 2012, 364; Seitenfus 
2014, pos 1533-1580).  
On the same day, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a 
resolution establishing the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) under the Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, authorising ‘the Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its 
mandate’, of facilitating humanitarian assistance, providing support to the Haitian 
police and Coast Guard and ‘to establish and maintain public safety and law and order 
and to promote and protect human rights.’59 The force was composed by troops from 
the United States, France, Canada and Chile.60  
An interim government was established in March, remaining in power until 
elections were held in 2006. The period that followed Aristide’s oust was of the most 
intense violent conflict, with a considerable improvement only after 2006 elections. The 
armed supporters of Aristide did not accept his oust from power, promoting a violent 
rebellion that they understood as a ‘revolution’ (Braum2014). Beyond the fight between 
the different factions, there were many kidnappings in this period, and an alarming 
increase in common criminality (Kolbe and Muggah 2011; Kolbe 2013).  
The approach of the UN intervention was the plain use of force. As the armed 
supporters of Aristide were in poor, marginalised and densely populated 
neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, MIF operations made use of indiscriminate violence, 
                                                          
58 Three of my local informants said that in their view this was a decisive factor for Aristide’s fall, and 
this is a common opinion among Haitians (interviews with Haitians members of Haitian civil society on 
11 April, 2 and 4 May 2016 in Port-au-Prince).  
59 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529, 29 February 2004.  
60 Political, Security, and Civil Developments in Haiti (March 15, 2004 Weekly Report), U.S. Department 
of State Archive, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/30486.htm.  
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with the killing of hundreds of civilians (Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013; Cockayne 2014). 
This further alienated the habitants of these neighbourhoods, as it reinforced their sense 
of injustice, only aggravating the social and political conflict in the country. Although 
there were considerable changes after the establishment of Minustah, as further 
analysed, the operation still made use of indiscriminate violence in the Haitian 
‘ghettos,’ mostly in the period before the 2006 elections, with the killing of civilians 
(Cockayne 2009, 2014; Danticat 2007; Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013). 
The context where Minustah was established was, in this way, one of strong 
political contestation and social conflict, where political legitimacy was contested by 
different groups divided by deep social, economic and class cleavages. The next section 
demonstrates, nonetheless, that the UN mission did not work to address this conflict, 
lacking a local source of legitimacy, and how this configuration contributed for the 
reproduction of a non-democratic political framework, connected to state and structural 
violence, and of the condition of chronic political instability in the country.   
3.2. Minustah’s ‘security first’ approach, legitimacy and the reproduction of 
instability and crisis in Haiti 
This section presents the core of the present thesis, the empirical analysis 
concerning the legitimacy of the UN stabilisation mission in Haiti to the local 
population, and how this configuration shaped the results achieved in the country in the 
areas of security and political stabilisation. In the following, I present a panorama of 
how Haitians reacted, resisted, lived with, cooperated and blamed Minustah; how the 
operation interacted with the Haitian population in general, with local political actors, 
and also with influent foreign actors in the country, something that also impacted on the 
perceptions of Haitians about the UN mission; how this interaction shaped the results 
achieved, and ultimately, how it shaped the long term political outcomes of the 
international intervention.  
The legitimacy of authorities to its subjects can be better investigated if 
understood as a dynamic phenomenon, as already reflected, something that can and 
actually permanently changes in the often tense interaction between power holders and 
subjects of power (Beetham 2013). This understanding is important to analyse the 
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legitimacy of political systems in general, but especially in cases with which this thesis 
is concerned, of long term political instability, crisis and conflict, as the contestation of 
political legitimacy is most often the very reason for violent conflict (Mitchell 2018), 
certainly in the case of Haiti.  
Talking about the state, Haiti suffers from a chronic political instability, for 
which, for an important part of the Haitian history, there has not been a settled political 
system that enjoyed the approval and obedience of its subjects.61 As analysed by 
Trouillot (1990), the very development of the Haitian society, economy and culture, 
peasant and agrarian and organised around the lakou system, happened mostly in 
resistance to the Haitian political elite, that is, in resistance to the state, since this 
political elite deployed, for most of the Haitian history, an exploitative taxation system, 
without the production of common goods in return. We can talk, in this sense, about 
legitimacy in the social institutions created by Haitian peasants as a way of building 
their freedom, as an alternative to the plantation system, that some Haitian leaders tried 
to re-establish after the revolution, without succeeding (Dubois 2012).  
The Haitian social institutions, or the lakou system, suffered an important 
erosion with the decades of predation by the Haitian political class, combined with the 
foreign interventionism, as analysed in the previous section, with the massive 
impoverishment of peasants and migration to the capital. Although it is common that 
people who migrated and their descendants maintain contact with relatives in the 
countryside, and that they refer to their origins and identity as peasants (Braum 2014), 
in the city the peasant culture and its social ties weaken or disappear, and the peasant 
life is something most of them ceased to aspire for (Beckett 2019, 26-32). People in 
Haiti talk, in this sense, about the “death of the lakou” (Beckett 2019, 44), that is, the 
end of a way of living and of a social system, often pointed as the main reason for the 
long-lasting crisis in the country.  
 The thesis aims to analyse not only the legitimacy of the UN mission for the 
Haitian population, but also to present a panorama of prevalent ideas, struggles and 
disputes around political legitimacy in the Haitian society, for which I rely not only on 
                                                          
61 Haitian society is characterised by a permanent tension between hierarchy and egalitarianism (Braum 
2014; Trouillot 1990). While the Haitian Revolution and culture of resistance of Haitian peasants that 
shaped the development of the country’s agrarian culture produced an egalitarian basis, the militarism and 
authoritarian political experiences promoted a hierarchical and often authoritarian culture. Both coexist in 
permanent tension in everyday social relations and politics.  
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my field research, but also on ethnographic studies (beyond the historical analysis 
already mentioned) which dug deeper in the universe of the Haitian society, its means of 
cohesion, its conflicts and forms of dealing with crisis, insecurity and instability 
(Beckett 2013, 2014, 2017, 2019; Braum 2014; James 2010; Marcelin 2015).  
If international interveners aimed to support the development of legitimate, 
accountable and democratic state institutions, such panorama should be part of their 
basic work plan. As we will see, this was not the case, a problem of UN peace 
operations already pointed in existing literature (Pouligny 2004; Autesserre 2009, 
2010), but in which a proper scrutiny of the local dimension of political legitimacy is 
often missing. The thesis aims to fill this gap, analysing both dimensions so as to enable 
a proper understanding of the role of the UN mission in Haitian politics and society.  
As already developed in the section Methods, my goal is to present an analysis 
of the different and often conflicting social political groups in Haiti, through an 
interpretation of their own understandings of the political crisis, in the different cycles 
of it, comprehending the duration of Minustah, from 2004 to 2017. I believe this 
qualitative analysis with an interpretative approach will enable a new understanding of 
individuals’ motivations and attitudes, enabling us to undergo the study of this period 
passing through their diverse perspectives, and better understand the whole social and 
political panorama in Haiti.   
In the following, different phases of Haiti under Minustah are analysed, marked 
by critical junctures, events that substantially changed the set of factors and conditions 
at play, that is, the conjuncture in the country and of the international intervention.  
3.2.1. 2004-2006: Political crisis, civil conflict, foreign intervention and Minustah 
security enforcement 
As described in the historical background, Aristide’s second election as 
president in 2001 was marked by a low turnout, contestation by the opposition and by 
the fact that he did not have the same support as in his first election, when he 
represented the hopes of the popular democratic movement in the post-Duvalier period 
(Beckett 2019; Dubois 2012; Dupuy 2007)62. As for 2004, the country was dragged in 
                                                          
62 The fact that Aristide represented the hope of this period, for a new era of democracy and development 
in the country, was unanimous among my interviewees, Haitians and foreigners alike.  
106 
 
social and political conflict and violence. An important part of the civil movements that 
supported Aristide back in 1990’s was now protesting against his increasing 
authoritarian tendencies and violence perpetrated by his armed supporters, and many of 
them asking his resignation (Beckett 2019; Dupuy 2007, 2009).63  
It is important to note, nonetheless, that Aristide’s government did not have 
control over these armed groups, who operated independently, and fought their ‘war’ 
from 2004 to 2006 without his leadership – it was a reaction against Aristide’s oust, but 
not commanded by him (Braum 2014).64 Many of these groups grew in the previous 
decades among the political instability and successive political crises the country 
underwent, in the absence of the state and with the unplanned growth of Port-au-Prince, 
with the massive migration from the countryside due to the collapse of the peasant 
economy (Beckett 2014; Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990). As summarised by Cockayne: 
Since that regime’s demise in the late 1980s, the state’s control of violence has once again 
fragmented: the middle and upper classes rely on highly organized private security companies, 
while Haiti’s urban slums are controlled by neighbourhood protection rackets and gang violence 
(Cockayne 2009, 78).  
With Aristide’s populist government, these groups grew in strength and power, 
with the acquiescence of the government, despite their often violent and predatory 
behaviour. Aristide’s government was not only permissive, but had connections and 
gave space to these groups in the government (Braum 2014; Beckett 2019). Tellingly, 
the Haitian historian Suzy Castor calls Aristide an “anarcho-populist” (Castor 2008). 
The former FAdH soldiers (among other groups who joined them), on the other 
side, were mobilising and gaining strength with support and funding from foreign 
actors, mainly from the United States and the Dominican Republic (Kolbe 2006; 
                                                          
63 See also: Movements within Haiti declared the Lavalas Government an outlaw government, PAPDA, 2 
February 2004, http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=47.  
64 The documentary ‘Ghosts of Cité Soleil,’ which presents rare footages of the areas controlled by these 
armed groups in 2004, also shows it, as its main character, Billy, says that Aristide abandoned them, but 
that they were going to fight in any case. 
It is interesting to note that in Beckett ethnographic account, a man who was Aristide’s supporter back in 
1991 said they were expecting a call to arms from Aristide, to resist the brutal military junta, but it didn’t 
come, as Aristide was defending a political solution. Beckett quotes him: “‘We waited,’ he told me, ‘we 
waited. But nothing. We should have fought. Aristide, the international community, they said we need a 
political solution,’ Maxo shook his head. ‘You can’t have a political solution to war’” (Beckett 2019, 25). 
Maxo was a social and environmental activist, and one among the many disillusioned with Aristide and 
the Lavalas movement. The fact that Aristide’s political movement later recurred to the alliance with 
violent entrepreneurs demonstrates the strength of the pattern of use of violence for political ends in Haiti, 
something, as we shall see, the UN intervention did not contribute to tackle.   
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Muggah 2013),65 from where they invaded Haiti to overthrow Aristide. We can say, in 
this sense, that there was external support and funding for these armed actors to 
overthrow Aristide, and when they did it, the most influent countries in Haiti, including 
the United States, acquiesced to this outcome.  
Despite the fact that this context clearly consisted on a political crisis and 
conflict, contrary to most UN peace operations, there was no peace process or 
comprehensive and minimally inclusive political settlement for the establishment of the 
operation, neither in the following years. The ‘solution’ brought by the international 
intervention was to treat the social and political turmoil and violence through coercive 
means, something that ended up further worsening the situation (Cockayne 2014; Kolbe 
2013; Muggah 2013).  
Up to the present, there is no minimal consensus in Haiti about the events of that 
period, around the nature and source of violence that hit the country,66 something that, I 
argue, contributes to the continuation of political instability, social fragmentation and 
lack of success in democratisation.  
For Aristide’s armed supporters, they were fighting a war, making a revolution 
against those who overthrew Aristide (Braum 2014), fighting for their rights and space 
in Haitian society and politics. When they gave up the use of violence, in 2006, many of 
them say that they made the peace, and decided to work through other means to reach 
peace, development and to benefit their communities – the time of war was over, it was 
the time of development, many of them said (Braum 2014, 106-110). Although 
outsiders consider these groups as ‘gangs,’ they recognise themselves, or fall under the 
social category of Baz, or base, a broad category that refers to diverse associative forms, 
from a simple group of friends to civic, cultural, musical and/ or political organisations 
(Braum 2014, 12). While in the culture and aesthetics adopted by some of these groups, 
there might be references and identification with a ‘gangsta’ culture, inspired by the 
American rap,67 we can affirm that they did not recognise themselves as simple ‘thugs’ 
                                                          
65 As the United States, the Dominican Republic has an important political influence in Haiti, from where 
funding to political groups come (Seitenfus 2014).  
66 As further analysed, these divergences were clear comparing interviews with Haitians from different 
social and economic background, and also taking into account ethnographic accounts and other existing 
literature (Braum 2014; Beckett 2019; Castor 2008; Dupuy 2008; Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013).   
67 Port-au-Prince armed groups are considerably diverse in this respect. The influence of the voodoo 
religion is very common, but also references to Rastafari and reggae, American rap and hip-hop, and even 
American movies about mafia (Braum 2014). 
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in the period from 2004 to 2006, since for them they were rebelling against an unjust 
political outcome.68 As noted by Muggah:   
In Bel Air, as elsewhere, identities of armed groups are often fluid, with groups displaying 
complex alliances, and serving overlapping functions. The idea that the baze is criminal neglects 
the dynamic and polyarchic identities within them. Coercive and enforcement-led activities are 
in danger of ignoring these multiple identities, and the local legitimacy these gangs might enjoy 
as a consequence of the other functions they exercise. (Muggah 2013, 304-305).  
It is important to emphasise that the armed Baz often have a predatory behaviour 
towards the population under their control. The local legitimacy Muggah refers to is 
often a permanently tense relationship, following the already mentioned tension 
between hierarchy and egalitarianism characteristic of the Haitian society, or between 
the leader versus his base (and the power of the latter to pressure the former).69 Besides, 
these groups, their leadership and bounds, are extremely unstable, following the 
precariousness of everyday life in the ghettos of Port-au-Prince (Braum 2014). For these 
reasons, I would not say these groups in general enjoy legitimacy concerning the 
populations under their control, at least not in the more refined, politically and 
normatively relevant meaning this thesis seeks to develop.70  
In any case, to classify them as simple bandits, for which the solution should be 
simple use of violent coercion, was to completely ignore the context of these armed 
groups, their role in the ghettos, offering a kind of protection to their vulnerable 
populations, and their political implications. As summarised by Kolbe: 
Residents of popular zones have a complicated relationship with armed urban groups. Those that 
are more predatory inspire fear and disgust from residents while those armed urban groups which 
provide protective, advocacy and social services to the residents are spoken with respect and 
admiration, albeit with some apprehension as well (Kolbe 2013, 19).  
68 There is a fundamental gendered dimension in the context of conflict and violence in Haiti. As pointed 
by Muggah, those who join armed groups are often emasculated young males, who cannot fulfil a social 
role expected from males traditionally in the Haitian culture, a process that developed with the collapse of 
the agrarian economy and massive migration to the capital. As pointed in Chapter 2, fristrasyon is a 
feeling often expressed in contexts of violent behaviour (Braum 2019, Marcelin 2015) not only in the 
context of gang activities, but also in circumstances of domestic violence (Marcelin 2015). 
69 Pedro Braum, anthropologist and projects coordinator at Viva Rio, reports that there were cases in 
which leaders who abused their power were killed by their bases, in one of these cases, people made a 
party to celebrate the fall of the tyrant (so to say).  
70 Some of them can reach a more stable equilibrium in their territories, and as providers of security and 
stability, can have a basic legitimacy (Popitz and Gottlich 2017) as analysed in Chapter 2 (Braum 2014); 
but we can say this is not the rule. Mainly after 2010, these groups underwent severe violent conflicts, or 
‘wars’ (Braum 2014), so even if these more stable territories exist, they can be destabilised by external 
threats.  
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For some of those who protested against Aristide in 2004, on the other hand, 
demanding political change in face of the increasing authoritarianism and violence of 
Aristide government, with whom I had the opportunity to talk in Haiti, the international 
intervention happened to actually halt their movement for democratic renovation. For 
them, the objective of powerful foreign actors and of the “international community” was 
to suppress their struggle.71 For this group, in this sense, the intervention did not 
represent a solution to the crisis, but one more problem. The fact that the armed 
movement who overthrew Aristide had support and funding of foreign actors, including 
from the United States (Cockayne 2009, 2014; Kolbe; 2013; Muggah 2013), 
corroborated their understanding of an international plot once again working against the 
democratic forces in the country.  
Haitians from the educated middle class and belonging to the intellectual elite, in 
turn, do not recognise the violent conflict of that period as a civil war or as politically 
motivated, but see Aristide’s supporters as common thugs or gangsters,72 something 
reinforced, to be sure, by the fact that they engaged in criminal activities during that 
period, including with the pervasive practice of kidnappings (that members of different 
factions practiced), added to the alarming rates of opportunistic criminality, or an 
epidemics of violence that hit Haiti at that time (Kolbe 2006, 2013).  
This urban intellectual middle and upper class broke with Aristide for his 
populist, clientelist and antidemocratic politics. As Aristide, and also Préval (who also 
broke with the former, but not becoming exactly an opponent, as much of Aristide’s 
                                                          
71 Camille Chalmers, director of PAPDA, and Frank Seguy, professor of sociology of the Université 
d’État d’Haïti, whom I interviewed in my field research in Haiti, expressed this understanding of the 2004 
intervention (interviews performed on 11 and 3 May 2016, respectively). We can say that they represent 
the more leftist group left in Haiti, as leftists were harshly persecuted in the country during the Duvalierist 
period and during the government of the military junta in the 1990’s; there are also those who survived 
and remained in Haiti who are mostly disillusioned with a possibility of real change in the country. This 
collective frustration and dismay is widespread in Haiti and common knowledge for those with contact 
with the country’s reality. The strongest movement countering this environment of frustration and apathy 
came last year, in 2018, with the massive protests against the scandal corruption of PetroCaribe, 
demanding the investigation of the case and the return of the embezzled money worth billions of dollars, 
that should have been invested in social and development projects. This campaign started online, mainly 
on Twitter, and quickly spread with street protests, uniting for the first time in years different social 
groups for a common cause (‘Haiti protests: Why are so many people on the streets?,’ BBC News, 18 
June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-48665945/haiti-protests-why-are-so-many-
people-on-the-
streets?fbclid=IwAR1wgpyOH26pFWayIoEBm56BwR_EipyW21Kf0nU4lWAjr46GbhXPFj5aCS4). 
72 As expressed in the interviews with Michèle Duvivier Pierre Louis, president of the cultural 
organisation Fokal and former prime-minister of the country (on 15 April 2014), and in most of the 
interviews with civil society representatives from Port-au-Prince educated middle class.  
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base supported Préval’s second government) did not address the question of the urban 
crisis (or urban collapse) in Port-au-Prince, ending up worsening it with their populist 
policies,73 much of this educated urban class started seeing Aristide’s democratic model 
as synonymous of disorder and chaos (Beckett 2019, 29-32).  
These divergent views, as we can see, follow the deep-rooted social and class 
cleavages and conflicts in Haiti.74 The crisis of Aristide’s second administration 
happened in the context of the long and interrupted political transition after the fall of 
Duvaliers’ regime, as analysed in the previous section. Aristide lost the support of a 
progressive urban educated middle and upper class for his populist politics and 
connections with armed groups, for the way he was (or mishandling) the social conflicts 
in the country, ending up weakening its democratic forces. The business elite and more 
conservative and authoritarian political class quickly took advantage, with their armed 
intervention to forcefully overthrow Aristide. Once again, Haitian political actors were 
not able to fulfil the transition to democracy, amid unfavourable internal conditions, 
mainly concerning the economic conditions of the country, and continuous external 
interference.  
The international intervention, nonetheless, did not address these social and 
political conflicts. As we shall see, Minustah had important improvements over time, 
delivering some specific positive outcomes. But in not addressing these deeper conflicts 
and political questions, neither from the outset, at the beginning of the operation, nor 
afterwards, the intervention created a political void that only fuelled violent conflict in 
the short term, and ended up worsening social fragmentation and the undemocratic and 
predatory logics of Haitian politics in the long term.  
                                                          
73 With lenient policies to squatters, mismanagement of the city, of basic services, water supply, etc., 
because of their clientelist policies. Beckett (2019) brings a very telling account, in this sense, about the 
only forest left in Port-au-Prince, the Habitation Leclerc, that environmental activists fought to protect, 
and that was occupied by squatters and an armed group called ‘Red Army.’ The conflict between these 
groups symbolised the social conflicts in Haiti, the ideological clash marked by deep class divisions, a 
situation that illustrates the problem Hannah Arendt (2006) pointed concerning the social question, as 
democracy can be undermined when individuals engage in politics to extract economic benefits (or 
actually their livelihoods), without a proper care for the common good and the commonwealth.   
74 It is important to note here that mainly after the Duvalierist dictatorship, the class and race cleavages 
are very complex in Haiti, as the dictatorship, which sustained a ‘black power’ discourse, persecuted 
members of the old ‘mulatto’ elite. Black people could rise in the class structure in the country since after 
the revolution, mainly through the military, but the valorisation of lighter skin persisted, influencing the 
choice of marriage, with the perpetuation of a ‘mulatto’ elite (Trouillot 1990). A political movement 
around the black power gained force in the 1950’s, when Duvalier was elected. We can say that after the 
fall of Duvalierism, there was an opportunity for overcoming such race cleavages and the conflicts they 
generate, something that unfortunately did not happen.  
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Existing literature has already pointed the limitation of the ‘security-first’ 
approach of Minustah to promote stabilisation and statebuilding in Haiti (Muggah 
2013), or the “futility of force” (Cockayne 2014) to tackle the problem represented by 
the armed baz or ‘gangs’ of Haitian ghettos, as the causes of their existence and the 
political economy around their activity went unaddressed. Back in 2004, these armed 
groups used to publicly display their force in Haitian ghettos, showing their weaponry 
in broad daylight and openly ruling these territories. Today, almost two years after 
Minustah’s departure, these armed groups returned to do so.75   
The physical coercion exerted by the intervention ended up reinforcing an 
‘anarchic’ state, where entrepreneurs in the market of violence competed in turfs, with a 
passive acceptance by the population under their control (who simply didn’t have other 
choice) or adherence to their claims and rule, mostly young and disenfranchised males. 
There is a set of factors that indicate that the populations under their control tacitly 
accept the protection of these groups: the already mentioned permanent tension and 
instability of these relations; the lack of options and very restricted agency of these 
vulnerable populations; the fact that they often collaborate with other actors to tackle 
the problem of violence, when there are other sources to access basic services.76 
The military component of Minustah reached positive outcomes for the capture 
of ‘gang’ leaders when they started policies of ‘winning hearts and minds,’ although 
those who collaborated and were identified were often stigmatised as betrayers of the 
community (Braum 2014, 142). But already pointed, there is an important variation; 
these groups should not be understood through rigid categorisation. They comport a 
very important diversity of actors; a chief from one baz can consider himself as social 
leader who cares for his neighbourhood, who works for the development and common 
wellbeing, while he can consider chiefs of other baz as gangsters and thugs connected to 
robbery and other crimes; bases often protect their territory of crimes from bases from 
other territories; there can be agreements between different baz, in which assaults 
outside their territory is tacitly accepted, provided that their baz is protected, and so on 
(Braum 2014). The ghettos in Port-au-Prince are highly complex social environments, 
result of a life marked by extreme poverty and insecurity in different levels. 
                                                          
75 Interview with Pedro Braum, projects coordinator at Viva Rio in Port-au-Prince, by telephone, in July 
2019.  
76 Becker 2011; Beckett 2019; Interview with Colonel Ricardo Pereira de Araujo Bezerra, commander of 
Minustah’s Brazilian battalion, on 25 April 2016. 
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Kolbe well summarises the process that led to an increase in the recruitment of 
young and disenfranchised males in the ghettos of Port-au-Prince with the establishment 
of the international intervention, with an escalation of the violent conflict and 
recruitment by different factions:  
During this three years period of political repression, membership in armed groups across the 
spectrum increased. Both pro- and anti-Lavalas gangs actively sought funding and members. 
When ex-FAdH supported anti-Lavalas gangs and attacked pro-Lavalas gangs, it only fuelled the 
membership drive and accelerated violence. Crime, both that committed by political actors and 
crime committed by opportunistic criminals, increased (Kolbe 2013, 8). 
In this sense, instead of facilitating a solution for the conflict, the intervention 
ended up worsening it, alienating not only those who supported Aristide and dwellers of 
the ghettos affected by the violence and by Minustah’ military incursions in general, but 
also those who opposed Aristide’s government and were protesting against its 
democratic setbacks.  
There are few sources of data to ascertain the number of deaths and victims of 
kidnappings and sexual violence during this period, a general problem in Haiti as the 
Haitian state has a very low administrative capacity, for which we can rely mostly on 
household surveys, which have, evidently, a limited precision. Kolbe and Hutson 
estimates, in this sense, that the number of violent deaths in the period from the day of 
Aristide’s oust, 29 February 2004, and December 2005, was of 8.000, 11.000 
kidnappings and 35.000 women and girls were victims of sexual violence (Kolbe and 
Hutson 2006).  
Before Aristide’s oust, there were attempts of negotiation to reach a political 
solution to the crisis led by the Caribbean Community (Caricom), with the involvement 
of the European Union, France, OAS and the United States.77 Aristide accepted to 
negotiate, but the armed opposition refused. Nonetheless, one can question if the 
alternative in face of the refusal of an armed opposition with the support of foreign 
actors and of the Haitian business elite to negotiate was to suppress the violent rebellion 
and social turmoil through violent means and to establish a transitional government that, 
on the top of all this, had members connected to the armed opposition against Aristide 
(Cockayne 2009, 2014; Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013). Taking into account that the 
                                                          
77 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, 16 April 2004, S 2004/300.  
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United States is accused of supporting the armed revolt against Aristide, it is doubtful 
that this country exerted its power of influence to make the rebelled armed group 
cooperate with the negotiations.  
The international intervention (now in the broader sense, concerning hegemonic 
countries with decision power) ended up rewarding those who made use of force to 
achieve their political goal and were not willing to sit at the negotiation table. Once 
again, the use of force prevailed in Haitian politics, with the influence and support of 
foreign actors.  
Haiti was once again casted out from the political and discursive realm and 
treated as a pariah in the international system, not only as a consequence of its own 
political forces but for deliberative policies of foreign countries towards it, which in 
turn had, as it usually happens, a self-fulfilling effect. The absence of negotiation and of 
a peace process, in the establishment of the operation and in the following years, created 
a situation in which the political process and the political realm in Haiti were 
suspended. As it was occupied by foreign troops, the social and political forces of the 
country lingered powerless (at least those without guns). The intervention further 
reinforced the disillusion with the possibility of democratisation of those who were 
protesting against Aristide, enraged his supporters, and put in power an illegitimate and 
inoperative government that was “business friendly”, with the inclusion of individuals 
connected to the armed rebellion against Aristide in the security apparatus (Muggah 
2013, 297).  
If, as already pointed, Haiti did not count on legitimate state institutions for most 
of its history, the international intervention in 2004 represented one more gear in the 
constellation that perpetuated this situation, generating, this time, a political void. The 
country’s sovereignty was suspended, something the UN and the countries involved in 
the intervention did not properly recognise. The UNSC resolution that based the 
intervention was under the Chapter VII, with which, in practice, Haiti lost its 
sovereignty. It remained in this way the whole period of intervention, but as the United 
Nations did not assume the administration of the Haitian territory, as in the cases of East 
Timor and Kosovo, for instance, the intervention suspended Haiti’s sovereignty without 
assuming it. This situation seems to be an archetypical case of what Chandler (2006) 
called ‘Empire in Denial,’ as international organisations and hegemonic countries do 
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not assume the power they have in countries under international intervention, something 
enabled by the neutral and technical discourse of their peace-and-statebuilding project, 
as pointed in the first chapter.  
This sovereignty in suspension led to what I see as a political void that was 
created by the intervention, and that it could not bridge with the elections and the DDR 
process from 2006 on, despite the improvements achieved after these processes, as we 
shall see, as there have not been efforts to address the deep fractures in Haitian society 
and to restore a common and unifying understanding for political change and 
democratisation.78  
The interim government established with the support of the international 
intervention did not enjoy legitimacy towards the population, not only among Aristide’s 
supporters, but more broadly (Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013)79; some of my interviewees 
pointed that transitional government members knew themselves that they were not 
legitimate, and that they could not, by consequence, act to tackle and intervene in the 
violent conflict and social turmoil from 2004 to 2006.80 The conflict and violence, in 
this sense, went unaddressed in this period, except for Minustah’s military incursions in 
Haitian ghettos with the PNH, which were, as pointed in the existing literature, 
ineffective, beyond the victimisation of civilians (Cockayne 2014; Kolbe 2013; Muggah 
2013). In this sense, the transitional government did not fill the sovereignty and political 
authority gap because it was, it is reasonable to say, a façade government.  
In this sense, if Aristide promoted a kind of “anarcho-populism” (Castor 2008), 
the UN intervention ended up contributing for the consolidation of a violent anarchical 
state that reigned in the country from 2004 until 2006, with different armed groups and 
                                                          
78 When I conducted the field research in Haiti, in 2016, a number of my interviewees, especially 
foreigners living in Haiti for years or decades, expressed certain contempt with the idea of a ‘national 
dialogue,’ since Haitians constantly talked about the need for it, but it never happened. Underlying was an 
idea that Haitians talked a lot about politics, about their history, without ever reaching real results. The 
fact that the country needs, indeed, real and practical measures to address all its urgent needs and crises 
reinforces this understanding. But despite the fact that Haitians talk a lot about politics in daily life, there 
has not been a concerted and institutionalised process of national dialogue (as many of them point as 
necessary) since the democratic movement post-Duvalierism was suppressed in the 1990’s.  
79 This understanding was expressed by most of those I interviewed in Haiti, mainly locals and foreigners 
who were present in the country at that time.  
80 Understanding expressed in interview with a foreigner who lives in Haiti since more than three 
decades, representative of a development aid NGO, as well as with two Haitians representatives of civil 
society organisations, between April and May 2016. 
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factions, or entrepreneurs of violence, competing in the market of protection/ violence 
(Cockayne 2009), amid the absence of a minimally legitimate political authority.   
Aristide supporters were decided to violently contest Aristide’s oust (Braum 
2014, Muggah 2013), fighting to maintain their control over the territories of ghettos in 
the capital.81 The armed factions who overthrew Aristide, on the other side, beyond 
acting in the city, maintained control over territories in the countryside in this period, 
mainly in the northern and eastern rural areas (Cockayne 2009), something the 
operation initially did not tackle, as they were concentrated to fight the armed groups in 
the capital.  
In this period, the United States pressured Brazil to reinforce the use of coercion 
in the military incursions in Port-au-Prince ghettos, culminating with the suicide of the 
Brazilian commander of the UN troops, Lieutenant-General Urano Bacelar, in January 7 
2006 (Seitenfus 2014). Although it is not possible to ascertain Bacelar’s motivations, 
Seitenfus notes that he was under pressure by different actors and in divergent 
directions, from the leadership of Minustah, corroborating the US position, from the 
government of United States, and from the Brazilian government, then led by president 
Lula da Silva, who sustained a discourse of solidarity and cooperation among Southern 
developing countries and wanted a more contained and humanitarian approach in the 
incursions (Patriota 2017; Seitenfus 2014). This unsettling situation was the result of the 
lack of clarity concerning the political authority in charge in the country (or the absence 
of it), with multiple and unclear instances of decision.82  
It is reasonable to say, in this sense, that means of violent coercion were being 
deployed with the absence of responsibility of government, we can say, the perfect 
negation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001), with a context in 
which we cannot even talk about political legitimacy, for there were not proper 
81 The armed revolt in Haitian ghettos has been named ‘Operation Bagdad’ by the local media; later on, 
those involved in the revolt would also call the rebellion of that period by this name (Braum 2004).  
82 The lack of clear directions and guidelines is not uncommon in the context of UN peace operations, for 
their very nature, as they depend on the decisions coming from a multilateral mechanism, leading to 
highly complex political contexts (Pouligny 2006; Paris and Sisk 2009); in the case of Bosnia, this lack of 
clarity probably led to even more civilian losses (Power 2013). In Haiti, nonetheless, the conflict did not 
seem to come from international multilateral decision-making, but from the disagreement between the 
United States and Brazil, which held the military command of Minustah and was the main troops’ 
contributor the whole period, and from this political void created by the intervention. In Seitenfus’ 
account on this situation, the Haitian interim government was not even mentioned, those involved in the 
conflict, as he reported, were mainly Minustah’s civilian and military leadership, the US and the Brazilian 
government (Seitenfus 2014).  
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claimants of legitimate political authority.83 Recalling the Arendtian differentiation 
between violence and power (Arendt 1970), and that in the Weberian political 
sociology, for political power to exist, or for power to become domination, more than 
physical coercion is required (Schlichte 2018; Weber 1949), the international 
intervention promoted not only a negation of politics in the sense of the lack of 
negotiation between the parts of the conflict and of a political settlement to solve the 
social and political crisis in the country, but in the literal sense of promoting a void of 
political authority in Haiti.  
If it is true that the Haitian state has historically a predatory role, governing 
against the Nation (Trouillot 1990) as already pointed, or has been often absent, or what 
Beckett called “the art of not governing” (Beckett 2014), the international intervention 
in 2004 also followed the historical pattern of foreign intervention in the country, 
supporting antidemocratic forces and contributing for a state of anarchic violence, 
instead of supporting stabilisation, conflict resolution and a path for a democratic 
political settlement. The use of violence to achieve political ends was, in this sense, 
once again reinforced in Haiti.  
Minustah’s mandate has been annually renewed by the UNSC based on the 
Chapter VII, even if an agreement was established with the interim government with 
which it formally welcomed the international intervention, and even if all Haitian 
governments widely cooperated with the mission. In this sense, despite the absence of 
an international administration, such as in East Timor and Kosovo, Haitian’s 
sovereignty was continually limited by the UNSC Resolutions that annually renovated 
Minustah’s mandate, without long-term considerations. The transition to the United 
Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (Minujusth), in October of 2017, did not 
completely change this scenario. Despite the fact that the mission does not have a 
military component, counting only with the UNPOL, the UNSC Resolution establishing 
it is still under the Chapter VII, with the use of a language according to it.84   
                                                          
83 It is possible that the stronger (or only) claimants to represent a legitimate authority were the leaders of 
the baz who violently contested Aristide’s oust. At least, according to the reports available, many of them 
believed in their own claims (Braum 2014; Beckett 2019; ‘Ghosts of Cité Soleil’). This is not to condone 
their violent means and crimes, nor to say they had legitimacy among the population under their control, 
but only an evaluation of their self-perception and their own claims.  
84 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2350, 13 April 2017. 
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In this sense, uncertainty concerning Haiti’s sovereignty persisted even after 
2006, when elections were held and a government with the legitimacy of people’s vote 
was established, ceasing the void of political authority in the country. The political 
configuration involving international interventionism and compromise of sovereignty, 
nonetheless, still reproduced a state of crisis, or a state of exception – Haiti did not have 
an international administration, but neither had it had complete control over its 
sovereignty. As we shall see, this protracted and uncertain configuration ended up 
undermining Haitian’s sovereignty and self-determination more than in cases of 
international administration, such as in East Timor and Kosovo.  
3.2.2. 2006 – 2010: Preval’s election, DDR, Community Violence Reduction and 
Security Sector Reform  
René Préval was elected in February of 2006, in elections considered as free and 
fair by international observers,85 without major incidents and with considerable popular 
participation, of around 60% (Seitenfus 2014; Nordem 2006), something remarkable in 
the context of turmoil of that period. Préval was a suitable candidate in that situation: he 
broke with Aristide, but still had substantial support from all the Lavalas movement, 
which at that time was not a single party anymore; he was also well connected with the 
most influent countries in Haiti. Préval presented, in this sense, a conciliatory option 
(Seitenfus 2014), as the groups with power to influence and shape the political scenario 
approved his election (beyond the popular vote), something attested by the 
achievements and relative stabilisation reached during his government.   
From this period on, the question of the armed groups began to be addressed, not 
only through the military incursions that aimed, without success, to enforce order 
through the use of violent coercion, but with actions to dialogue with these groups, to 
address their grievances and causes of violence. With a government that enjoyed some 
level of legitimacy in power (Braum 2014; Cockayne 2009; 2014; Muggah 2010), 
Minustah moved from the difficult situation of the previous period, in which it had the 
                                                          
85 Préval did not have the majority of votes in the first round, and according to the Haitian law, there 
should be a second round. To avoid further dangers of destabilisation, the actors more involved in Haiti, 
that formed the so called ‘Core Group’, decided that he should be elected in the first round, as he was in 
first with an important advantage. The solution was suggested by Brazil, taking as model the Brazilian 
law, where the votes are counted in the sum of valid votes proportionally, and in this way, Préval had the 
majority (Seitenfus 2014).  
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hands tied, to one where it had the possibility of developing more productive means to 
achieve its stated goal of stabilisation, having an elected government as local partner. 
Préval created the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and 
Reintegration to pacify the territories controlled by armed groups, including inviting 
some among the leadership of the groups to facilitate the dialogue and the process of 
demobilisation (Braum 2014). Minustah supported the work of the Commission, first 
under the scope of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme 
(DDR), later substituted by the projects of the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) 
programme (Cockayne 2014; Schuberth 2017). The UN mission supported programs of 
professional training, social and cultural activities and community policing.  
Minustah has been responsive to local criticisms to the DDR programme, as 
some accused it of offering economic incentives to gang members, promoting the idea 
that ‘crime pays’ (Schuberth 2017, 421). Independently of the appropriateness of these 
criticisms or not, to benefit only former members of armed groups was indeed a 
problematic strategy in communities hit by alarming rates of poverty and extreme 
poverty, with general lack of educational and economic opportunities. A study showed 
that armed baz leaders had better levels of education then the population of these areas 
in general (Kolbe 2013) something that evidences the complexity of these social 
realities and the conflicts and tensions that permeate them.  
Under the umbrella of the CVR, the UN mission started promoting and 
supporting projects to generate socioeconomic and cultural opportunities to people at 
risk of joining armed groups instead of only focusing on former members (Cockaine 
2009; Kolbe 2013). Minustah worked not only with the Haitian government in these 
fronts but also with local and international NGOs for efforts of peacebuilding, 
reconciliation and social inclusion.86  
Although  these initiatives were key for the promotion of stabilisation, Préval’s 
government did not get the cooperation of the urban armed groups easily – it needed to 
recur to repressive and coercive measures, especially at the beginning, underwent by the 
                                                          
86 Interview with representatives of five local and international NGOs who received support of Minustah, 
through the Community Violence Reduction section, to implement projects in this sense, between April 
and May of 2016.  
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PNH and Minustah troops, in order to make the armed baz cooperate (Cockayne 2009, 
2014; Muggah 2011; Seitenfus 2014).  
The UN mission, in turn, created an intelligence section to gather information 
and use refined tactics, with support of satellite images, to identify and arrest gang 
leaders without confrontations putting civilians at risk, something innovative in the 
context of UN peacekeeping operations (Cockayne 2014). The Joint Mission Analysis 
Cell (JMAC) was implemented in the second half of 2006, involving personnel from 
different departments of the mission. 
The military component, especially with the Brazilian leadership, also started 
implementing practices aiming at ‘winning minds and hearts’ and the cooperation of 
populations under control of armed groups, installing a health clinic in Cité Soleil, 
promoting social events after military incursions “aiming to hear the feedback of the 
population” and to promote a better relationship with them in general, among other 
initiatives.87 As already mentioned, it was often not hard to get the cooperation of these 
vulnerable populations, especially in territories worst hit by gang violence, for which 
these policies generated positive outcomes in the short term for violence reduction, 
despite the possible backlashes against those who cooperated, something of which, 
nevertheless, there are few reports.88  
In this sense, empirical studies suggest that there were positive outcomes 
regarding the reduction of violence, and also regarding the Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) in the period between 2007 and 2010 (Kolbe and Muggah 2011; Kolbe 2013; 
Braum 2014). There are enquires showing an improvement of the credibility of the 
PNH, and that the work of Minustah, of the UNPOL as well as other efforts led by the 
                                                          
87 Interview with Colonel Ricardo Pereira de Araujo Bezerra, commander of Minustah’s Brazilian 
battalion, on 25 April 2016.  
88 The backlash against informants is reported in Braum’s ethnographic account focused in Bel Air, a 
traditional and old neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince which witnessed a process of impoverishment and 
irregular growth with the intensification of the migration from the countryside and irregular occupation of 
the city. According to his and other accounts (Cockayne 2014; Muggah 2013), some baz in this territory 
enjoy some level of acceptance by the population, depending on their leadership and behaviour, so it 
happened that informants got a bad reputation in these neighbourhoods, and some of them needed to leave 
the territory, or even Haiti (Braum 2014). In Cité Soleil, on the other hand, reports of the population’s 
cooperation with external actors are common (Becker 2011, Interview with Colonel Ricardo Pereira de 
Araujo Bezerra, commander of Minustah’s Brazilian battalion, on 25 April 2016.), most probably because 
the levels of violence in this territory are higher. Some baz leaders, leading participants of the National 
Commission for Disarmament, were assassinated, but some of these homicides are most probably 
connected to what James (2010) calls ‘bureaucraft,’ when individuals are accused of using external aid 
for their own personal advantage (Braum 2014).  
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civilian component, remarkably for the inclusion of women in the police force, to 
improve the attention to victims of sexual violence, and projects of community policing, 
contributed in this sense (Braum 2014; Hauge, Rachelle and Gilles 2015). This can be 
considered an important achievement, since the PNH had historically a low credibility, 
for rampant corruption, human rights abuses and involvement with criminal activities 
(Cockayne 2014; Muggah 2013).  
In this way, with the improvement of the political situation, with the election of 
a government legitimated by the popular vote and with the support, or at least 
acceptance, of diverse and determinant groups for the Haitian political context, the UN 
stabilisation mission could cooperate with and support the Haitian government for the 
achievement of its stated goals. From a context of the use of violent coercion without a 
proper political authority in the country, Minustah progressed with more productive and 
constructive means to address the Haitian crisis, with Haitian political authorities.   
With these changes, the opinions and attitudes of locals towards Minustah 
changed, mainly, paradoxically, among those who were the most affected by its military 
incursions in Port-au-Prince ghettos, because of the benefits and opportunities the 
mission facilitated to these territories after 2006. In this respect, the group of people I 
interviewed in Haiti entails certain bias as they were former armed baz members and 
communitarian leaders benefited or employed by Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO that works 
in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, and was invited by Minustah in 2004 to develop a similar 
work with poor urban communities in Haiti. Viva Rio was the biggest employer in the 
region of Bel Air from 2007 to 2011, among fixed, temporary or small jobs contracts 
(Braum 2014, 134). Other existing studies, nonetheless, also point for this increase in 
the cooperation and acceptance of locals towards the operation in these regions (Becker 
2011; Hauge, Rachelle and Gilles 2015). Some of them show that people in these 
territories pointed more often the PNH as responsible for arbitrary violence then the UN 
mission. In a survey conducted by Kolbe and Muggah (2011), blue helmets were 
accused of making threats, without putting them in practice. 
The mission did not promote opinion polls to assess its acceptance among locals, 
as it did in Kosovo, for instance (Lemay-Hébert 2013), and surveys on this matter are 
scarce. Two surveys, one performed in 2011 (Gordon and Young 2011) and another in 
2012 (Schuller 2012), have some variation but mainly a very different interpretation of 
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the results. While the first one emphasises that street protests held against Minustah, 
especially after the cholera contamination, did not necessarily represent the opinion of 
the population, tending to portray more radical sides, showing results suggesting there 
was support and cooperation with Minustah (something confirmed by other studies and 
my own field research, as already indicated), the second one emphasises the disapproval 
of Minustah by locals, recognising, nonetheless, that in neighbourhoods worst hit by 
violence, especially Cité Soleil, people tend to agree with the need for foreign troops 
and cooperate. 
If opinion polls bring inherent challenges and limitations to understand social 
and political realities, as it depends on how questions and available answers are 
elaborated (something that often carries researchers’ biases), in the highly complex 
context of Haiti, with the prevalence of instability and general feeling of insekirite in 
diverse aspects of life, there is a further limitation in the ability of these instruments to 
evaluate public opinion, behaviour and attitudes. When individuals have very few 
options, and need to make choices to have a minimum sense of security and access 
basic means of survival, their opinions can change following these daily pressing needs. 
In these complex and challenging conditions, nevertheless, the positive outcomes 
achieved for violence reduction and stabilisation, with cooperation of part of the 
population in these territories, may point for the improvement of their acceptance 
towards Minustah in this period. The improvement of PNH’s reputation was also a 
positive sign concerning the work of Minustah in the country.  
Concerning the Haitian population outside the ‘ghettos,’ certain general 
contempt towards the operation has been expressed by most locals I interviewed in 
Haiti, as already pointed in the previous section, despite the very important diversity of 
opinions among them. The strongest critics of Minustah were the civil society and urban 
educated middle class who protested against Aristide back in 2004, as well as a group of 
the Haitian diaspora, mainly from the United States, who remained strong supporters of 
Aristide – two very distinct (or actually opposite) groups.   
In general, nonetheless, several Haitians I interviewed pointed to the high 
amount of resources spent in the UN mission, while the country was in dire need of 
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investment for social and economic development.89 The adjective ‘useless’ was very 
common in these criticisms. The times I visited the UN Log Base in Port-au-Prince, I 
was impressed by the number of parked cars there, the famous white 4X4 with the UN 
symbol, there were certainly hundreds of brand new cars that, it seemed, would not be 
even used, something that resonated with this opinion.   
The impact on the local economy was also often mentioned, as the prices of 
rents at least tripled, added to the fact that the Haitian rentier elite enjoyed the profit 
coming from the heavy international presence in the country, evidently, an 
unsustainable economic boom. In this conjuncture, a number of my local and also 
external informants believed the maintenance of instability was of interest of part of the 
Haitian elite, who was profiting with the presence of Minustah in the country. Two of 
my informants affirmed that before every annual renewal of Minustah’s mandate, there 
was an increase in violence in the city. 
The DDR and later CVR programme were also criticised by some of my local 
informants because the disarmament focused only the former FAd’H soldiers and urban 
armed groups, but not other non-state armed actors, mainly the private security 
companies that grew after the fall of the Duvalierist regime.90 Indeed, a national 
campaign of disarmament could help improve the security situation in the country, de-
escalate violence and tackle political instability. It is really puzzling that in a country 
with such high levels of poverty and extreme poverty and a depressed economy, the 
possession of guns and ammunition is so common and widespread.  
In this sense, Minustah’s coordination and support of projects of social and 
economic inclusion in territories with the presence of armed groups (in their diverse 
configurations and kinds of relation with the population under their control, as already 
emphasised) created certain level of legitimacy for the mission in these territories. Other 
                                                          
89 Interviews with Haitians, NGO employees and representatives of Haitian civil society organisations, 
Between April and May 2016.  
90 In Braum’s ethnographic dissertation, there are characters that are members of armed baz and were or 
are at the same time private security guards, guards of government officials and institutions, and also 
former police officers; one of the characters’ father was member of the FAd’H. These cases suggest that 
the separation between these groups is not so stark. There are also cases of armed supporters of Aristide 
whose fathers belonged to the tonton macoutes and, besides, referred to this fact as a continuation of the 
political engagement in the family. Especially this last case demonstrates how violence can end up being, 
instead of a mean to achieve ends such as emancipation and liberation, a central dimension of individuals’ 
subjectivity and identity, with deleterious effects for collective and political action (Arendt 1970; 
Mbembe 2018). 
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social groups remained in general more critical of the operation, even those who worked 
or were supported by it.91   
There were important differences of approach by the UN mission, as well as by 
the Haitian government and humanitarian and non-governmental organisations in 
general, in different territories with the presence of armed groups. Viva Rio’s 
headquarters has been established in Bel Air, a region historically inhabited by an 
educated middle class, which underwent a process of impoverishment in the last 
decades, and with a history of political engagement (Braum 2014). Despite the presence 
of violence among different armed groups in the region, something that worsened 
considerably in 2012 with ‘wars’ among different armed baz, the leaders of this region 
were more open to dialogue and cooperate with peacebuilding efforts, and often 
represented their neighbourhoods in projects of development and humanitarian 
assistance (Braum 2014).  
In Cité Soleil, on the other hand, military operations and the policies for 
‘winning hearts and minds’ led by the Brazilian military prevailed.92 Other actors also 
engaged in this region directly with the population, trying to create alternatives for them 
and to get their cooperation to repress and arrest members of armed groups (Becker 
2011). In this sense, the means to reach local cooperation, or some level of legitimacy, 
varied. 
Préval’s administration faced one major crisis in this period, with the 2008 
global economic crisis that hit Haiti, causing inflation and violent food riots; the senate 
ended up voting against the prime minister Jacques Edouard Alexis, Préval’s ally.93 
Daily life is marked by constant hardship and insecurity for the poor majority in the 
country, and economic crises have a tremendous effect for most people. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, nonetheless, the progress of the 
UN mission in the ghettos generated disapproval of other sectors of the Haitian society, 
something that evidences the complexity of the conflicts and political instability in 
                                                          
91 Interview with a then employee of an international NGO that promoted projects of peacebuilding in 
neighbourhoods affected by violence, and with representative of a local human rights organisation, on16 
April and 9 May 2016, respectively.  
92 Becker 2011; Interview with Colonel Ricardo Pereira de Araujo Bezerra, commander of Minustah’s 
Brazilian battalion, on 25 April 2016.  
93 Haiti's government falls after food riots, Reuters, 13 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
haiti/haitis-government-falls-after-food-riots-idUSN1228245020080413.  
124 
 
Haiti, and also the consequences and reverberations of the lack of a peace process and 
political settlement to address these conflicts and to complete the unfinished and 
troubled transition to democracy in the country. With the lack of minimum grounds and 
common understanding among different social groups about the problems of the country 
and how to address them, the social fragmentation and distrust continued to hinder 
stabilisation, democratisation and development, maintaining Haiti vulnerable to the 
policies and oscillations of foreign countries.  
The DDR and later CVR programmes, as well as the work with the PNH with 
the Security Sector Reform programme, at least promoted dialogue and some level of 
understanding and common ground among the security forces of the country and groups 
that were part of the conflict. As further analysed, nonetheless, since the political 
economy and clientelist networks involving urban armed groups were not addressed 
(Cockayne 2009, 2014), the progress achieved during this period did not last. The 
Haitian police, although being accused of human rights violations itself,94 is mostly at 
the crossfire of the clientelist networks that are increasingly bringing back necropolitics 
to the country’s daily life (Braum 2014; 2019).  
This political economy emerged, as already pointed, with the government of the 
military junta that overthrew Aristide in the 1990’s , and the UN peacekeeping mission 
established after the restoration of Aristide’s government by the US army neither 
tackled this problem, beyond the deficient process of disintegration of the FAd’H 
(Cockayne 2009; Schuberth 2017). This intrication of illicit economies, criminality and 
instability evolved over time, so although the intelligence work developed with the 
JMAC facilitated the arrest of important gang leaders, this political economy and 
clientelist networks have still not been tackled (Cockayne 2009). As further analysed, 
                                                          
94 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – Haiti, Human Rights Section Minustah, Report 
on Alleged Killings by Haitian National Police and the Response of State Authorities, December 2011, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/Report_on_killings_en.pdf. Recently, the most serious 
denounces of human rights violations in Haiti, especially the massacre perpetrated in La Saline, has not 
been attributed to the PNH (‘Haiti facing worst crisis since 1986?’, AlterPresse, 5 April 2019, 
https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article24204#.XXakYCgzbIU); in another reported massacre, on 16 
January 2019, witnesses say the perpetrators were using police uniforms, but apparently did not belong to 
the PNH (‘Men in police uniforms ‘massacre’ unarmed civilians in Haiti’, The Independent, 16 January 
2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/haiti-massacre-port-au-prince-police-
uniforms-gangs-united-nations-a8729876.html). Both episodes happened in the context of the massive 
protests against the corruption scandal of PetroCaribe (See: ‘Haiti protests: Why are so many people on 
the streets?,’ BBC News, 18 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-
48665945/haiti-protests-why-are-so-many-people-on-the-
streets?fbclid=IwAR1wgpyOH26pFWayIoEBm56BwR_EipyW21Kf0nU4lWAjr46GbhXPFj5aCS4).  
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the effects of this political economy are hitting now a tipping point, as the country is 
again dragged in violence, social unrest and political instability. 
UN peacekeeping missions are not especially equipped to tackle the problem of 
criminal political economies, and the cooperation between countries’ intelligences and 
the international intervention, that would be essential to tackle efficiently the problem, 
did not happen in the case of Haiti, for the very institutional barriers for it (Cockayne 
2014). Nonetheless, the ‘security-first’ statebuilding approach (Muggah 2013) and lack 
of a political settlement contributed for the reproduction and worsening of this scenario, 
as the political arena remained under the shadow of the use of force and violence. The 
controversial election of Michel Martelly in 2010, amid irregularities and contestation, 
marked yet another setback in the political process in Haiti, as analysed next.  
Studies have shown that the progress achieved since 2007 in violence reduction 
was reversed after the earthquake in 2010 (Kolbe and Muggah 2011; Kolbe 2013). 
Kolbe notes that the social disruption occasioned by the earthquake led to a re-
organisation of gangs and the rise of violent crime. Some gangs also profited 
appropriating and controlling the distribution of humanitarian aid (Braum 2014).95 
Former members of armed groups that received professional training went back to gang 
activities for the lack of economic opportunities and because the root causes for the 
existence of the gangs were not addressed (Schuberth 2017).  
In this sense, the positive outcomes in the area of law enforcement could not 
bring sustainable advancements, without significant changes in the political scenario 
and the predatory economy that involves criminality, drug trafficking and political 
instability in Haiti (Cockayne 2009, 2014). Without any progress for the establishment 
of the basic democratic rules of the game, stabilisation remained elusive in Haiti.  
3.2.3. 2010 – 2017: Earthquake, Martelly’s election and democratic reversal 
On 12 January 2010, Haiti was hit by a magnitude 7 earthquake that devastated 
the country. Death toll estimates vary between 80.000 and 316.000.96 The 
disproportionate damage and death toll occasioned by the quake should be historicised 
95 Also expressed in interview with a Haitian employee of an international humanitarian organisation, on 
27 April 2016.  
96 Two Years Later, Haitian Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute, Maura R. O’Connor, Columbia 
Journalism Review, 12 January 2012, 
https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php.  
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and contextualised, as pointed by Farmer (2011, 13), so one can have a reasonable 
understanding on this episode and its consequences for Haiti. The scale of the damage 
was the result of years of policies that have destroyed the Haitian agrarian economy, led 
to an ecological collapse, as Haiti is one of the most deforested countries in the world, 
and of the vastly unplanned occupation of the capital, Port-au-Prince, were the 
earthquake claimed more lives (Beckett 2019). In this sense, it was less a natural 
disaster and more a man-made catastrophe (Farmer 2011).  
The earthquake happened when the country finally enjoyed some level of 
stability, after two decades of a tortuous and interrupted process of democratisation. The 
Haitian government, as well as the UN mission, took some time to properly answer to 
the emergency, while Haitians struggled mostly alone to get back on their feet 
(Seitenfus 2014), in often extreme conditions (Braum 2014). Beyond the immense 
material loss, the event provoked a deep traumatisation in the Haitian population, as it 
created one of the worst humanitarian crises ever seen (Beckett 2019; Braum 2014; 
Farmer 2011).   
Haitians elaborate this event in diverse forms, including through their religiosity, 
but a belief that became very widespread was that the United States provoked the 
earthquake through military technology, something Hugo Chávez, then president of 
Venezuela, affirmed, helping spread the story.97 There is no evidence whatsoever about 
the existence of this kind of technology. But the fact that many Haitians believe on it, or 
at least think it is a valid possibility, although not proved (as two of my local informants 
did)98 have an important meaning in the social context of the country and concerning 
how Haitians understand and deal with the heavy external interventionism that shapes 
their reality since the country was born.  
97 Chavez: US weapon test caused Haiti earthquake, RT, 20 January 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9QtZkT8OBQ.  
98 Interviews with an employee of a local NGO, and with a representative of the Haitian civil society 
(mentioned as a possibility). This belief was also expressed during informal conversations with Haitians 
with whom I had contact during the field research.  
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Among difficult conditions, elections were held in November of 2010, bringing 
a new period of instability and political contestation. Contrary to the previous election, 
there were incidents of violence and a tense environment.99  
Ricardo Seitenfus, special representative of the secretary general of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) in Haiti from 2009 to 2011, denounced that 
there were manoeuvres for the selection of Michel Martelly by international actors, 
involving the chief of the UN mission, Edmond Mulet, and high level US politicians, 
including Hillary Clinton (Seitenfus 2014, pos. 8071-8106). Martelly, a popular singer 
in the country, was in fact in the third position in the first round. Jude Célestin, who was 
the second and would dispute the second round with Mirlande Manigat, simply 
disappeared from the election. He protested at the beginning, as well as Lavalas’ 
supporters, but the politician did not go further to object the manoeuvre (Seitenfus 
2014).   
Martelly is an unapologetic Duvalierist100 and his government had a negative 
impact in the weak Haitian democracy. Local elections were not held – he pointed 
political allies to assume local offices; Parliamentary elections were also delayed for 4 
years.101 The electoral and political situation deteriorated even further in the following 
election, which started in October of 2015 and was concluded only in January of 2017. 
Several of my local interviewees did not understand how the quality of elections 
in Haiti was so low while the country had a UN peacekeeping operation and heavy 
international presence.102 Violence and intimidation in polling stations were common, 
and the Haitian institutional electoral apparatus has not substantially improved, still 
relying on a provisional commission to manage and supervise the elections. Election’s 
day in general is still tense in the country, as the recent past of political violence has not 
                                                          
99 Final Report – Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 
Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti, January 13, 2011, OAS, 
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2011/CP25512E.pdf Accessed 14 May 2018. 
100 The Clintons, Duvalier, Martelly and Haiti, Centre for Research on Globalization, 16 August 2014, 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-clintons-duvalier-martelly-haiti/5396127.  
101 “Elections in Haiti: 2015 Legislative Elections.” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 6 
August 2015, http://www.ifes.org/faqs/elections-haiti-2015-legislative-elections 
102 Opinion expressed by five among the Haitians I interviewed in Haiti, all of them representatives of 
national or international NGOs.  
128 
 
been completely overcome.103 There is an environment of apprehension, rumours spread 
easily, often causing more fear and turmoil (Braum 2014). 104  
Another problem reported is the disproportionate number of political party 
representatives, known as mandataires, in polling stations.105  This is partly due to the 
high number of parties in Haiti, but also symptomatic of the fact that political actors still 
seek to manipulate the democratic process through means such as coercion and funding 
of clientelist networks.  
The understanding that there was manipulation for Martelly’s election was 
unanimous among the Haitians I interviewed.106 Martelly had, nonetheless, certain 
popular support, as he was a very famous and popular singer in Haiti (Braum 2014, 
114). He represented a model of successful and at the same time popular man, 
something that can appeal to the poor masses. His successor, Jovenel Moïse, a self-
made businessman, of Martelly’s political group, somehow incorporated the same 
appeal to the masses, despite the fast deterioration and widespread rejection of his 
government.  
In this sense, the dubious role of Minustah in 2010’s elections contributed for 
serious setbacks in the process of stabilisation of the country, which had progressed in 
the period from 2007 to 2010. It also evidently reflected in the following elections, and 
the use of force instead of the democratic process gained, again, protagonism in Haitian 
politics. Although such logic is deeply rooted in the country, the UN mission and the 
foreign policy of countries involved in Haiti contributed to reproduce it, instead of 
tackling the problem. A concrete indicator of the deterioration of the political situation 
                                                          
103 Recent reports on elections in Haiti inform that intimidation and violence in polling stations is still 
common. See, for instance: OAS, Final Report - Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of 
the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti, January 13, 2011; OAS, Report to 
the Permanent Council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, General Elections, September 12, 2017 
(http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Final-Haiti-CP-2017-ENG.pdf). This view was also 
expressed by several of my interviewees, Haitians and foreigners alike. 
104 Rumours are very present in the political life in Haiti, and often develop among individuals to 
elaborate daily life and experiences, or for the achievement of certain goals (Braum 2014; Other two 
foreigners who spent a considerable time in Haiti also expressed this understanding).  
105 OAS, Report to the permanent council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, General Elections, 29 
January 2017 http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Final-Haiti-CP-2017-ENG.pdf.  
106 Some of them spoke about this process jokingly. 
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in Haiti has been the continuous drop of elections turnout,107 a symptom of a more 
general trend of loss of hope in the country.   
Furthermore, the funding of urban armed groups by political actors and 
businessmen showed, again, its effects after Martelly’s election, something that further 
worsened after Minustah’s departure. Street protests are, of course, a good sign of 
democratic participation, but in Haiti, because of this clientelist political economy, they 
are often one more way of making politics through coercion, or a negation of 
democratic politics that presuppose the need for a public space of debate and 
contestation, where discussion and communication among divergent views prevails over 
the use of force.  
It is fundamental, of course, to take into account the extreme inequalities and 
power imbalances present in Haitian society. Nevertheless, the clientelism that connects 
‘ghettos’ with the political class and business elite in the country, an intricate and 
complex web of power relations, disputes, pressure and use of economic power and 
violence, permeates class boundaries and turn the scenario way more complex than a 
more classical context of class struggle. Through these networks, subaltern groups 
extract material benefits, maintaining an important level of independency, but at the 
same time remain strongly alienated from their political agency. This malicious process 
further aggravates social fragmentation and distrust, which emerged and reproduced in 
Haiti through the years of the Duvalierist totalitarian regime and the long an interrupted 
transition to democracy with the brutal military junta from the 1990’s.  
If some armed baz had a certain level of acceptance by the population under 
their control, with considerable stability in certain neighbourhoods, after 2010 the 
situation started deteriorating.108 The multiple and unstable loyalties, the conflicts over 
                                                          
107 The reported turnout in 2006 was of 60%, 22% in 2010 and 18% in 2016 (Inter-Parliament Union, 
Haiti – Elections held in 2006, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2138_06.htm; OAS, Final 
Report Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, January 13, 2011; OAS, Report to the Permanent Council, 
Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, January 29, 2017). In my interviews with Haitians, the waning 
trust in the elections and political system was also predominant. 
108 Braum describes a series of ‘wars’ between armed bases in the region of Great Bel Air that started 
after 2010, with a considerable number of deaths. In 2012, the homicide rate in the region (according to 
Viva Rio estimations) skyrocketed. He presents the following estimates (for 100,000 habitants):  
2006/07 32 
2007/08 22 
2008/09 16 
2009/10 19  
2010 50 
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scarce resources, which turned even scarcer with the departure of the UN mission in 
2017, and the vicious circles entailed by the use of violence in politics and political 
instability, with which the political and business elite seek to control the mass of 
disenfranchised people – all these processes worsened up to the present as they 
remained unaddressed.  
The process of elections in Haiti developed a complex configuration, with 
extreme political fragmentation, use of force, intimidation or even popular pressure 
during elections and after them for the extraction of benefits and to access government 
positions. Such clientelist relations can be merged or be confounded with demands for 
social justice. Braum, for instance, reports that the ‘United Ghettos Movement’ was 
founded as a grassroots movement in 2011 to start a dialogue with Martelly’s 
administration to demand social policies and investment for development in poor urban 
communities. As the movement evolved, nonetheless, some of its leaders were accused 
of using it to get positions in Martelly’s government (Braum 2014, 166-221). In this 
sense, although the Haitian business and political elite seek to manipulate the 
democratic process to defend their interests and extraction of benefits, there is also a 
sort of popular participation on it, what Bayart and Ellis (2000), as already pointed, 
called extraversion, something that pervades different social and economic classes.  
In this way, the political scenario in Haiti has been marked by a zero-sum game 
(as often pointed by foreign observers and Haitians themselves) where most actors seem 
to be selling out the possibility of building a viable future for immediate access to 
benefits (in the case of the poor strata, actually often basic means of survival). The 
ecological crisis in the country represents a very suitable metaphor for its political crisis 
(the former also being deeply related to the political problems of the country), as 
illustrated by this passage of Beckett ethnographic work:  
You can tell people not to cut down trees all you want,” Cameron said, as we continued on our 
walk. "But they are still going to do it because they have to. No one here wants to cut down 
trees, except the big families that run the logging and charcoal and cement business. What are 
peasants going to do? Economy is gone. They can’t live on dirt, so they cut trees. Charcoal is the 
country's leading cash crop. So, they're stuck, getting the one-off economic value of trees. But 
trees aren't mere commodities! Some cut trees beyond market prices. What about the medicinal 
value of trees things and plants? The value of a fruit tree?" For Cameron, rural Haitians were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2011 50 
Apr. 2011/Mar. 2012 73 
Nov. 2011/ Oct. 2012 104 
(Braum 2014, 222-223).  
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stuck in a vicious circle, caught between a declining rural economy and the demands of everyday 
life. Maxo had said something similar when he noted the bitter irony that Haitians cut down trees 
in order to survive, knowing full well that in doing so they were committing themselves, their 
families, and their ancestors and gods to a certain death. “It is crazy!” he had said. “They do it to 
live, but we all die!” (Beckett 2019, 37). 
Beyond the questionable role of Minustah and other foreign actors in 2010 
elections, something that brought a new cycle of deterioration of the process of 
democratisation in Haiti, the cholera epidemics brought by UN blue helmets from Nepal 
was yet another factor determinant for the deterioration of the UN mission’s legitimacy 
in the country. The contamination started on an affluent of the Artibonite river, and 
easily spread throughout the country, with the lack of basic infrastructure for sanitation 
and access to clean water, killing at least 9.000 people.109 The UN denied for a long 
period the responsibility for the contamination, even after considerable amount of 
evidences were available (Seitenfus 2014). When it was impossible to deny the facts 
and scientific evidences of the source of the epidemic, Minustah evaded responsibility 
blaming the lack of basic sanitation for the catastrophe.110   
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon apologised for the contamination only six 
years later, in the end of his mandate, announcing new measures and investment to fight 
the epidemic and help affected communities.111 The mismanagement of the crisis and 
the delay to properly answer to it occasioned many deaths that could have been 
prevented.112 If the UN wanted to avoid paying for all the damage and also 
compensation for victims, as members of the Haitian civil society demanded, the 
mismanagement and delay ended up creating even more costs for the international 
                                                          
109 Epidemiological Update – Cholera, 11 October 2018, Pan-American Health Organisation and World 
Health Organisation, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018-oct-11-phe-epi-update-
cholera.pdf; Haiti – Events of 2018, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2019/country-chapters/haiti; Haitians launch new lawsuit against UN over thousands of cholera 
deaths, The Guardian, 11 March 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/11/haiti-cholera-
un-deaths-lawsuit.  
110 “Leaked UN report faults sanitation at Haiti bases at time of cholera outbreak” (The Guardian, April 5, 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/leaked-un-report-sanitation-haiti-bases-cholera-
outbreak?CMP=share_btn_fb).   
111 “UN’s Ban apologizes to people of Haiti, outlines new plan to fight cholera epidemic and help 
communities,” UN News Centre, 1 December 2016, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55694#.WSgoQGjyjIV; “U.N. Apologizes for Role in 
Haiti’s 2010 Cholera Outbreak,” The New York Times, December 01, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/world/americas/united-nations-apology-haiti-cholera.html. 
112 “UN could have prevented Haiti cholera epidemic with $2,000 health kit – study,” The Guardian, 14 
April14 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/haiti-cholera-epidemic-un-
prevention?CMP=share_btn_fb 
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organisation,  in terms of financial resources but mainly politically and for its 
reputation. 
Another element that further damaged the local legitimacy of the operation was 
the cases of sexual violence and exploitation. There is a considerable consensus about 
the systematic nature of the problem in contexts of peacekeeping operations, including 
in UN documents and resolutions.113  Despite having declared a zero tolerance policy in 
2003, the problem remained persistent and the process to hold perpetrators accountable 
flawed. Scholars have considered the long term outcomes connected to the problem, 
linked to the peacekeeping economy, with a considerable increase of sex tourism and 
human trafficking in countries affected (Jennings 2010; Smith and Smith 2011).  
Although very often already present in the context of peacekeeping operations before 
their deployment (certainly in the case of Haiti), these authors support the hypothesis 
that the peacekeeping economy contributes to a qualitative increase of these 
phenomena, an effect that lasts long after operations’ departure. 
These developments not only eroded the legitimacy of Minustah and of the state 
institutions it was supporting to develop, but also the hope of the Haitian population in 
the possibility to solve the political problems in the country and to reach a minimum 
normality and security in everyday life. If the destruction caused by the earthquake led 
many to seek leaving the country to find more viable living conditions, the new phase of 
political turmoil neither help Haitians believe in the possibility of reconstruction and for 
a new start after the devastation.   
As already mentioned, after the earthquake, there has been an increase in 
violence and in the activity of armed groups, who not rarely controlled resources 
coming from humanitarian assistance (Braum 2014; Kolbe 2013). The international 
community promised billions of dollars in aid for the country. Some Haitians thought 
that it could be an opportunity for a new beginning, to reconstruct the country and 
overcome its most critical problems.114 This hope, unfortunately, has not been fulfilled, 
                                                          
113 One of the most important documents in this sense: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2272 
on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 11 March 2016. 
114 ‘My Pride and Hope for Haiti,’ Michèle Pierre-Louis, HuffPost, 27 March 2010, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/my-pride-and-hope-for-
hai_b_435398?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnLw&guce_refer
rer_sig=AQAAAN12hpZkkzMxKDP2HvSRnYA0FXOjvgRg_xHnjsBJ3RfZKbtuy2PoiorB_ZmvPaZBIo
ObzjnlViHqrssIIgZZ-
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as the international aid after the earthquake mostly followed the common logic of 
immediate relief, without a consistent plan to rebuild the country. Isolated intents to 
improve the quality of humanitarian aid did not, evidently, met the need for a 
comprehensive project to develop basic infrastructure and conditions for economic 
development, and the vicious circle of dependency on humanitarian aid in Haiti actually 
received a new boost after this tragic event (Beckett 2017; Farmer 2012; Zanotti 2010).  
As for the progress achieved with the SSR, it has not been followed by a 
considerable progress in the rule of law and judicial system, something that ended up 
contributing to unintended negative outcomes, with the worsening of the problem of 
détention préventive prolongée, that is, people imprisoned without trial, often without 
any judicial procedures – the condition of around 70% of Haiti’s prison population.115 
Poor individuals often do not have access to a lawyer and spend even years without 
seeing a judge or other judicial authority.116 Furthermore, the crisis in the prison system 
peaked in the last years, with reports of inmates dying of thirst, starvation and 
disease.117  A research suggested that the population trusted more in the police than in 
the judicial system, because of its inefficiency (Rachelle and Gilles 2015). Not 
surprisingly, mob justice is a common problem throughout the country.118 
The electoral crisis that lasted from October 2015 to January 2017 reflected not 
only the democratic setback brought with Michel Martelly’s election, but also the 
absence of a minimum ground and agreement between the different social and political 
forces in the country. The results were heavily contested by different political groups, 
and this period witnessed constant (often almost daily) street protests. Even if some of 
them could be spontaneous, they often reflected the precarious clientelist relations 
between political and business actors and groups from the ‘ghettos.’  
                                                                                                                                                                          
EUtKLxp6FGDThtUyNM__3AODjo0Sz4xlm6kqFQcSpg33pDyCeYwhDlREqUeCCW4A8LcdEU0Skl8
Y02d6tpMygf_.  
115 L’Expert indépendant de l’ONU présente ses conclusions au terme de sa mission en Haïti, OHCHR, 
13 March 2017 
https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21352&LangID=F.   
116 As informed by a French lawyer and human rights activist who lives in Haiti, on 25 April 2016.   
117 See, for instance: “Mass funeral held for inmates who died in "cruel, inhuman" Haitian prison,” CBS 
News, 21 February 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/families-mourn-after-20-haitians-die-in-dismal-
prison/. 
118 OHCHR, Report: “Se faire justice soi-même ou le règne de l’impunité en Haïti”, January 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/HT/170117Rapport_Se_faire_justice_soimeme_FR.pdf  
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With a political stalemate that could not be solved through the electoral process 
and institutions, a provisional government was installed through agreements between 
the contesting groups, and Jocelerme Privert, that had been minister of the second 
government of Aristide,119 was pointed as president, remaining in power from January 
2016 until January 2017. One of my local informants affirmed that Minustah’s troops 
bragged about their success in the pacification of troubled areas of the capital, but that 
in fact the ‘ghettos’ were quiet because they supported the transitional government in 
power.120  
In sum, the foundational and structural problems of the UN mission limited the 
positive outcomes it supported bring about for violence reduction and SSR. In the 
period from 2010 to 2017, Minustah's legitimacy was again heavily contested by the 
local population (Schuller 2012) with the aggravating factors of the cholera 
contamination, the cases of human rights violations by international interveners, and 
their contested role in elections.  
The clientelist relations involving political groups and businessmen with urban 
armed groups worsened until the critical situation the country faces right now, with 
social unrest, a soaring in violence, and reports of massacres committed by armed 
groups, some of them under suspicion of involvement with the government.121 
Journalists are being targeted in street demonstrations, and a journalist anchor of a radio 
station critical of the government was shot dead on 10 June 2019.122  
The protests against the corruption scandal of PetroCaribe are certainly part of a 
genuine popular movement against the embezzled money that should have been 
invested in social and economic development. It is estimated that billions of dollars 
have been stolen from the programme of cooperation with the Venezuelan government. 
119 Privert is accused of being involved in La Scierie massacre. According to the accounts of victims’ 
relatives and human rights organisations, dozens of people were killed in the city of Saint-Marc on 4 
April 2004. At that time, the city was an opposition stronghold against Aristide (Seitenfus 2014; The 
fêted and the dead in Haiti, Michael Deibert, 17 February 2016, 
http://michaeldeibert.blogspot.com/2016/02/the-feted-and-dead-in-haiti.html).  
120 Interview with a Haitian, employee of an international NGO, on 11 April 2016.   
121 Special Report: Massacres in Haiti – Pacifica’s Margaret Prescod, 14 April 2019, 
https://therealnews.com/stories/special-report-massacres-in-haiti-pacificas-margaret-prescod; Men in 
police uniforms ‘massacre’ unarmed civilians in Haiti, Independent, 16 January 2019, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/haiti-massacre-port-au-prince-police-uniforms-
gangs-united-nations-a8729876.html.  
122 Radio Sans Fin host Pétion Rospide Killed in Haiti, Havana Times, 14 June 2019, 
https://havanatimes.org/sos-for-journalist/radio-sans-fin-host-petion-rospide-killed-in-haiti/.  
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In face of the daring conditions most Haitians live, it is easy to understand the popular 
revolt against the scandal. As already mentioned, this is the first time different social 
groups join forces in Haiti for a common cause after decades of fragmentation and 
conflict. It certainly represents a hope for real change in the country.  
The manipulation of violence by the business and political elite, nonetheless, 
complicates the scenario and hinder the political potential of this movement. As pointed 
by Mbembe (Mbembe 2018), we can only hope that the conscious action of those 
protesting against injustice and the abject structural violence pervasive in Haiti can win 
over the necropolitics fed by webs of power that connect local as well as international 
political forces (Mbembe 2003, 2012).  
 
3.3. Concluding remarks  
“The nation of Haiti will never be right. It will never be right.”123   
Following the existing literature which points the problems, contradictions and 
collateral damage the statebuilding project can produce (Barma 2017; Lemay-Hébert 
2012; Paris and Sisk 2009; Orford 2011; Suhrke 2011; Von Trotha 2009), of the 
statebuilding as peacebuilding paradigm (Jones 2013; Newman 2013; Guevara 2012) 
and of the technical and managerial problem-solving approach for problems that are 
essentially political, this chapter sought to demonstrate how this model failed in Haiti, 
reinforcing the predatory and undemocratic logics predominant in the country. Besides, 
for Haiti’s geopolitical location, the UN stabilisation mission was connected to the 
broader context of external interventionism in Haiti, which historically produced 
deleterious effects for politics and development in the small Caribbean nation.  
Although the UN mission might have counted on dedicated and well intended 
employees, the broader political context in which it was located determined not only its 
foundational problems, but also made it dependent on decisions and interests of the 
foreign countries more influent in Haiti. The US politics of containment for Haiti, to 
                                                          
123 “As Richman recounts it, Ti Chini came to understand the illness that would kill him, and the broader 
global forces that had propelled him from his village in Haiti to a life as a migrant worker in the United 
States, as an evil force that had invaded his body, as a ‘a vast, sorcerous system that turns poor Haitians 
neighbours against one another’ and that routinely exposes the most vulnerable among us to harm and 
possible death” (Beckett 2019, 13). 
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deal with the intense influx of migrants to its shores, to a great extent, result of their 
own policies towards the small country (Dubois 2012), dominated many of the 
decisions and directions took by the UN mission, mainly in the political dimension 
(Seitenfus 2014).  
Other influent countries of the ‘Core Group’ might have pushed in different 
directions, mainly Brazil since the beginning of the operation, in the context of a foreign 
policy of solidarity towards countries of the Global South (Seitenfus 2014; Patriota 
2017). Canada, who was the main contributor for the UNPOL, might also have 
supported a different approach, both of which helped to deliver positive outcomes for 
violence reduction and improvement and professionalization of the Haitian National 
Police. These counterbalances, nonetheless, could not remedy the foundational 
problems of the UN intervention, nor mitigate the essentially detrimental external 
interventionism in Haitian politics, especially during 2010 elections, as described above. 
In the electoral crisis of 2015-2017, foreign actors dropped their funding and 
support for the process,124 not without reason. In Haiti, some political groups contest the 
result of the election before the release of the results (Seitenfus 2014).The problem is 
that part of these foreign actors greatly contributed (as it has been historically) for the 
lack of minimum grounds for the achievement of a political concert in Haiti, with which 
the country could finally become ‘governable,’ and politically and economically 
independent. The United States, beyond focusing mainly on military ‘remedies,’ refused 
Haitian refugees during the dictatorship of the military junta in the 1990’s, affirming 
they were economic migrants (Beckett 2019). They refused refugees of the 2004 
crisis.125 Right now, dozens of Haitians are dying, again, trying to reach the US 
                                                          
124 See: US Withdraws Funding for Haiti Elections, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 8 July 
2016, http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/us-withdraws-funding-for-haiti-elections; 
Will a Haiti election without U.S. dollars undermine the vote?, The Miami Herald, 18 July 2016, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article90376627.html.  
125 Edwidge Danticat tells the story of her uncle, who was a protestant priest from a congregation in Bel 
Air, and has been caught between the crossfire among the armed groups of the region, the PNH and 
Minustah during a mass in his church. He tried to negotiate and protect people who were attending the 
mass, but ended up being threatened by the armed groups because the police and interveners climbed the 
roof of the church and fired hundreds of bullets around it, killing dozens of civilians. He died in a 
migration facility, or prison, trying to enter the United States to escape the death threats, as he was old 
and had a number of health issues. This is only one story among countless and many untold ones, but 
illustrates the tragedy and injustice Haitians are submitted to (Danticat 2007).  
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territory.126 As the problem of ‘boat people’ persists, indifference and dehumanisation 
become the new normal among the public opinion.  
The economic boom promoted by Minustah and the international presence 
around it, instead of supporting the Haitian economy, further deepened the dependency 
of the country.127 After the 2010 earthquake, the massive influx of foreign aid deepened 
this dependency instead of helping the reconstruction and recovery of the country 
(Braum 2014; Beckett 2019; James 2010; Seitenfus 2014).  
With a crippled economy and an urban disenfranchised mass, humanitarian aid, 
beyond being a small palliative, often ends up becoming one more factor contributing 
for economic stagnation, social fragmentation and distrust through dispute over scarce 
resources (James 2010; Braum 2014; Marcelin 2011).128 The development of a ‘market 
of projects’ penetrated Haitian civil society and shaped individuals’ behaviour and 
strategies of subsistence and survival, often with the competition for government and 
international funds. In poor urban communities, although baz leaders need to distribute 
resources and are often permanently under the pressure of those under their protection 
(Braum 2014), this does not prevent unfairness. These relations are constantly marked 
by tension, without an established equilibrium, amidst the extreme precariousness of 
everyday life.  
There is also a strong gendered dimension in the Haitian crisis. As pointed in 
Chapter 2, in contexts of massive disenfranchisement, male frustration, that is, lack of 
economic opportunities and social role for vast populations of young males, often fuels 
violence as a mean to regain some sort of agency, even though this often means a self-
destructive path (Mbembe 2018). In Haiti, with the collapse of the agrarian economy, 
this process has evolved throughout decades and through different political phases, from 
the Duvalierism and its institutionalised necropolitics, until the troubled period of 
democratisation, where the use of force and violence ended up being, again, protagonist. 
                                                          
126 At Least 28 Haitian Migrants Dead After Their Boat Sinks Off Bahamas, The New York Times, 
February 3 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/world/americas/haiti-migrant-boat-sinks-
bahamas.html; At least 15 Haitians dead after boat sinks off Turks and Caicos in shark-infested waters, 
Miami Herald, 31 March 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/haiti/article228665574.html.   
127 The negative impact of UN peace operations on local economies has been reported in a number of 
other countries, such as Cambodia and East Timor (Pouligny 2004).  
128 The documentary Assistance Mortelle, by Raoul Peck, about the foreign aid after the earthquake in 
Haiti, demonstrates how this process works (http://www.film-
documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/38155_1).  
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Frustration fuels violence (Braum 2019; Marcelin 2015), and the Haitian business and 
political elite use this perverse process in their benefit instead of remediating it.  
As for women, most street vendors, mainly of food, are female, but men control 
the spaces of street markets (something that often generates violent conflicts) and 
charge them fees for protection (Braum 2014). In the countryside, households are often 
led by women, and fatherhood is inexistent in many families. There is a relevant 
feminist movement in the country, there are women in leading roles in civil society 
organisations and a few in politics. Nevertheless, the position of women in Haitian 
society in general is, to an important extent, an invisible one.129  
Despite such precarious conditions, Haitians are often very conscious about the 
origins of their problems and their most pressing needs. As already mentioned, they 
discuss a lot about their history, politics and their long-lasting crisis. The ‘Movement 
Ghettos from Haiti’ described by Braum had the slogan: “Hands in hands, head in 
place, let’s walk through the path of development. Eyes open.”130 In Braum’s 
ethnographic study of Bel Air baze from 2010 to 2013, what most people emphasised 
was the need for economic development. Beyond prejudiced and paternalist 
understandings of the Haitian crisis, the need for economic recovery and to overcome 
dependency on humanitarian aid is self-evident for many (or most) Haitians (Beckett 
2017). Minustah was not equipped nor had as a goal to tackle this problem. But it ended 
up contributing for the reproduction of Haiti’s predatory political economy and the 
precarious clientelist networks that base it, that is, the cause of the country’s long-
lasting economic stagnation. 
To break the mould (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), to break the vicious circles 
of dependency and of the strategies of extraversion (Bayart and Ellis 2000) or, to 
resume the ecological metaphor, of cutting down valuable and priceless trees, 
compromising the very possibility of a future to survive today, an essentially 
endogenous force is needed, as already suggested in Chapter 2. But with the lack of a 
nationalist and productive bourgeoisie and the majority of the population living in 
daring conditions of poverty or extreme poverty, the most probable is that Haiti will 
                                                          
129 See, for instance: Markets and Margins: An interview with Etant Dupain, The Public Archive, 17 July 
2019, https://thepublicarchive.com/?p=5201.  
130 Translation from Portuguese: “Mãos com mãos, com a cabeça no lugar (ou a postos), vamos correr 
pelo caminho do desenvolvimento, OLHOS ABERTOS”, which the author translated from creole: “Men 
nan men, tèt an plas, nap franchi chimen devlopman an je kale” (Braum 2014, 173).  
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remain in need of foreign aid, something that, as we saw and paradoxically, also 
contributes for the maintenance of the status quo in the country.  
In this sense, as pointed by a number of researchers (Zanotti 2010; Farmer 2012; 
Beckett 2017),foreign aid needs to change if the goal is to support Haitians to reach 
minimum standards of security, wellbeing and economic development, and better 
conditions of agency so they can take their future in their own hands.131  
Haiti is often portrayed as ungovernable, and some even suggested an 
international trusteeship to administrate the country in face of the inability of local 
political forces (Morneau 2006; Ward 2006). The US military occupation of Haiti from 
1915 to 1934 well illustrates how such paternalism can end up worsening the local 
social, economic and political conditions, beyond being itself a perverse force 
responsible for gross human rights violations and, most importantly, for the 
maintenance of the use of force as the main political tool available, something that, as 
we have seen, is among the main problems in the country.  
I suggested elsewhere that a transitional governance process with an inclusive 
approach conducted by the UN (that is, a UN interim administration, like in East Timor) 
could have remediated the political stalemate in 2004, and enabled the support of a 
peace process and political settlement to address the conflict and the development of 
minimum grounds for democratisation in the country, for the establishment of the basic 
rules of the game (Parra 2019). Taking into account the damage caused by decades of a 
totalitarian regime supported by the United States to the country’s social, economic and 
political capacities, such transitional governance process could have supported the 
country to get back on its feet.  
External interventionism in Haiti is, nonetheless, always a double-edged sword 
(as elsewhere). And since this moment passed, other solutions need to be sought in 
order to support the embattled nation to regain minimum standards of security, stability 
and real sovereignty and self-determination. To stop feeding social fragmentation and 
distrust (even with the best of the intentions) is a fundamental goal in this sense. To turn 
the building of legitimate and accountable institutions possible, a social environment 
with minimum cohesion and trust is needed.  
                                                          
131 There are, of course, organisations active in Haiti who are committed to work in this sense, such as 
Fonkoze and Partners in Health (Zanotti 2010).  
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During the popular democratic uprising that ended Duvalierism in Haiti, student 
demonstrators shouted: “Long live life! Down with death!” (Dubois 2013, 359), a motto 
that well synthesised this movement and the democratic forces in the country at that 
time. Today, a necropolitical force gained, as in other cases, a different configuration 
from the period of Duvalierism, as tyranny transfigured from a central authority into 
atomized and individuated destructive force (Mbembe 2018). We can say that in Haiti, 
instead of ethnic and religious divisions, it materialised into a necropolitical clientelist 
patronage.  
The danger of an authoritarian solution lurks again in the country, following the 
global trend of populism and politics of fear.132 Certain conservatism predominant in 
Haitian society added to the wish for minimum order and security aggravates this 
danger. Despite the seriousness of the present situation in Haiti and of this risk, the 
movement against the corruption scandal of PetroCaribe united different groups for a 
common purpose and pointed for the possibility of construction of a political space and 
the potential for collective action and agency.  
Many in the movement ask Jovenel Moïse’s resignation, something the most 
influent actors in Haiti do not support,133 pointing that “in a democracy change must 
come through the ballot box.” As democratisation remains elusive in Haiti, with the use 
and manipulation of the electoral process by different political groups through coercive 
means, and disillusion and alienation of most of the population, the request for his 
resignation is understandable. The challenge seems to be the overcoming of the 
tradeoffs between demand for justice and compromise, revolt and security, for which a 
more democratic and inclusive political equilibrium is certainly needed. As already 
emphasised, this can only be accomplished through an essentially endogenous force. 
With a history of injustice and a present of pressing needs, nonetheless, international 
                                                          
132 This danger has been mentioned in an interview with a former employee of an international 
organisation in the country, on 2 May 2019. The participation of members of the dismantled Haitian army 
who participated in the dictatorship of the military junta in the 1990’s in the reestablishment of the 
institution (which has a substantial popular support) evidences this danger. See: Haiti installs new high 
command for planned 5,000-strong army, Reuters, 28 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
haiti-military/haiti-installs-new-high-command-for-planned-5000-strong-army-idUSKBN1H40CV; Haiti 
has a new army with much of the old leadership. Some in the U.S. aren’t happy, Miami Herald, 26 March 
2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article206915699.html.  
133 Press Release of the Core Group, Minujusth, 10 February 2019, 
https://minujusth.unmissions.org/en/press-release-core-group-%E2%80%93-10-february-2019; OAS tells 
Haiti opposition to back off – and tells president to start governing, Miami Herald, 20 June 2019, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article231731618.html.  
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solidarity is needed, not only by disenfranchised Haitians, but so as minimum ethical 
and civilisational standards do not remain as dead letter.  
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4. Political legitimacy, peace and statebuilding in comparative perspective
This chapter is dedicated to a comparative analysis with other four cases of 
countries that underwent violent conflict, statebuilding and international interventions, 
the latter being absent in one of them.  
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we will see that there were certain similar 
conditions comparing to Haiti concerning the historical process through which social 
and political infrastructures developed, as well as foreign interference and international 
intervention, resulting in similar outcomes.  
Afghanistan, in turn, presents one more case with the reproduction of violent 
conflict, political instability and economic stagnation, with certain similarities 
comparing to Haiti and DRC. But we will see that variables often pointed in the 
literature as explanatory for failure of international interventions do not hold in this 
case, markedly interveners’ military capacity and funds, something that strengthens the 
explanation presented in the thesis through the lenses of political legitimacy.  
In the case of East Timor, the chapter seeks to grasp what key differences in the 
process of independence of the country help explain the production of substantially 
different social and political outcomes. Despite being a poor country, East Timor 
reached considerable social and political stability and democratisation. I seek to clarify 
the path through which this outcome was reached, despite a combination of variables 
pointed in political science literature as conductive to instability and lack of 
democratisation, mainly low income (Boix and Stokes 2003), recent history of conflict 
and political transition (Flores and Nooruddin 2012) and predominance of extractive 
industry (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015, 4).  
Finally, Somaliland is analysed as a sort of counterfactual case (Weber 1996), as 
it did not receive an international intervention, with the development of an essentially 
endogenous process able to create considerable social and political stability, a quite 
remarkable achievement despite the challenges the country faces, especially taking into 
account the ongoing violence and instability in Somalia and in the region.  
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While the case of Somaliland, “the road less travelled” (Richards 2012), could 
be pointed as an example that favours arguments against international interventions, 
East Timor illustrates that they can be a key instrument to cease gross human rights 
violations committed by states against less powerful minorities, not necessarily having 
as main outcomes the reinforcement of dependency and reproduction of unequal power 
relations, mass disenfranchisement, violence and instability. 
The chapter aims to present a structured comparative analysis, further 
developing what researchers usually consider in the literature review and conclusion 
(Veit 2010; Autesserre 2010; Wedeen 2015) or throughout a case study (Suhrke 2011), 
comparing the case selected with cases with considerable existing literature. For the 
cases analysed here, in this sense, I rely mostly on secondary sources and on existing 
analyses of experts in these countries. In this way, I hope to develop insightful 
reflections on Haiti’s case study, and also the peace-as-statebuilding endeavour in 
general, and around the question of political legitimacy in societies affected by violent 
conflict, recent political transition and international interventions.  
The chapter aims, in this way, to bring the case study of Haiti to the broader 
context of international interventions, conflicts and state formation in the postcolonial 
world, aiming to better understand what are its take-always to this broader reality. 
Taking into account variations, what can we expect in contexts of postcolonial societies 
that were affected by violent conflict, political transition and international intervention? 
In this sense, I hope to bring more insights into the theoretical and normative questions 
discussed in Chapter I, which are reviewed in the conclusion of the thesis.  
4.1. Democratic Republic of Congo – International intervention, statebuilding 
violence and the reproduction of decentralised violence   
4.1.1. Historical background 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, similarly to Haiti, has its history marked by 
the brutal violence of colonialism, in the case of Congo, especially and more 
systematically with the colonialism of the XIX century (Autesserre 2010; Orford 2011; 
Veit 2010). Belgian King Leopold’s reign of terror, which lasted from 1885 to 1908, 
was responsible for one of the bloodiest chapters of colonial violence in that period. It is 
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estimated that 10 million people died of forced labour, massacres, burned villages, 
malnutrition and torture during the whole period of colonial rule, as Congo became a 
colony of the Belgian state from 1908, by a decision of the Belgian parliament in 
response to the criticisms against Leopold’s brutal violence, until 1960 (Autesserre 
2010, 76, 273).  
Congo has also been similarly impacted by the geopolitics of the Cold War, as 
the enduring dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu received massive foreign aid (Autesserre 
2010; Orford 2011; Veit 2010), being able, with this support and the extraction of 
mineral and other natural resources, to sustain itself without the need to cultivate and 
yield legitimacy towards its subjects (Autesserre 2010, 70), even abstaining from 
governing parts of the country after the end of the Cold War (Veit 2010). 
The political transition of DR Congo after the end of the Cold War has been, 
though, even more turbulent and violent than in the case of Haiti, with two wars 
involving other countries in the region that killed around 5 million people, the deadliest 
conflict in the world since the Second World War (Autesserre 2010, 231). In DR 
Congo, Joseph Mobutu remained in power after Cold War aid ceased to flow, but his 
clientelist and neopatrimonial regime started to crumble after this period (Veit 2010) 
facing several armed rebellions, active opposition and unrest throughout the country 
(Stearns 2014, 164).  
He manipulated ethnic cleavages after this period to ensure his regime survival, 
despite the increasing international pressure to open and democratise the country 
(Autesserre 2010, 56-57), starting a process of manipulation and use of elections as a 
tool for different factions to extract and predate. Amidst international pressure for 
political reform and liberalisation, from March 1993 Congo had two competing 
governments, and increasing political and territorial fragmentation would contribute for 
the outbreak of violent conflict. One of the main catalysts that ultimately led to 
Mobutu’s regime end was the spill-over of the Rwandan genocide and conflict, with the 
massive flow of Rwandan Hutus and the serious destabilisation and violent clashes it 
provoked in the country (Autesserre 2010, 1).  
An external factor was, in this sense, determinant for the definitive end of the 
dictatorship, as in the case of Congo Mobutu’s regime was more resilient in face of 
internal opposition comparing to other cases, such as Haiti, where a democratic 
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movement was able to defeat Duvalierism after Cold War aid ceased. The First Congo 
War took place between 1996 and 1997, as Laurent-Désiré Kabila declared himself 
president. Conflicts with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, nonetheless, led to a second 
war, amplifying the involvement of other countries in Congo (Autesserre 2010, 48-49).  
4.1.2. International intervention, the peace-as-statebuilding paradigm and the 
reproduction of decentralised violence  
A peace agreement was signed in 1999, and the UNSC authorised the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 
February 2000. The UN has been long involved in the country, as analysed in Chapter I, 
where it first deployed a peace enforcement mission (Autesserre 2010; Orford 2013), 
during the process of independence in the 1960’s. In 2000, it faced one of the most 
complex and challenging cases of UN peace operations, taking into account the size of 
the Congolese territory, the lack of transport and basic infrastructure and the high 
fragmentation of violent conflict in the country.   
As argued by Autesserre, simplistic interpretations that end up normalising 
violence in Congolese society, as if it was part of the local culture and costumes, often 
come from prejudice and shallow understandings of the causes and drives for the 
reproduction of violence in DR Congo (Autesserre 2010, 72-79). This dominant view, 
nonetheless, was connected to the course of action taken by MONUC (later 
MONUSCO) and other foreign interveners, with serious and comprehensive 
consequences for the efforts to promote peace in the country.  
Autesserre analyses how the categorisation of DR Congo as a post-conflict 
country after 2006 corresponded to a formal understanding of the situation and did not 
take into account the actual conditions of violent conflict throughout the country – 
simply because a peace agreement was signed, a new constitution approved by a 
referendum and a national government elected.   
The reproduction of the idea that Congo was a post-conflict country went hand 
in hand with the normalisation of violence in Congolese society and culture, as 
something present in the country “since a long time ago,” something with which 
Congolese people were used to and “understood in a different way” comparing to 
Westerners (Autesserre 2010, 74-81). Violence, mainly in the Eastern Provinces where 
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armed groups are more heavily present, was considered, in this way, either as coming 
from the political and ethnic manipulation by elites, or as mere criminal, predatory and 
gratuitous, following the explanation of ‘greed’ in the ‘new’ civil wars  as opposed to 
past conflicts motivated by ‘grievance’, that is, by political and ideological motivations 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
Autesserre (2010, 70-72), nonetheless, as well as other authors (Kalyvas 2001; 
2003; Mundy 2011) challenge this differentiation between old and new civil wars, and 
the understanding of contemporary conflicts as coming merely from criminal and 
opportunistic behaviour, with disregard to the social, economic and political factors 
related to violence (Autesserre 2010, 81-83). As discussed in the case study of Haiti, 
this is also an important issue in the country, not only concerning foreign scholar 
research and observers, but also local actors.134  
In this respect, as developed in Chapter I, Achille Mbembe (2003; 2012; 2018) 
brings insightful reflections that can shed light on the social and political process in 
postcolonial societies affected by violent conflict, and that should be considered by the 
literature on civil wars, political violence and international interventions. Mbembe 
elucidates a macro phenomenon concerning the transition from tyrannical dictatorships 
during the period of the Cold War, where violence and authoritarianism were 
centralised in the state and personified in dictators, to what the author names as lumpen 
radicalism (Mbembe 2018), an atomized and individuated form of tyranny that plagued 
many societies after the end of authoritarian regimes, in cases such as DR Congo, Haiti, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Mbembe’s reflects on colonial violence and the racism in which it was based, 
and its psychological, social and political consequences, with what he names as 
necropolitics, with which colonised peoples were denied their human life, casted in a 
sort of death-in-life (Mbembe 2003, 21). Colonial necropolitics, and the consequent 
social and cultural fragmentation and deterioration it generated, were succeeded by 
different forms of exchange with foreign actors, still marked by extreme inequalities 
(Mbembe 2012, 26), with brutal authoritarian regimes externally supported in the 
                                                          
134 In this respect, similarly to the case of DR Congo, it is understandable that many Haitians have lost 
their patience concerning the activities of armed groups, the violence and criminality in the capital Port-
au-Prince, especially as it is often connected to the corrupted and predatory political class of the country. 
Nonetheless, to understand the context and the causes of this violence is essential in order to meaningfully 
and sustainably address the problem.  
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context of the Cold War, and massive disenfranchisement of young and male 
populations after this period (Dolan 2009; Urdal 2006), with the economic adjustment 
programs of the 1990’s that further worsened the situation of many African and other 
developing countries (Bayart and Ellis 2000; Evans 1992; Mbembe 2012). 
Mbembe points that under slavery and colonial occupation, “death and freedom 
are irrevocably interwoven” (Mbembe 2003, 28), and this situation of negation of life, 
or what Dolan (2009) named as social torture, endured after colonialism in different 
forms. The (often nihilist) violence witnessed in DR Congo and elsewhere can be better 
understood, in this sense, as a reaction, a form of agency (Mbembe 2003, 39),135 in a 
context of death-in-life, in a historical continuum that could not be broken with the 
unsuccessful political transition of the 1990’s, a psychological state and social and 
political configuration that not only affect those involved in the practice of violence, but 
these societies as a whole, as the other individuals have their social and political agency 
severely limited by this context of violence and insecurity. In this sense, the 
decentralised violence, and social and political unrest that plagues DR Congo came into 
being with the way the country entered modernity, as opposed to the common claim that 
it originates from some native, cultural or inherent characteristic of its people.  
With the atomization of tyranny, the grand narrative that violence in DR Congo 
represents the Hobbesian archetypal state of nature, which would be evidence of the 
lack of a functional central state, a ‘Leviathan’ able to control this violent anarchy, 
dominated the discourses and approach of foreign interveners in the country (Autesserre 
2010, 69). Autesserre demonstrates, in this way, the strength of international 
interveners’ presuppositions, which did not change with the real conditions that 
developed in Congo on the ground.  
Despite the fact that United Nations human rights reports pointed the Congolese 
army itself as responsible for many of the gross human rights violations happening 
                                                          
135 In an article about the work of Frantz Fanon, who is known for his standing concerning violence, as an 
almost unavoidable mean through which colonised peoples could free themselves, Mbembe brings 
fundamental insights and clarifications concerning Fanon’s ideas (Mbembe 2012). Fanon well knew and 
expressed the dangers of the elites of colonised countries to reproduce the colonialist logics, something he 
developed in Black Skin, White Masks (2008), and also the dangers of violence as a mean for resistance 
and social transformation. As mentioned in Chapter I, Arendt (1970) criticises Fanon’s position 
concerning violence, but she probably failed to grasp what Mbembe well demonstrates in this article 
concerning Fanon’s thought.  
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during the conflict (Autesserre 2010; Veit 2010),136 the peace-as-statebuilding paradigm 
and top-down approach of international interveners did not change. MONUSCO and 
other UN agencies, especially the UN Human Rights (OHCHR), work to pressure the 
Congolese government so perpetrators can be held accountable, and there were cases of 
trials against high-rank officers for crimes against humanity, as the mentioned reports 
inform.  
Nonetheless, UN blue helmets kept working side by side with an army 
responsible for mass atrocities in the country (Veit 2010). As Autesserre herself notes, 
the state has been the source of most mass violence during the history of the country, 
from the colonial violence to its successor, the brutal regime of Mobutu, contrary to the 
common idea that assumes it came from some sort of primitive costume or inherent 
savagery (Autesserre 2010, 75-76).  
Today, if it is true that an important part of the violence comes from non-state 
armed groups, it is fundamental to reflect the different quality of the violence 
perpetrated by the Congolese army, which is backed by the structural power and the 
legitimation of the state, and fuels the reproduction of violent contestation by the other 
armed factions, instead of fighting and controlling it. Stearns (2014), a researcher that 
presents different explanations for the source of violence in Congolese Eastern 
provinces, emphasising dynamics of escalation with counter-mobilisation and the role 
of elites for the reproduction of violence, a role that increased in importance over time, 
also demonstrates the fundamental role of the Congolese state not only as perpetrator, 
but for the reproduction of violence. In an illustrative passage, he notes:  
More than just state weakness, it appears that it is the form of governance that affects patterns of 
mobilisation. Two aspects stick out. First, the increased use of armed groups by politicians and 
military officers. In part, this is due to the advent of democratic politics in 2003, which forced 
politicians to appeal to largely uneducated and inexperienced electorates. Some politicians did so 
by supporting armed groups, which bolstered their reputation, gave them bargaining leverage 
with the central government and availed them of a local enforcement arm when needed. The 
same arguments valid for some military officers who use armed groups as a fonds de commerce 
(a means of business) to extract revenue and to bolster their influence within the army. Many of 
the armed groups operating in the eastern Congo were initiated by defectors from the national 
army or other armed groups who seek to use military leverage to negotiate for positions and 
ranks (Stearns 2014, 169).  
                                                          
136 For instance: Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights and the activities of her Office in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, A/HRC/13/64, 28 January 2010; Human Rights Council, Third joint report of seven United 
Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, A/HRC/16/68, 3 March 2011.  
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Besides, one can only imagine the sense of hopelessness of ordinary people in 
DR Congo, as all those with power in the country are, directly or indirectly, involved 
with the perpetration of gross human rights violations, including international 
interveners that are there, in theory, to protect them. The imperative of the statebuilding, 
or the ontological primacy of the state (Trouillot 1990), nonetheless, sustains the belief 
that the only possible solution is the gradual improvement of the state, independently 
from the empirical reality concerning its role in the country, and of the conditions that 
would be required for its ‘improvement,’ or change of quality, not only concerning the 
question of violence, but also the transformation of the predatory and neopatrimonial 
political economy that prevails (Evans 1992).  
Stearns also argues that the there are important incentives for armed groups and 
for individuals to join them, since there is a general sense that one cannot have 
economic and political gains without the use of violence (Stearns 2014, 166), something 
fed by the Congolese state and, directly or indirectly, by international interveners, 
through their support and legitimation to the Congolese state.  
4.1.3. International intervention and the maintenance of a predatory Leviathan 
Following the discussion presented in Chapter I on the often intrinsic violence of 
the process of state formation, and consequently often entailed in the statebuilding 
endeavour, the case of DR Congo demonstrates that the bitter competition for power 
and resources that often have characterised the process of state formation (Jones 2013) 
has aggravating factors with the extreme inequalities in the international arena, the 
weight of colonial violence and consequent social and cultural disruption in postcolonial 
societies. These aggravating factors set unfavourable conditions for an endogenous 
process that could enable the limitation of this intrinsic violence in the process of state 
formation, with a bottom-up pressure from subjects (whether the population in general 
or more economically powerful and organised groups), essentially what enabled the 
process of democratisation in developed countries (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; 
Olson 1993; Weingast 1997).   
Veit, in turn, through his study of the Congolese region of Ituri, analyses how 
international interveners ended up contributing for local unequal power relations and for 
further disenfranchisement of the population, contrary to the stated goal of 
democratisation (Veit 2010). He analyses how the practice of indirect rule, which dates 
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back to the colonial period, with which local leaders sought to extract benefits from 
colonial rulers without being accountable to local populations, is at the core of the 
reproduction of an unaccountable and undemocratic political model. If we think in the 
political motto “no taxation without representation,” the condition of extraversion 
presented an opportunity for local rulers for extracting wealth without representing local 
populations (something comparable with countries that heavily rely on extractive 
economies, as analysed below). The UN peace operation, as well as the broader context 
of international intervention in Congo, did not transform this logic but reproduced it in a 
different manner.  
Veit analysis of the indirect rule reproduced by international interveners relates 
to what we have observed in the case study of Haiti, when political actors (domestic or 
an international intervention) have power and exert physical coercion against subjects, 
but don’t assume political responsibility. We can say that they exert power, but not 
political domination in a proper sense (Schlichte 2012; Morcillo Laiz and Schlichte 
2015), something that may explain the chronic political instability, lack of legitimacy 
and violent contest in these contexts as concerns domestic political actors, and the fact 
that international interventions often fail to support the development of accountable and 
legitimate state institutions.  
As Veit research demonstrates, this is a double edged process with which 
political responsibility does not grow out of international interventions, despite their 
stated goals and the international normative framework with which they are connected 
of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Orford 2013).   
In this sense, international interventions, even if their stated goal is to support a 
locally owned process of statebuilding and democratisation, can fatally spoil the 
political path that would enable an endogenous process of democratisation, as subjects 
of power are rendered powerless in standard top-down approaches of peace-as-
statebuilding. Added to the common deleterious effects of international interventions 
and, broadly, humanitarianism to local economies and means of subsistence,137 we can 
137 As already stated, although the ‘do no harm’ principle has been coined in the 1990’s and much have 
been developed to tackle this problem in the policy world, the collateral damage of humanitarianism is 
still present, especially in situations of chronic humanitarian crisis, such as in Haiti, Congo and Somalia 
(For instance: Beckett 2017; Schuller 2012; Markets and Margins: An interview with Etant Dupain, The 
Public Archive, 17 July 2019, https://thepublicarchive.com/?p=5201#haiti%20#neoliberalism, Accessed 
on 14 August 2019).  
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say that it is not a surprise that “the most puzzling question is why international efforts 
sometimes succeed, rather than why they fail” (Autesserre 2017, 4).  
One can fairly argue that there are domestic factors that hinder democratisation, 
and that they may be the main factors that explain the absence of democracy and the 
state fragility in general. One of them vastly analysed in political science is concerning 
regimes that rely on extraction of natural resources, such as Saudi Arabia, being able to 
sustain themselves without being minimally accountable to their subjects (Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis 2015). In this sense, in the absence of an international intervention, DR 
Congo could have developed (or remained) as a rentier regime, relying on the vast 
mineral and other natural resources of the country. In any case, this possibility does not 
deny the fact that international interveners worked in a way so as to support the 
reproduction of predatory politics in the country, similarly to cases such as Afghanistan, 
Cambodia (Barma 2012; 2017) and Haiti, as analysed in this dissertation.  
Rentier regimes are perhaps the main evidence to question Weber’s assertion 
that every system of domination “attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 
legitimacy” (Weber 1978, 213). Although even rentier and the most personal 
authoritarian regimes have clientelist channels to distribute wealth and some level of 
power, it is indeed very questionable to assume that they seek to legitimate their power 
through these and other means such as propaganda, ideological and information control, 
as pointed by Wedeen in her study of Hafiz al-Assad regime in Syria (Wedeen 2015).  
Wedeen’s insightful analysis of one of the worst totalitarian regimes of recent 
times shows that, in sum, subjects often perform acquiescence and obedience in order to 
avoid regime repression and to simply secure their lives and of their loved ones. She 
points out that such performative obedience was often permeated by small acts of non-
compliance or even opposition, for which individuals used means such as comedy, 
jokes and figures of speech. The regime, in turn, persistently reproduced an image of the 
dictator as an omnipresent and omniscient figure, someone who personified and 
represented the most essential values of Syrian society and culture, ratifying and 
authorising its own power for itself – a narcissistic form of validation that hardly 
involved the subjects of the regime, who were massively victims of violent repression. 
In this sense, regimes that do not properly seek to cultivate and yield legitimacy among 
their subjects are not limited to rentier regimes and those who receive massive external 
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support, but can be authoritarian (especially totalitarian ones), as well as very fragile 
democracies such as Haiti (although much more unstable).  
Concerning DR Congo and Haiti, as political actors have often an openly 
predatory behaviour, and not rarely seek to seem legitimate more to foreign actors than 
to their own subjects,138 we can say that Weber’s formulation is indeed very 
questionable. As already discussed in Chapter I, individuals have different motives, 
incentives and behaviour in situations of violent conflict and widespread insecurity, so 
the legitimation of political actors and institutions follows different logics comparing to 
“normal” situations. In this respect, Veit brings insightful remarks on the conceptual 
discussion of his study on DR Congo:   
Civil war and intervention are situations in which domination is extremely uncertain, fragile, and 
contingent, and these circumstances demand a focus on the emergence and fragmentation of rule. 
Weber’s exclusive condition of legitimacy leaves little leeway to analyze the latter. His 
definition excludes crises of legitimacy and merely opportunistic obedience without genuine 
belief on the part of those who, as often in violent political conflict, have to choose between two 
equally undesirable options (Lemke 2001) (Veit 2010, 30).  
Further research, case studies and comparative analysis can shed more light on 
Wedeen’s criticism of Weber and on Veit remarks, as this point seems to be indeed 
critical to understand politics in postcolonial and developing countries, especially those 
ones affected by violent conflict and chronic political instability, favouring better 
explanations for how political scenarios marked by instability and violent contest come 
into being, and what are the internal as well as external conditions that enable their 
reproduction and endurance over time.  
4.1.4. DR Congo and Haiti: reproduction of violence and predatory politics and the 
role of international interveners  
Both in DR Congo and Haiti, the process of social disruption brought by 
colonialism, slavery and externally sponsored authoritarian regimes could not be ‘fixed’ 
by post-Cold War international interventions. In the case of Haiti, the ‘security-first’ 
                                                          
138 We can say that with the political phenomenon of extraversion, analysed by Bayart and Ellis (2000) as 
developed in Chapter I, political actors act exactly in this way: they seek to legitimate themselves to their 
foreign sponsors, and are exempted to do so concerning their subjects. In the case of Haiti, this op-ed by 
Monique Clesca, a journalist, writer and former UN official, well illustrates this point, as she criticises the 
current president of Haiti for seeking to being accountable to international bodies and the ‘international 
community’ instead of his own constituency: ‘Jovenel Moise is not fit to be Haiti’s president. He should 
resign’ | Opinion, Miami Herald, 19 July 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-
ed/article232861192.html. 
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statebuilding approach ended up contributing for the reproduction of the undemocratic 
and predatory logics of Haitian politics, while the social, economic and political 
conditions that sustain a condition of chronic crisis and political stability have not been 
tackled, and the intervention ended up contributing for the perpetuation of some of these 
conditions, such as economic dependency and lack of legitimacy and accountability of 
state institutions.  
In the case of DR Congo, international interveners ended up colluding and 
supporting a state responsible for mass atrocities, contributed for further political 
disenfranchisement of the local population (Veit 2010), and did not contribute to 
address the local causes for the reproduction of violent conflict, such as local ethnic 
conflicts and disputes over land and resources (Autesserre 2010, 257), or, from another 
perspective, to change elite’s incentives and the predatory characteristic of the 
Congolese state (Stearns 2014).139  
Haiti and DR Congo are two cases that illustrate the serious faults of the 
statebuilding paradigm, according to which international interveners can contribute for 
peacebuilding and democratisation supporting the development of the formal 
procedures of state institutions and elections, and working strictly with local political 
elites and parts of violent conflict.  As developed in Chapter I, this paradigm disregards 
the social conditions that actually support the development and sustainability of 
(especially democratic) state institutions (Lemay-Hébert 2015), the established and 
unwritten social norms, the behaviour and rules political actors follow, the social and 
political equilibrium, as well as the economic conditions that enable the development 
and consolidation of the state and its predominance in societies. 
If the social norms and institutions that ensured the social and economic 
reproduction and order in these societies, in Haiti with the Lakou system that developed 
after its independence, and in DR Congo the diverse social systems that existed before 
colonialism, cannot be ‘recovered’ or ‘revived,’ a local sense of social and political 
legitimacy needs to build up and be consolidated so these societies can overcome crisis, 
instability and violent conflict and retake their own political future.  
                                                          
139 From my reading of Autesserre’s work and Stearns’ analysis, I do not see irreconcilable 
understandings of the causes of violent conflict in DR Congo, but two different perspectives and 
approaches, from both of which I understand that state violence and its support and legitimation by 
international interveners is a key factor that explains the ongoing violence in the country.  
155 
 
As pointed in Chapter I, nostalgic and essentialist movements often ended up 
being used by local political actors to sustain authoritarianism and unjust structures 
(Prashad 2008). International interveners can support, nonetheless, this endogenous 
process of social reconstruction that local agents actually already carry out on a daily 
basis, through local social interactions as well as with the contact with the external 
world, with the incorporation and adaptation of values, beliefs, norms and culture 
(Autesserre 2014, Beckett 2019), as actually most societies in the world do with the 
process of globalisation.  
In this sense, I agree with Autesserre recommendations concerning the case of 
DR Congo, as she emphasises the need for international interveners to address conflict 
at the local level, dealing with the social, economic and political causes of violence 
instead of portraying it as merely criminal and predatory and limiting its framework of 
action to national and macro processes. The potential of more local and bottom-up 
approaches, with which the process of statebuilding could develop endogenously and 
indeed locally owned, has been suggested, in different ways, by other authors (Barma 
2017; Hancock and Mitchell 2018; Mitchell 2018; Pouligny 2006; Ramsbotham and 
Wennmann 2014). As much as these suggestions have a considerable traction in the 
policy world, again, the peace-as-statebuilding paradigm, habitus and mindset seem to 
resist the considerable changes and reforms it would be required so these ideas can be 
put in practice.140  
Concerning Autesserre’s policy recommendations, nonetheless, I suggest that it 
is essential to bear in mind the violent features inherent to the process of state formation 
and the need to address and limit them. Addressing violent conflict at the local level 
should be understood, in this way, as a form to contribute for the development of more 
legitimate and accountable state institutions at the national level and to limit the power 
(and violence) of the state. Local efforts for peacebuilding must be, in this sense, 
inclusive and legitimate to local populations (Mitchell 2018), or they can remain 
supporting the reproduction of clientelist and predatory politics (Stearns 2013, 2014) 
                                                          
140 War and Peacekeeping, by Peter Yeo, Séverine Autesserre (debate), May/ June 2019, Foreign Affairs, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/war-and-peacekeeping. In this debate, Autesserre 
emphasises that Antonio Guterres declarations to reform peacekeeping operations, in line with this 
literature, for “the inclusion and engagement of civil society and all segments of the local population in 
peacekeeping mandate implementation” are one among many promises already made in the past, and that 
promises need, of course, to become practice so peace operations can indeed support affected societies to 
overcome violent conflict.  
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and contributing to further disenfranchise ordinary citizens (Veit 2010). On the other 
hand, if international interveners keep offering support and legitimation to national 
institutions and political actors responsible for gross human rights violations and for the 
maintenance of predatory and clientelist political behaviour, it is hard to see how efforts 
at the local level could beat the structural power of national state institutions with 
international support and legitimation. 
These reflections are also valid for Stearns’ policy recommendations concerning 
DR Congo. He points: 
If the Congolese government continues to hamstring its own security apparatus and to fuel armed 
groups in the country's eastern region, and if Rwanda's ruling party maintains its support for 
armed groups next door, there is little doubt that the heart of Africa will continue to be plagued 
by insurrection and violence. 
If, on the other hand, outside donors and other African countries can tailor more honest 
engagements with both Kinshasa and Kigali, conditioning their aid on genuine progress toward 
more accountable and less bellicose governance in Congo and unlocking Congo's economic 
potential, then the Congo war stands a chance of ceasing to be a current event and finally 
becoming history (Stearns 2013, 9).  
The researcher may underestimate the ability of Congolese and also Rwandan 
politicians to work with foreign actors and international interveners for the achievement 
of their own interests, maybe not paying enough attention to the strategies of 
extraversion of local political actors, which evolve and adapt over time. In this sense, I 
follow a ‘Jeffersonian’ (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b) or republican understanding of 
politics, for which the only possible guarantee for a pluralistic and democratic political 
order – that is, in which state violence is tamed and limited – is the ability of people to 
act politically (that is, collectively) and exert bottom-up pressure (Arendt 2006).  
As the cases of Haiti and DR Congo present important similarities, we analyse 
next the case of Afghanistan, which has important differences concerning its social and 
political formation, it has been differently impacted by the geopolitics of the Cold War, 
and received a different kind of international intervention, but the outcomes of the 
peace-as-statebuilding endeavour are similar to the cases previously analysed.  
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4.2. Afghanistan – Externally-driven statebuilding, intervener’s arbitrary violence, 
war economy and continuation of insurgency and violence   
Afghanistan is a valuable case to analyse the inherent problems and 
contradictions of the contemporary peace-as-statebuilding paradigm. It is so because 
different strategies have been tried in the country: light and heavy footprint (Suhrke 
2014); war aiming to destroy the enemy (Taliban) and counterinsurgency (Suhrke 
2014). Besides, common sense explanations to the failure of international peace 
interventions such as lack of fund, military strength, personnel and capacity don’t hold 
in this case. In 2011, there were 150.000 NATO and other allied forces in Afghanistan 
(Suhrke 2011b, 1), a larger contingent than during the Soviet military occupation, and 
the international funds destined to the country totalised 2,5 billion dollars in 2004/05, 
representing 90% of its budget (Suhrke 2009, 232).  
In the following, I present a brief historical background of the case, so we can 
understand the macro social and political processes the country went through up to the 
present context of international intervention and continuation of insurgency, violence 
and political instability.  
4.2.1. Historical background  
The process of state formation in Afghanistan dates back to the XIX century, 
when European imperialism and its political and economic dominance swept the world, 
creating incentives for places with diverse and often decentralized political systems to 
adopt a model more similar to the Western one, with centralisation of power through the 
creation of modern state institutions and bureaucracy, and to create conditions for 
economic development (Suhrke 2011a).  
Suhrke compares the process of state formation in Afghanistan with the cases of 
Turkey and Japan, noticing that the former was a partially successful one. The three 
countries had favourable conditions for the development of the modern state, namely: 
strong leadership; incorporation of the Western model of modernisation, but 
maintenance/ creation of a national identity with unifying cultural elements; and an 
endogenous political process to face the external threat posed by European imperialism 
– in  the case of Afghanistan, mainly British and Russian imperialism, as in other Asian 
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territories (Suhrke 2011, 235). In the case of Afghanistan, nonetheless, strong local 
leaders with religious power opposed the national secular leadership, aligning with 
British colonialists to maintain their local religious-based power (Suhrke 2011, 235-
236). This tension between politics and religion, which was more successfully managed 
in the process of formation of modern Turkey, prevented the development of a strong 
state with centralisation of political power in the case of Afghanistan.  
Wardak and Braithwaite, in turn, emphasise the importance of informal social 
and political institutions at the local and village level in rural areas, where most Afghans 
still live, which are the ones that actually ensure social order, in some territories until 
the present, while “state formal social control at the macro level has historically been 
weak” (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b, 197). The authors note that before the Soviet 
invasion, Afghanistan enjoyed considerable stability under the King Mohammad Zahir 
Shah and President Mohammad Daoud Khan, when state institutions were gradually 
strengthened (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 181).  
In the second half of the Cold War, Afghanistan got caught in the bipolar 
hegemonic dispute, with the Soviet invasion in 1979 aiming to re-establish a communist 
government that had risen to power the year before with a military coup (Braithwaite 
and Wardak 2013a; Suhrke 2009; 2011a; Hobsbawm 1998; Prashad 2007). The United 
States, on the other hand, supported different groups, among them Islamist groups, 
including the Taliban (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a; Hillenbrand 2015, 284). The 
communist government did not enjoy much popular support, least of all in rural areas; 
they wanted to impose a modernisation agenda without a social and political basis for it. 
The United States, in turn, saw in Afghanistan an opportunity to bring upon the Soviet 
Union “its Vietnam” (Prashad 2008, 272). With the end of the Soviet support, the 
communist government supported by Soviet tanks crumbled. Among these conditions, 
the Afghan Civil War was one of the bloodiest of that period, with the estimated death 
toll between half million (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, 154) to 1,2 million (Braithwaite 
and Wardak 2013a, 182), and millions of refugees, with which “Afghanistan's 
economic, political, educational and cultural infrastructure was decimated” 
(Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 182).  
After the communist regime crumbled, the United States and other Western 
powers did not have more interest in Afghanistan nor in intervening or supporting the 
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halt of the bloodshed. Pakistan kept supporting different Mujahideen groups, for its 
interests in the country, mainly for the supply of oil and gas and to counter the influence 
of India (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a). They ultimately focused their support on 
Taliban, seeing the potential of the group, who was originated in madrassas, the 
religious schools that became the most common form of education in the war-torn 
country (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a). Taliban grew in power and ultimately gained 
control of 90% of Afghans’ territory, counting also on the support of al-Qaeda 
(Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 184).  
The brutality and anarchic violence of the civil war, with the rise of numerous 
violent entrepreneurs, beyond the external sponsorship, enabled Taliban’s rise to power. 
As developed in Chapter I, once again the concept of basic legitimacy, which 
emphasises people’s aversion to total insecurity and unpredictability, helps us 
understand the rise of this group who professed an extreme, fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Koran and its application to civilian life through the Sharia law. 
Minorities in the country, mainly Hindus, Sikhs and Shia, were violently persecuted and 
chosen by the Taliban as scapegoats, enemies of the only legitimate religious and 
political order that they represented (Mohan 2005, 223). The religious basis was 
fundamental for the social legitimation of the group, despite their extremism, strict rules 
and brutal and random violence, especially against women (Mohan 2005; Goodson 
2001).  
The educated class of the country also especially suffered in this period, most of 
them perished, hid or went to exile (Goodson 2011, 128-129). The Hindus and Sikhs 
had a high status, economic and political power in Afghan society, and were targeted by 
the Taliban also for this reason (Mohan 2005). The years of civil war and of the Taliban 
regime were, in this sense, very destructive for the Afghan society and culture, with the 
reign of religious fundamentalists on one side, and warlords on the other, all sides 
ending up sustaining themselves with the extractive industry and drug trafficking, 
something that enabled the prolongation of the conflict (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a; 
Sharan and Bose 2018).  
4.2.2. 2001 US-led intervention – legitimacy problem from the outset 
With the 09/11 terrorist attacks, the US intervention in Afghanistan with the 
support of its NATO allies ended the regime of the group United States previously 
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supported (Hillenbrand 2015, 284). This time, the US was willing to support any other 
group to defeat the Taliban, allying, in this sense, not only with the cultured Afghan 
elite who was in exile, represented by Hamid Karzai who later became president, but 
also with the violent entrepreneurs that emerged during the civil war (Braithwaite and 
Wardak 2013a; Sharan 2013; Sharan and Bose 2018; Suhrke 2011a).  
The US-led intervention’s reliance on the Northern Alliance, formed mainly by 
warlords and Mujahideen who lost the civil war to the Taliban, has been pointed as a 
strategy designed to fail (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 2013b; Suhrke 2011a 227), as 
it entailed a fundamental legitimacy problem from the outset. The intervention 
empowered in the post-Taliban government, in this sense, the villains and criminals of 
the civil war, what some classified as ‘bribery for peace,’ or a strategy to ‘keep the 
warlords happy’ (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 185). Once again, the basic legitimacy 
yielded by the Taliban was reinforced, something illustrated by Braithwaite and 
Wardak’s quote of a Kabul resident: “So long as you did not break their religious rules, 
you could walk safely anywhere. You could not do that before they took over and you 
cannot do that today” (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 185).  
It is important to note that at the beginning, there were senior Taliban figures 
willing to submit to the new order and reconcile, as well as former members of the 
communist regime, something that Karzai wished to reciprocate, but that was rejected 
by the United States, which sent some of these Taliban members to Guantanamo, who 
could have contributed for a process of reconciliation. Others, seeing that attempts to 
reconcile were rewarded with imprisonment, joined the remnants who wanted to rebuild 
the insurgency and fight against the foreign intervention and the Karzai government 
(Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 186).  
Setting aside the important differences between Haiti and Afghanistan, the 
reflection of a senior UN official somehow relates to what I point in the case of Haiti, 
concerning the lack of a transitional governance process that could have supported both 
wrecked countries to get back to their feet: 
Some of us forcefully argued for a heavy footprint on the model of Cambodia, East Timor, 
Bosnia or Kosovo, convinced that, after years of conflict and misrule, the Afghan people were 
ready for a strong international role that would do away with both warlord and Taliban rule, 
reconstruct their country, and assist in building up rule of law institutions. But we were overruled 
by those favouring a 'light foot print', in which the Afghans would be 'in the lead', a politically 
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correct slogan that in practice ensured that the process would be led not by genuine 
representatives of the Afghan people, but by a group of mostly rapacious individuals. Afghans 
saw the international community's support for transferring power to the worst villains in their 
country and drew the natural conclusions (Vendrell 2011, 54-55). 
4.2.3. Intervener’s variations and mixed strategies and the overall effect of 
arbitrary violence 
 United States swung between a discourse and strategy of full use of force 
against the enemy, and of winning the approval of the population to defeat the Taliban 
(Suhrke 2015.). Nonetheless, they kept working with violent entrepreneurs, supporting 
them for the development of the mining industry and local governance as part of their 
exit strategy (Sharan 2013). 
Suhrke elucidates different phases of the US and NATO intervention in 
Afghanistan as follows: (1) The early phase, with the Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), in which the objective was the complete defeat of the Taliban, as the author 
illustrates:  
An American navy fighter pilot who a decade later described the military’s mode of operation at 
the time called it a ‘fangs-out, kill-kill-kill culture . . . the mind set was: maximum number of 
enemy killed, maximum number of bombs on deck, to achieve a maximum psychological 
effect’.12 In more conventional terms, the strategy was unambiguously enemy-centric, focused 
on killing or capturing as many Al Qaeda and Taliban as possible. It was also a system design 
likely to produce high civilian costs (Suhrke 2015, 102).  
Suhrke notes how the official discourse of the United States remained a legalist 
one, with which the country kept claiming it was respecting international humanitarian 
law, playing with the space for interpretation in international norms, mainly the 
principle of proportionality (with which if civilian damage is expected to occur, it must 
not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”), and with the use of expressions such as ‘normal accidents’ (Suhrke 2015, 
101-102).141 During this period, the US army systematically denied responsibility even 
when large number of civilians were killed and injured (Suhrke 2015).  
(2) From 2003 to 2005, in turn, the intervention changed leadership and adopted 
a counter-insurgency strategy, aiming to gain the support of the local population, 
                                                          
141 Other authors have analysed the legal doctrines developed by the United States to justify aerial 
bombardments (and mass victimisation of civilians) according to international norms, especially after the 
9/11 (Crawford 2013; Evangelista and Shue 2014). 
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working, in this sense, to decrease the number of civilian causalities, with the idea that 
to “defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, political reconstruction and sustainable 
Afghan leadership” (Suhrke 2015, 105). The new strategy demanded less 
bombardments, which evidently cause more civilian causalities, and more terrestrial 
troops’ deployment, something that raises the risk for the troops, a political cost for the 
United States and its allies that increased over time, as the importance of the 09/11 
terrorist attacks decreased over time, with an increasing sense that the war in 
Afghanistan did not affect their interests (Suhrke 2015).  
(3) With the increasing challenges of the counter-insurgency strategy, in this 
sense, the intervention went back to the enemy centric approach from 2006 to 2009. The 
soaring in civilian causalities, which peaked in 2008, caused outrage in Afghanistan. 
The deaths were caused not only by aerial bombardments but also ground fire and night 
raids, many of them carried out by CIA-led operations.142 President Karzai strongly 
protested against this change of approach, and the blooming civil society and human 
rights organisations well documented the fatalities and protested against the 
indiscriminate violence against civilians perpetrated by the foreign troops (Suhrke 
2015).  
(4) The US and NATO intervention went back to a population-centric approach 
again from mid-2009 until 2012, with new tactical directives aiming to reduce civilian 
causalities, this time with more emphasis on a better long-term strategy, as “The cost of 
restraint was frankly recognized. ‘[C]arefully and disciplined employment of force 
entails risk to our troops….. But excessive use of force resulting in an alienated 
population will produce far greater risks’ (Suhrke 2015, 111). The author emphasises, 
in this sense, that the pressure from civil society and human rights organisations in the 
US did not seem to have influenced in the change of strategy of the intervention, but 
instead the strategic and tactical calculus of the war.  
Even with this variation over time, the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by 
interveners certainly had a role for the alienation of communities affected and for the 
                                                          
142 C.I.A.ʼs Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger, The New York Times, 31 December 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/world/asia/cia-afghanistan-strike-force.html, Accessed on 15 
August 2018. There is growing evidence and attention for CIA’s role in Afghanistan, not only to their 
own operations, but also their support to militias to fight Taliban, especially in the border with Pakistan, 
at the same time that peace talks with the insurgent group are progressing (Suhrke and De Lauri 2019), 
something that calls into question if the United States really wants to contribute for peace in Afghanistan.  
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reproduction of Taliban’s social basis and power of recruitment,143 added to the fact that 
life has not improved for most Afghans. As pointed by Suhrke: 
There were also signs that the international military presence had negative effects that reduced 
the initial, popular support for the post-Taliban order. Repeated coalition offensives – with their 
civilian casualties, detested night raids, arbitrary detentions and the practice of some US forces 
of bulldozing villages to create ‘safe zones’ around their forward bases – caused deep resentment 
among the Afghans. Possibly the costs would have been easier to live with if the rest of the 
international project had delivered economic benefits and protection from arbitrary exercise of 
power. As it was, the benefits from the aid-and-war economy were extremely unevenly 
distributed, the state administration was mired in corruption, and its legal system rarely offered 
redress of injustices experienced (Suhrke 2012, 486). 
Furthermore, the predatory political economy (or reproduction of the war 
economy) through the extraction of mineral resources and drug trafficking, that the US 
exit strategy ended up fuelling, added up in the constellation that enabled the 
reproduction of insurgency and violence (Sharan 2013; Sharan and Bose 2018). United 
States supported local leaders and strongmen in order to develop the country’s 
extractive industry and local governance, so the Afghan state could increase its 
revenues, enabling the exit of the US-led intervention (Sharan and Bose 2018). 
Nonetheless, it ended up fomenting corruption, violent struggle between different 
groups and the shadow economy controlled by diverse groups, including pro and anti 
government, or simply criminals (Sharan and Bose 2018). According to Sharan and 
Bose, in this sense, international interveners did not help to transform the logics of the 
war economy, deep-rooted in the country with the decades of civil war. As they 
summarise:  
...little of the mineral wealth is mined legally. The case studies analysed in this chapter show 
how illegal extraction is rampant and prolongs conflict in Afghanistan, especially at the local 
level.  Illegal extraction of mines enables strongmen and commanders to amass arms and money, 
which in turn allows them to exert leverage within government. Within this milieu, donor 
strategy has contributed to the empowering of substate actors who have strong incentives to 
continue conflict. This creates a complex peace-building space where  state  actors,  non-state  
criminals,  insurgents  and  donors,  all  benefit from a mix of political  stability  at the  macro-
level,  but  political  instability  at the micro-level (Sharan and Bose 2018, 260).  
Moreover, if in the years after the end of the Cold War there has been an 
important progress of international justice and accountability for war crimes and crimes 
                                                          
143 C.I.A.ʼs Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger, The New York Times, 31 December 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/world/asia/cia-afghanistan-strike-force.html, Accessed on 15 
August 2018. 
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against humanity (Newman and Schnabel, 2002),144 Afghanistan represented an 
exception (Gossman 2009) among cases such as Rwanda, Cambodia and former 
Yugoslavia, where some form of transitional justice (as much as imperfect) has been 
delivered. Sharan’s quote summarises the absence of transitional justice and the role of 
international interveners on it:  
As one political party leader commented, “the international community have sacrificed justice 
for security and stability. They have sacrificed democracy and human rights for security. For 
them it doesn’t matter if Mullah Raketi, a Talib fundamentalist, comes to power or a corrupt 
official, as long as there is stability (Sharan 2013, 222). 
The lack of any effort to bring some form of justice and reparation to the victims 
of the civil war and of the Taliban regime, added to the empowerment and legitimation 
of the violent entrepreneurs who rose during the civil war by the interveners, also set 
fertile grounds for the persistence of the Taliban, of the legitimacy claims of the group 
and reproduction of its social base, as well as, in the end, instability and violence. As 
already pointed in the literature (Newman and Schnabel, 2002), the trade-off between 
peace and stabilisation versus justice showed, one more time, to be deceptive. 
Projects of justice sector reform, in this sense, did little to fight the culture of 
impunity that prevails in the country, where those with economic and political power 
are not hold accountable for crimes, while poor people can spend years in prison 
without access to a lawyer (Tondini 2008). The fact that individuals responsible for 
crimes against humanity were given power, resources and legitimation by international 
interveners aggravates this scenario, with the lack of minimum grounds for the 
establishment of the rule of law.  
Opinion polls have shown, on the other hand, that traditional mechanisms of 
governance and conflict resolution, the jirkas or shuras, have considerable support and 
trust from the Afghan population, and are also preferred over the Taliban in locations 
surveyed (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b, 205-207). Besides, contrary to the common 
sense idea that these traditional mechanisms are against individual human rights, they 
are having an important role to transform attitudes concerning women’s rights, ending 
the practice of forced marriages in some locations and dealing with cases of domestic 
violence (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b, 204). Besides, in another opinion poll, 62% 
                                                          
144 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf, Accessed on 15 August 2019.  
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of the respondents affirmed they support women’s participation in these traditional 
governance mechanisms (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b, 208). As the authors 
emphasise, in line with Autesserre’s analysis of DR Congo, international interveners 
disregard these local mechanisms of governance, which in Afghanistan have historically 
ensured social order, even in times of war and political upheaval, and these mechanisms 
could be a key part of a more constructive and sustainable process of peacebuilding 
(Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b, 210-212). Once again, the Leviathan imagined by 
international interveners not only did not contribute to produce civil order, but 
systematically works to undermine it (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013b).  
As warlords maintained their predatory behaviour, the Taliban represented in 
numerous territories the alternative available as providers of minimum order and 
maintenance by communities of revenues from the formal and informal economies, 
mainly the mining industry and drug trafficking (Sharan 2013, 165, Sharan and Bose 
2018). In this way, Sharan and Bose demonstrate that the US exit strategy ended up 
contributing for strengthening the insurgent group, as communities found on them an 
alternative against predatory violent entrepreneurs, and also through the complex 
networks described above, with which the US exit strategy ended up even indirectly 
funding the Taliban (Sharan and Bose 2018, 251).  
4.2.4. Haiti and Afghanistan – different socio-historical contexts, similar outcomes 
concerning the reproduction of violence and predatory politics  
As in the case of Haiti, despite the numerous peace talks and agreements 
involving the parts of the conflict, there has not been a process aiming to establish 
minimum grounds for a comprehensive and legitimate political settlement that could 
enable Afghanistan to re-build its social, economic and political capacities and 
independence, to create a political arrangement to accommodate its territorial, ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic diversity.  
During his presidency, Hamid Karzai, with his impressive political abilities, was 
able to orchestrate and maintain certain political equilibrium, even if unstable, 
negotiating and distributing power among the different factions that were included in 
the peace talks and political process that followed (Sharan 2013, 2014). His successor, 
Ashraf Ghani, nonetheless, has not been able to maintain this unstable equilibrium, as 
he held a stronger modernisation and anti-corruption agenda (Sharan and Bose 2018). 
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He tried to tackle the clientelist and corrupt practices of local strongmen, who maintain 
the shadow/ war economy, hindering the development of the Afghan state capacity and 
resources, but he did not succeed, breaking the political concert achieved by his 
predecessor (Sharan and Bose 2018). 
These political developments, the persistence of Taliban’s power145 and the 
pervasive violence that affects Afghanistan today evidence the failure of the US-led 
intervention in the country, once again, of a top-down and formal/ technical approach to 
statebuilding, which disregards the social conditions and social legitimation required for 
the development of state institutions and, even more, democratisation.  
The case of Afghanistan also illustrates, probably more than any other analysed 
here, the consequences of the use of arbitrary violence by foreign troops, which, as 
developed in Chapter I, follows qualitatively different dynamics comparing to that 
perpetrated by domestic political actors. Despite the fact that the Taliban and other 
armed groups have been responsible for a higher proportion of civilian causalities 
(deaths and injuries) since the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) started monitoring them, except for the first quarter of 2019, when they were 
still responsible for more causalities, but the Afghan and international forces were 
responsible for more deaths,146 Taliban has been able to maintain their strength in a 
considerable number of districts, including with some social support, as pointed by 
Sharan and Bose (2018), while foreign interveners were forced to include the group at 
                                                          
145 According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 59 districts were 
under Taliban’s control in January 2019, 14.5% of all, spread over the country, while the government had 
control of 56.3% (Afghanistan: Who controls what, Al Jazeera, 24 June 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html, 
Accessed on 01 September 2019). According to a New York Times report from February 2019, the 
Taliban controls “more territory now than at any time since the United States invaded in 2001” (Amid 
Afghan Peace Talks, U.N. Reports Record Civilian Deaths in 2018, The New York Times, 24 February 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/world/asia/afghanistan-civilian-casualties.html, Accessed on 
01 September 2019).  
146 UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 31 March 
2019, 24 April 2019; UNAMA reports from 2009 to 2018 inform that the number of deaths and injuries 
caused by anti-government groups were higher than those caused by pro-government and international 
forces every year. Nonetheless, the overall number of causalities consistently increased during this period, 
with few exceptions (UNAMA, Press Release, Civilian Deaths from Afghan Conflict in 2018 at Highest 
Recorded Level – UN Report, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/24_february_2019_-
_civilian_deaths_from_afghan_conflict_in_2018_at_highest_recorded_level_-_un_report_english.pdf, 
Accessed on 14 August 2019).  
167 
the negotiation table,147 as the quagmire of the conflict showed no signs of ending, and 
they needed to postpone the exit from the country for consecutive years.  
Source: UNAMA Press Release, 24 February 2019. 
The fact that the Taliban refused to negotiate with the Afghan government for 
not recognising its legitimacy, and that the recent peace talks happened without the 
latter,148 demonstrates the bargaining power the group acquired, successfully resisting 
the efforts of the US-led intervention since 2001, to the point that today there is a 
147 In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government, The New York Times, 4 February 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-russia-talks-russia.html; Amid 
Afghan Peace Talks, U.N. Reports Record Civilian Deaths in 2018, The New York Times, 24 February 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/world/asia/afghanistan-civilian-casualties.html, Accessed on 
15 August 2019.  
148 In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government, The New York Times, 4 February 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-russia-talks-russia.html, 
Accessed on 01 September 2019.  
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considerable consensus (including the US government) that there can be no peace 
process without the group.   
The disregard for the need of social legitimation of political institutions 
happened in previous political experiences in Afghanistan, namely, with the communist 
regime supported by the Soviet Union, which aimed to impose a process of 
modernisation in a deeply traditional and religious society. Although the geopolitics of 
the Cold War and the foreign sponsorship (and its end) to different factions contributed 
to cripple the Soviet sponsored regime and their strength in the civil war, from which 
the Taliban rose victorious, the communists also failed for their incapacity to govern 
and yield legitimacy in the different regions of the country (Braithwaite and Wardak 
2013a, 181-182).  
With the US-led intervention in 2001, foreign sponsors once again ignored the 
domestic conditions required for the development of stable and legitimate political 
institutions. The external top-down political engineering has been once again a key 
factor for the reproduction of political instability and violent conflict in Afghanistan, 
even if in the present context without the nefarious effects of geopolitical disputes (as 
today in the case of Syria) and consequently without the outbreak of a country-wide 
civil war, despite the continuation of violent conflict in the country.  
In 2017, foreign donor grants still represented 62 percent of the Afghan 
budgetary expenditures (Byrd and Fararhi 2018, 2). Despite certain improvements, 
especially concerning women’s rights, who are represented in the Afghan parliament, 
the humanitarian and development aid brought to the country, the support for local civil 
society, as well as mechanisms of human rights monitoring, especially after the 
establishment of the UN assistance mission in 2009, the US-led intervention did not 
contribute for the achievement of sustainable peacebuilding, political stability and 
democratisation, with the entrenchment, instead, of a predatory economic and political 
elite (Barma 2017) and the perpetuation of a war economy (Sharan and Bose 2018).  
It is important to note that the more prolonged the state of war, the higher is the 
value of basic legitimacy or of the value of order (Popitz and Gottlich 2017) for 
populations subjugated by fear and insecurity, and the harder it gets for the achievement 
of a meaningful and socially grounded process of democratisation. As reflected by 
Braithwaite and Wardak: 
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The criminalization of NATO justified in the minds of the Taliban further criminalization of 
their jihad. The Taliban had never engaged in or approved suicide attacks on civilians until 2002; 
right up to the level of their foreign minister, whom we interviewed, and up to Mullah Omar, 
they strongly condemned the suicide attack on New York of 11 September 2001 (also see Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012). From 2002, the Taliban took a leaf out of al-Qaeda's book 
and, with technical support from them and from ISI-protected suicide bomb factories in Pakistan, 
the Taliban turned to terror. Armed gangs on all sides turned to funding their fighters partly 
through the heroin trade. This leads us to hypothesize that the longer a war continues in 
stalemate, the more criminalized it becomes, especially if visible precedents of impunity abound 
early on. This is hardly an original insight; it is a Hobbesian one. It is also Durkheimian, about 
anomic spaces where the rules of the game are no longer settled, where openings are created for 
all manner of sinister forces, not just those of the principal war makers and not only the 
brutishness of organized criminal groups (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013a, 192).  
In this sense, despite the considerably different historical process and social, 
economic and political conditions, the cases of Haiti and Afghanistan have important 
similarities concerning the role of external interveners for the reproduction of chronic 
political instability and violence, the lack of bottom-up/ social legitimation of the 
political processes and institutions supported by interveners, contributing for the 
cooptation, as also in the case of DR Congo, of democratic procedures by local political 
actors for the reproduction of clientelist and predatory politics (Sharan 2013; Sharan 
and Bose 2018; Suhrke 2009; 2011a; 2011b). 
Besides, discrepancy between mandates with wide ambitions versus low 
capacity in terms of funds, personnel and military strength as common explanation for 
the failure of international interventions does not hold in the case of Afghanistan. In this 
sense, it is a case that demonstrates that even if international interveners have 
considerable amount of funds, time and military power, if locally and socially 
embedded political settlements are not sought to address violent conflict and for the 
building of stable political institutions, the result will still be the reproduction of 
violence, political instability and state weakness.    
4.3. East Timor – Genocidal state violence, international rescue and minority’s 
statebuilding 
The context of the establishment of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999 was considerably different 
comparing to the previous cases of international interventions analysed here. It is so by 
the fact that the United Nations supported the process of independence of a new 
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country, as in the cases of Namibia and Kosovo, after 24 years of struggle and 
resistance of the East Timorese against the Indonesian occupation (Pureza 2001; Ingram 
2012; 2018).  
In this sense, as concerns what we characterised here as source legitimacy, in the 
case of East Timor the international intervention had a very different and more locally 
grounded configuration. If for some East Timorese leaders, the interim administration 
was not the idea they had for the independence (Power 2008, 299), in realistic terms, it 
represented a viable solution for the people of East Timor, who had just won their 
freedom from an extremely violent occupation, lacked qualified personnel for 
administrative, educational and health services, and had many needs in terms of 
infrastructure reconstruction, return of refugees and political coordination to establish 
the basic grounds for the new country.  
4.3.1. Historical background 
East Timor was a colony of Portugal since the XVII century, serving mainly as 
trading post for the commerce of goods and slaves (Devia Garzón 2016, 78). In the 
1960’s, the agenda of decolonisation was being put forward in the United Nations, with 
the establishment of the principle of self-determination of peoples (Prashad 2008). After 
the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, for which the question of the colonies was 
determinant (Pureza 2001, 7),149 with Portugal’s new government advancing the process 
of decolonisation, political parties bourgeoned in East Timor (Ingram 2018).  
Among them was the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(Fretilin), who wanted the immediate independence from Portugal. The Timorese 
Democratic Union, on the other hand, advocated for a progressive process of 
decolonisation (Ingram 2018). The latter launched a pre-emptive attempt to seize power 
in August 1975 and Fretilin fought back, quickly defeating UDT in a brief conflict. In 
the midst of this conflict, Portugal withdrew its administration from the territory. 
Fretilin declared independence unilaterally in November 1975 (Ingram 2018). 
Indonesia, despite having promised to respect the principle of self-determination, 
149 The Carnation Revolution was the result of the combination of social unrest and dissatisfaction in 
Portugal with the anti-colonial struggles, mainly in Angola and Mozambique. The dictatorship of the 
Estado Novo could not sustain the wars to hold the colonies with the rising internal dissatisfaction, 
something that ultimately prompted the military ‘coup’ that ended the regime (Varela 2012).   
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invaded East Timor in the following month, starting an occupation that lasted from 
1975 to 1999 (Ingram 2012, 2018; Pureza 2001).  
The solidarity movement of civil society organisations, the Catholic Church and 
by Portugal at the United Nations helped to keep the question of East Timor on the 
international agenda (Pureza 2001), but a change in the fate of East Timorese was made 
possible only after the end of the Cold War, since Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia was 
supported by the United States for its strong anticommunist character (Prashad 2008).  
The genocidal violence of Indonesia in East Timor with the invasion and 
occupation, where it is estimated that 200,000 people were killed, in a population at that 
time of less than 700,000 (Saul 2001, 510), did not change the US foreign policy, 
neither the extermination campaign promoted by Suharto’s regime against communists, 
ethnic Chinese and other political opponents between 1965 and 1967, for which the 
estimates vary between 300,000 up to 1 million people killed by the regime (Saul 2001, 
503).  
4.3.2. The end of the Cold War and the window of opportunity for East Timor  
The Asian Financial Crisis that hit Indonesia contributed for the fall of Suharto 
regime in 1998, and forced the country to turn to international financial institutions to 
recover its finances. In that context, IFI’s established an agenda to address the human 
rights record in East Timor (Ingram 2018), adding to the international pressure on the 
question and paving the way for discussions about the pursuit of a political solution for 
the territory.  
With this process, and the pressure from the United Nations (Pureza 2001), a 
referendum to decide about the status of the territory was held on 30 August 1999 by 
the United Nations, with 78,5% of the Timorese voting in favour of the independence 
(Pureza 2001, 366). Despite having allowed the referendum, Indonesia backed militias 
who orchestrated an attack in the territory, where it is estimated that 528 people were 
killed, 70% of the public infrastructure destroyed and one third of the population 
displaced (Ingram 2018).  
With the continuous international pressure, Indonesia was pushed to withdraw 
its claims over the territory, and the UNSC passed a resolution to establish a UN 
peacekeeping mission to administer East Timor and support the crippled new country in 
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the process of independence. It was the broadest and most ambitious mandate of a UN 
peace mission since then, as UNTAET assumed the government of the country as 
trustee (Ingram 2018; Suhrke 2001).  
With this historical background, the suggestion that the UN mission resembled 
something like ‘neo-imperialism’ seems simplistic (Butler 2012, 100), ignoring the 
solidarity movement that helped a question without much geopolitical relevance to have 
the UNSC attention, the international pressure over Indonesia and the deployment of a 
UN peace operation.150 This is not to deny the fact that UNTAET had several problems, 
including concerning its relation with local political actors and the population in 
general, as further analysed. But UNTAET had a locally grounded source of legitimacy, 
with the result of the referendum, and the fact that they needed international assistance 
to turn this result real.  
The fact that the mission lasted for a relatively short period of time, from 25 
October 1999 to 20 May 2002, the day the independence was declared, also in itself 
turns the suggestion of neo-imperialism questionable. The UN transitional 
administration ended once minimal conditions were set so local political actors could 
carry on without its support, with the establishment of a follow-up peacekeeping 
mission (the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) with a much more 
limited mandate, to support the development of the institutional capacity and 
maintenance of security in the new state. The interest for a quick exit of UNTAET was 
from both sides: East Timorese political leaders wanted to finally have independence, 
without UNTAET’s ordinances (Ingram 2018); the UN mission, on the other hand, was 
very costly and relied mostly on the general UN budget, that is, “on non-voluntary 
contributions from UN members, which entailed pressure to complete the operation as 
soon as possible to prevent an open-ended drain on UN finances” (Suhrke 2001, 1-2).  
If we compare the case of East Timor and Western Sahara, both with many 
similarities concerning the colonial historical background and developments after the 
end of the Cold War (Devia Garzón 2016), the suggestion of neo-imperialism seem 
even more incongruous. The people of Western Sahara did not have the same fate of the 
150 As pointed by Butler, there were hardly any ‘Imperial’ gains for the major countries who contributed 
with the mission, as East Timor was one of the poorest countries in the world, and the cost and duration 
of the UN intervention in the country surpassed what had been anticipated. The strongest argument for the 
suggestion of neo-imperialism would be the large oil reserves in the territory, but Western companies 
already exploited them long before 1999 (Butler 2012, 100).  
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East Timorese, as Morocco did not give up their claim over the territory, with the 
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Minurso) present in the 
territory since 1991 until the present, but with very little practical effect to bring about 
Western Saharans self-determination, neither to protect their human rights (Khakee 
2014). The fact that Spain ceded the territory in an agreement with Morocco and 
Mauritania in 1975 (Devia Garzón 2016, 93), instead of following and supporting the 
process for referendum and independence as Portugal did in the case of East Timor, also 
influenced this outcome and production of stalemate in Western Sahara, to the detriment 
of its people, who live under Moroccan occupation and are victims of systematic human 
rights violations (Khakee 2014).151 
4.3.3. UNTAET performance – international interveners’ blueprint and the local 
political dynamics  
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor was a 
peacekeeping operation with the mandate of governing a territory – it had, in this way, 
important shortcomings for its very design and structure (Suhrke 2001). The operation 
had at the same time the usual responsibilities of peacekeeping operations, to maintain 
the short-term goals of ensuring security and stability, support the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, supervise compliance with the agreements and support the 
resettlement of displaced people, and the ambitious and complex goal of temporarily 
assuming the government of East Timor, until local capacities were built up for the 
complete independence of the territory (Suhrke 2001; Butler 2012; Ingram 2018).   
Despite the fact that a UN mission assumed a similar role to assist in the process 
of independence of Namibia from 1889 to 1990, and in Kosovo in the same period of 
East Timor, in 1999, neither in the former nor in the latter (where the mission is still 
operating) the goals and authority of a UN intervention were so comprehensive (Ingram 
                                                          
151 It is also relevant to mention the case of West Papua, a territory inhabited by an ethnic minority who 
suffers until present days systematic and gross human rights violations by the Indonesian state. The 
human rights movements from the territory seek international solidarity for their case, and ask for the 
United Nations to intervene for the holding of a referendum, one more case of a minority group who 
suffers the systematic violence of the nation-state model, and that did not have the same international 
attention as East Timor. See: URGENT ALERT: United Nations intervention needed before Santa Cruz 
like massacre takes place in West Papua, United Liberation Movement for West Papua 
https://www.ulmwp.org/urgent-alert-united-nations-intervention-needed-before-santa-cruz-like-massacre-
takes-place-in-west-papua, Accessed on 03 September 2019; Exiled West Papuan leader: 'A referendum 
is the only solution', DW, 01 September 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/exiled-west-papuan-leader-a-
referendum-is-the-only-solution/a-50248569, Accessed on 03 September 2019.     
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2018). The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, 
assumed the executive, legislative and judicial powers,152 although as a trustee (Ingram 
2018, 366). In the biography of Vieira de Mello, Samantha Power notes that the UN 
servant was personally committed with the engagement of local actors and to listen to 
the local population in general in the interim administration (Power 2008). Beyond this 
personal note, as analysed next, different researchers pointed limitations and problems 
concerning the participation of the East Timorese during the period of the interim 
administration.  
Ingram noted that UNTAET supported the building of “the wrong peace,” as it 
contributed for the creation of “clear winners and losers” (Ingram 2012, 20) not paying 
enough attention for the political dynamics and disputes at play among the East 
Timorese political elite. Although the author points that it is not possible to assert if a 
more constructive political concert would have been possible had UNTAET acted 
differently, it is true that it did not work towards the support of a political settlement 
that could have avoided the resurgence of violent contestation in 2006. Ingram notes 
that UNTAET early focus on the development of party politics prompted a political race 
that contributed for the violence resurgence in 2006 (Ingram 2018).  
The operation ended up undermining the existing local organisation that united 
the different and divergent political groups who struggled for independence, with which 
these different groups negotiated and dialogued about the path to be taken for the 
construction of the East Timorese state (Ingram 2018). The National Council of 
Maubere Resistance (CNRM), later named as National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT), after a meeting in Portugal in 1998, ended up being emptied as consequence of 
UNTAET decisions, as Fretilin and UDT, the main political parties, left the group, 
rushing to political mobilisation throughout the country for the elections (Ingram 2012, 
8-9). Xanana Gusmão, one of the most prominent leaders of the resistance struggle and
the president of CNRT, was openly hostile to Fretilin, alleging they were more 
concerned with grabbing power than with the future of East Timor (Ingram 2018).  
In this sense, UNTAET rushed the process for the development of party politics, 
in the formal model of plurality of liberal democracy, voiding the CNRT, a locally 
152 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1272 (1999), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/312/77/PDF/N9931277.pdf?OpenElement, Accessed on 16 August 
2019).  
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grounded political group created with the aim of setting the grounds for the 
development of political institutions in the country (Ingram 2018). The intense political 
mobilisation by the parties prompted by UNTAET actions, mainly by Fretilin, set fertile 
ground for the violence that re-emerged in 2006, mobilised through political lines. 
Quoting Xanana Gusmão, Ingram clarifies these developments: 
Gusmão deplored the change in direction. In a bitter new year’s message at the end of 2000, 
which clearly had UNTAET in its sights, he reﬂected on ‘obsessive acculturation to standards’ 
peddled by ‘hundreds of international experts’. He was not, he emphasised, speaking against the 
‘values of democratic participation’. Rather, he ridiculed the way that ‘we absorb standards just 
to pretend we look like a democratic society and please our masters of independence’. 
Democracy, he asserted, is not built overnight, noting ‘some think that mere political party 
membership is a synonym of democracy’. These developments, he observed, were generating ‘a 
strong ill-feeling against the CNRT as if the CNRT was the main enemy of political parties and 
civil society’. Rather, he claimed, CNRT was ‘paving the way so that, in the near future, the 
parties may run for political power’ (Ingram 2018, 370).  
Tellingly, Ingram quotes part of Gusmão speech during the dissolution of the 
CNRT: 
Our people harbour a legitimate apprehension with regards to a possible resurgence of violence, 
provoked by the political parties, like that which accompanied the political awakening of the 
past. Our people are anxious about the conduct of some parties which are fervently registering 
people at the village level based on the notion of the party is the people and the people are the 
party. Our people are understandably anxious about the possibility of intimidation in an effort to 
coerce people to vote in a particular way and evoking memories of the campaign in favour of 
autonomy (Ingram 2018).  
The operation ended up, in this way, inadvertently favouring the strongest 
political party instead of promoting multi-party competition, as they aimed (Ingram 
2018; Barma 2017), mainly Fretilin, who was able to monopolise the legitimating 
discourse of the struggle for independence, at times leaning towards authoritarian 
tendencies, as when Mari Alkatiri, their main leader, affirmed that “Fretilin is the 
people and the people are Fretilin” (Ingram 2018, 371).  
Other factors connected to UNTAET policies contributed for the worsening of 
tensions that ended up in the political crisis and violence of 2006:  
(a) The process for the establishment of the East Timor Defence Force excluded
a portion of former Falintil combatants. Xanana Gusmão had asked the UN secretary-
general for the establishment of a defence force based on Falintil; he considered the 
request ‘sensitive and complex’ (Ingram 2012, 11). A group of experts was invited to 
give a technical opinion, and the final decision was that there would be two battalions: 
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the first recruited exclusively from Falintil, and the second would be open for all 
applicants. In this sense, 650 Falintil veterans were recruited, from around 1900 ex-
combatants registered. Those who were not recruited received assistance to back to 
civilian life. But a sizeable minority, identified with politicians from Fretilin and with a 
conflictive relation with Gusmão, did not receive the benefit (Ingram 2012); 
(b) The UN mission contributed for the concentration of political power and 
economic opportunities in the capital, Dili, neglecting other towns and the countryside, 
leading to an internal migration, mainly of young males looking for jobs (Ingram 2018). 
The government of Fretilin, elected in 2002, neither tackled this limitation, overlooking 
the need of strengthening governance structures in the countryside (Ingram 2018; 
Barma 2017);  
(c) A disproportionate inclusion of higher educated Timorese coming from the 
diaspora (many of whom English speakers) created resentment among those who 
endured 24 years of Indonesian occupation (Ingram 2012). 
The crisis in 2006 prompted the Timorese government to request the deployment 
of another peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste (UNMIT) which lasted from August 2006 until December 2012, composed by 
troops from Australia, Portugal and New Zealand, to restore order in the country 
(Ingram 2018). The Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, with less popularity, was forced to 
resign.  
Xanana Gusmão created a new political party, the National Congress for the 
Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT, the same acronym of the old political congregation), 
as he worked for a new political concert in the country and to address the grievances 
that led to the 2006 crisis. He was elected Prime Minister in the elections of 2007, with 
José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize, as President (formerly member of Fretilin, 
Ramos-Horta was then independent, not affiliated to a political party). Gusmão ended 
up himself accumulating considerable political power, with his significant popularity, 
even after he stepped down from the position of Prime Minister in 2015 (Ingram 2018, 
375).  
Among the policies to ensure governability, beyond the use of the oil income to 
promote economic development and social spending, Gusmão developed what can be 
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called clientelist relations among former guerrilla fighters and village leaders (Barma 
2017; Ingram 2018). Clientelist politics does not fit the most advanced model of 
democracy, and they mostly often reinforce and crystallise power and economic 
inequalities. In the case of East Timor, nonetheless, although there are important 
imbalances, markedly with the pension to veterans, which benefits 1% of the population 
and drains two-thirds of the budget for social assistance (Aspinal at all 2018, 164), there 
is certain distributive character on it, one that enables a political accommodation and 
equilibrium that ensured stability since after the last crisis in 2006 (Ingram 2018).  
Despite certain growth of inequality with the development of the oil industry, the 
country was able to maintain stability, with more social spending promoted by Gusmão, 
who opposed the previous policies of Fretilin that followed a more cautious and 
conservative economic agenda (Ingram 2018; Aspinal at all 2018). Besides, the political 
arrangements involving leaders at the village level, through the sucos, enabled a more 
locally and socially embedded political accommodation. As much as this form of 
governance may carry problems and limitations concerning a more progressive 
democratisation (Wallis, Jeffery and Kent, 2016), working with locally legitimate 
political mechanisms has been important so as to ensure the country’s governability. 
Traditional mechanisms are also responsible for conflict resolution, something very 
important in a country with a limited budget and capacity of the judicial system (Silva 
2014).  
Aspinall at all (2018) argue that the case of East Timor is remarkable in the 
region for the absence of stronger and more corrosive clientelist politics, with the 
absence, for instance, of vote buying, something common in neighbour countries like 
Indonesia and Philippines (Aspinall at all 2018, 162). The authors emphasise that the 
focus on parties, instead of candidates, with closed voting lists for parliamentary 
elections, may explain the absence of vote buying in East Timor, maybe the other side 
of the coin concerning UNTAET’s insistence on the development of party politics.  
If we have a realist perspective for the development of democratic institutions 
and culture, the kind of clientelist relations established in East Timor are not necessarily 
a negative outcome for democratisation, but can be understood as a necessary step, with 
room for improvement over time. As the East Timorese state did not develop as 
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authoritarian and violent like, for instance, in the case of Cambodia (Springer 2017), we 
can assume that there is room for democratic improvement in this case.153  
Factors such as enduring poverty, lack of education and access to information 
(that increase the power of local chiefs) may be major barriers for democratic 
improvement. Nonetheless, the presence of social policies (as much as limited) and 
basic freedoms represent more favourable conditions in East Timor for the advancement 
of democracy, especially if we compare with countries with similar conditions in terms 
of wealth, reliance on extractive economies, recent history of conflict and mass human 
rights violations and political transition (Boix and Stokes 2003; Flores and Nooruddin 
2012; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015, 4).  
4.3.4. UN intervention for self-determination in East Timor – a different story of 
statebuilding  
Comparing East Timor with Haiti and the other cases considered in this chapter, 
we can say that certain key elements help explain why in the case of East Timor social 
and political stability have been achieved, despite the 2006 crisis and return of a 
peacekeeping operation until 2012:  
(1) The character of the international intervention was substantially different
comparing to the previous cases, as it was an international intervention to support the 
East Timorese people to achieve their right to self-determination, after the Indonesian 
invasion that perpetrated genocidal violence, and ruled the territory for 24 years aiming 
to erase the East Timorese culture and completely integrate them in Indonesia – a 
project that miserably failed, despite the investments made in the territory and attempt 
of acculturation, which met a stubborn and invincible resistance.  
(2) In this sense, we can say that East Timor is a case of minority’s
statebuilding, result of resistance against the Indonesian state violence and attempt of 
integration and acculturation. Despite the internal struggles that resulted at times in 
violent conflict between the different groups who fought for independence, this 
character of resistance, as well as a common identity based on the local indigenous 
153 There were reports of police abuse during the crisis of 2006, but the Timorese government welcomed 
international observers to investigate the cases: Human Rights Watch, East Timor: Government Allows 
Investigation of Police Violence, 1 June 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/06/01/east-timor-
government-allows-investigation-police-violence, Accessed on 16 August 2019.  
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culture and the heritage of the Portuguese colonial times,154 set the ground for a more 
constructive political process, comparing to the other cases previously analysed. In this 
sense, as already pointed, the UN interim administration had a local source of 
legitimacy: the result of the referendum and the need by the East Timorese for support 
to achieve independence.  
(3) Despite the problems and shortcomings concerning the participation of local
political actors and the population in general, UNTAET was willing to improve its 
policies and to broaden the scope and space for local participation (Butler 2012; Ingram 
2018). As it was part of a locally grounded political process, despite the criticism and 
conflicts along the way, the UN interim administration was able to support an 
endogenous political process for the development of the East Timorese political 
institutions, even if their lack of knowledge of the local political context led them to 
contribute inadvertently to the worsening of local disputes and the tendency of the 
major party, Fretilin, to seek political hegemony instead of compromise with different 
political groups and legitimacy towards its constituency (Barma 2017, 122; Ingram 
2018). After the 2006 crisis, nonetheless, with the leadership of Xanana Gusmão and 
José Ramos-Horta, a political concert has been achieved, with the promotion of more 
progressive economic and social policies, and finally a peace dividend for the 
population (despite, as already pointed, the persistent poverty and inequalities).  
UNTAET was the result of decades of international solidarity with East Timor, 
despite having remained until then as a ‘forgotten case,’ instead of the result of a UNSC 
resolution for geopolitical interests of hegemonic countries. Local actors were able to 
articulate themselves and take advantage of this international solidarity, despite their 
internal disputes. In this sense, a combination of internal and external factors explains 
the different outcomes achieved in the country comparing to the other cases, with which 
an endogenous political process developed so as to achieve self-determination and 
sustainable self-government in East Timor.  
154 The questions of national identity and of Portuguese heritage have more complex implications, mainly 
on the linguistic aspect, for which the UN operation was criticised. The older generation that speaks 
Portuguese established, together with UNTAET, Portuguese as the official language of the country, 
alienating the younger generation, who speaks Bahasa, while the local lingua franca, Tetun, was excluded 
at the beginning (Ingram 2012, 10). In any case, we can say that the identity of the East Timorese people 
was strong enough to base the years of resistance and struggle against Indonesian occupation, and for 
their vote and achievement of independence.   
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Strong leadership proved again to be a key element for successful statebuilding, 
as pointed by Suhrke in her comparative analysis focusing on Afghanistan (Suhrke 
2011), combined with unifying elements connected to identity and culture, and 
distributive policies. These elements need to be better taken into account by 
international interventions, instead of the formal and inflexible steps and models they 
often rely on.  
To recap, through the lenses adopted here, these elements: character and ability 
of the leadership; identity and unifying cultural elements; and distributive policies, were 
key for the legitimacy of state institutions that were being developed, even with the 
recurrence of conflict (which can be considered as part of the process), and for the 
building of common grounds in society with which the legitimacy of political 
institutions can be built and sustained over time.  
Even if international interventions do not always find the same favourable local 
conditions as in East Timor, they can work so as to avoid fuelling predatory political 
actors and violent state structures, and to support, instead, local agents and endogenous 
processes that may bring more positive political outcomes in the future.  East Timor is 
also a common case concerning the process of state formation, in the sense that it 
happened against an external threat – the Indonesian occupation, something that 
strengthens internal cohesion and unification, despite divisions and disputes (Suhrke 
2011). This case shows, in this sense, that this element can be compatible with the 
deployment of a UN peace operation. 
4.4. Somaliland – the successful counterfactual? Locally-driven statebuilding as the 
alternative story of peacebuilding  
Somaliland gained considerable attention in the literature on peace, statebuilding 
and democratisation in post-conflict societies, for the remarkable achievements reached 
in this de facto state without international recognition (Autesserre 2017; Hastings and 
Philips 2018; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018). As several 
authors have emphasised the importance of endogenous and locally driven processes of 
statebuilding and democratisation, so they can be sustainable (Autesserre 2009, 2010; 
Jones 2013; de Guevara 2012; Mitchell 2018; Pouligny 2006; Suhrke 2011), and that 
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international interventions often create vicious circles of economic and military 
dependency (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009), as well as end up 
supporting the reproduction of neopatrimonial politics and predatory political 
economies (Barma 2012, 2017, Sharan 2013; Sharan and Bose 2018), Somaliland 
stands out as a counter-example where local society was able to reach outstanding 
achievements concerning political stability and democratisation without an international 
intervention, especially comparing with its neighbours and the region as a whole.  
Much of this literature have already pointed that the social embeddedness and 
legitimacy of the political process are essential elements that explain the success so far 
achieved in the process of statebuilding and democratisation in Somaliland (Hoehne 
2011; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018), considerably in line 
with the present thesis’ arguments. As Hoehne points in his thesis about north Somalia:  
The development of Somaliland furthermore shows that processes of state formation are highly 
unpredictable and do not take place in isolation. Unlike scientific experiments that require that 
external conditions be kept stable while one manipulates the conditions inside the test tube and 
observes the reactions, state formation takes place in volatile and highly interconnected settings. 
The outcome of the process cannot be predicted. Dynamics of state formation can change 
abruptly when one or more of the internal and/or external factors involved change. This makes 
external interventions to ‘built states’, which are advocated by some ‘practitioners’ and analysts 
close to the US government (Fukuyama 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2008), difficult, if not 
completely counterproductive. The success of Somaliland thus far is illustrative in this regard. It 
was based on internal processes that facilitated the acquiring of basic legitimacy of the polity 
established, at least in central Somaliland. Its development also hinged on external conditions 
that evolved dynamically and could not just be ‘fixed’ by actors in Somaliland or by any external 
‘superpower’. (Hoehne 2011, 448-449) 
In the following sections, I reflect on key elements raised in the literature 
concerning the case of Somaliland which explain its considerable successful process of 
statebuilding and democratisation, the limitations and challenges of it, and what insights 
can we extract comparing it with the case of Haiti and the previous cases analysed in 
this chapter, in the light of the theoretical discussions we developed so far.  
4.4.1. Historical Background 
Before European colonisation, Somalis were politically organised by clan elders, 
or, in anthropological terms, according to a segmentary lineage system, which “are 
constituted by a number of structurally similar kinship groups that combine or divide at 
different levels according to political, economic, or security circumstances” 
(Schwoebel 2018, 201). Somali’s autochthonous political organisation was loosely 
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hierarchical, without strong leadership, and competition among clan members for 
leadership was common (Hoehne 2011, 120).  
In the case of the region of Somaliland, the British established a protectorate in 
1884, interfering little in the way society was run (Pegg and Kolstø 2015, 194), as the 
territory served mainly to provide livestock to the British colony of Aden, which in turn 
was related to the control of the Suez Canal, leading to a “benign neglect” over 
Somaliland’s territory (Pegg and Kolstø 2015).  
Somaliland got its independence from Britain and had five days of independence 
in June 1960, before uniting with the rest of Somalia, which had been colonised by 
Italy, on 1st July 1960 (Hoehne 2018, 6). The dictatorship of Siad Barre was established 
with a coup in 1969, lasting until 1991, during which the seeds of the later clan-based 
war were sown (Hoehne 2018).  Somalia went to war against Ethiopia from 1977 to 
1978 for the dispute of the Ogaden territory, and it was defeated, with important losses, 
generating widespread discontent among the Somali population, a coup attempt in 1978 
and the formation of armed opposition groups by Majeerteen and Isaaq clans, the major 
clans from Puntland and Somaliland, respectively (Hoehne 2018). Both had support and 
bases in Ethiopia. The dictatorship repression against the armed opposition massively 
targeted civilians in both regions, with the perpetration of massive human rights 
violations (Hoehne 2018).  
Somaliland declared independence in 1991, after Siad Barre’s regime end, as the 
Isaaq clan understood they would only be safe if separated from Somalia, for the brutal 
violence they were submitted in the previous decades (Hastings and Philips 2018, 5). 
Other factor that reinforced Somaliland’s claim for independence was that the South 
descended into civil war, while in Somaliland they were able to maintain social and 
political order, despite periods of internal conflict, and an armed conflict with Puntland 
for a disputed territory, which is now frozen. The civil war in the South, on the other 
hand, kept escalating, with the US-led intervention in 1991 and afterwards (Hastings 
and Philips 2018; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Richards 2012).  
Hastings and Philips (2018) reflect how Somalilanders’ identity developed in 
opposition to Somalia, and how their social and political identity is a factor that helps 
explain the absence of piracy in Somaliland’s shores, contrary to the rest of Somalia, 
including Puntland, where this is a widespread phenomenon. Other authors agree that 
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the brutal civil war in the South is an ominous example and permanent reminder of the 
consequences of political fragmentation and violent conflict, a scenario against which 
Somalilanders define themselves and seek to solve their conflicts in a peaceful manner 
(Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Richards 2012). In this sense, despite the existence of a 
minority group in the territory against the independence, there is a strong sense of 
identity and distinction among Somalilanders, and this has been pointed as an important 
factor for the social and political progress achieved in the country (Hastings and Philips 
2018; Pegg and Kolstø 2015).  
Beyond the identity construct pointed by Hastings and Philips, the authors make 
an essential question, which should be made more often in the field of peacebuilding 
and international interventions: what actually produces civil and political order? 
(Hastings and Philips 2018, 7-8, 26) Through the case study of Somaliland and the 
virtual absence of piracy in the territory, the authors demonstrate that the common 
explanation of ‘state failure’ for this sort of phenomenon does not always hold. Despite 
the relatively successful process of statebuilding and democratisation, Somaliland 
remains a poor country, without proper means for law enforcement in all its territory, no 
better than in Puntland, were piracy is a common phenomenon (Hastings and Philips 
2018, 15). In this sense, the dominant assumption that a strong and politically 
centralised state is the only possible guarantor of civil order needs to be critically 
assessed, as I also argue along this thesis. 
4.4.2. Democratisation through hybridism between Western institutions and the 
traditional clan system  
 Somaliland have been pointed as an example of how hybrid social and political 
orders can be a solution for postcolonial societies affected by conflict and political 
instability (Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018), for which the simple reproduction of 
Western models and ready-made solutions very often not only did not contribute for 
peacebuilding, but also contributed for the production of collateral damage, as already 
argued.  
After declaring independence in 1991, internal conflicts in Somaliland were 
solved through the traditional clan politics, with negotiation and compromise between 
the clans (Hoehne 2018; Richards 2012). National clan-conferences were held, where 
the development of political institutions and a constitution were discussed (Hoehne 
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2018, 9). A constitution establishing a multi-party system and regular elections was 
accepted by a public referendum in 2001 (Hoehne 2018). The first presidential election 
was held in 2003, and Dahir Rayaale Kaahin was elected with a very small margin, but 
the result was accepted by the opposition. The constitution has provisions for power 
sharing, such as that the vice-president must come from a minority clan (Pegg and 
Walls 2018, 4).  
Parliamentary elections for the lower house were first held in 2005. The upper 
house, named Guurti, consists of selected elders that should serve six-year terms, but 
election or selection for this house did not happen since 1997 (Pegg and Walls 2018, 
5).155 Parliamentary elections for the lower house were also often delayed, something 
that attests the considerable dominance of the executive (Hoehne 2013; Pegg and Kolstø 
2015). Hoehne presented a more realist analysis concerning hybrid political orders, 
pointing that in Somaliland it ended up creating a strong executive power, and 
undermined the traditional authority of Guurti members, who ended up distancing 
themselves from their local constituencies and being co-opted by the politics and 
economic benefits in the capital (Hoehne 2013). The positive outcomes of the elections 
in 2017, nonetheless, may point for a more positive direction (Hoehne 2018; Pegg and 
Walls 2018).  
Presidential elections were later held in 2005, 2010 and 2017, were considered 
free and fair by international observers156 (Hoehne 2018; Pegg and Walls 2018; 
Richards 2012, 152) and happened with considerable calm and stability. In 2017, one of 
the candidates alleged irregularities and did not accept the result; there were protests in 
two locations, leaving three people dead and nine injured (Pegg and Walls 2018, 12). 
The situation was quickly stabilised by President Silanyo and the contender, Waddani’s 
Irro, who few days later “conceded defeat because he did not want his ‘desire to hold 
this post [to] destroy my country and shed my people’s blood’” (Pegg and Walls 2018).  
Considering the limitations faced in the country and comparing to other 
countries in the region, the reported quality of elections in Somaliland is impressive, 
155 The Guurti exists, in this sense, since before the constitution and the holding of elections in 
Somaliland. There were cases of members who died and were replaced by their family descendants (Pegg 
and Walls 2018, 5). 
156 There is a well structured and organised international observation of elections in Somaliland, but it is 
an informal process, promoted by Somalilanders themselves, members of the diaspora and supporters of 
the country (Hoehne 2018, 10-11).   
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with high turnouts,157 an environment of peace and civility in polling stations, with 
respect for the procedures and among delegates of different parties (Hoehne 2018; Pegg 
and Walls 2018). Some voters displayed the candidate they voted for, for not knowing it 
was illegal – despite a breach in the rules, it somehow demonstrates voters feel safe and 
free to chose their candidates (Pegg and Walls 2018, 5). International observers also 
witnessed illiterate candidates asking monitors to cast the ballot for them – the monitors 
did so and showed for the observers (Pegg and Walls 2018) – again, despite the 
irregularity, on the bright side it can be seen as a good sign of the development of a 
democratic culture in the country.  
Few isolated locations did not count on polling stations, and Hoehne estimates 
that around 30,000 voters were excluded, or around 3.5% of registered voters – despite 
being a low number, the regions were politically relevant, and with minority clans 
(Hoehne 2018, 13). 2017 elections progressed, nonetheless, in the inclusion of 
territories covered by the elections, mainly in the East (Hoehne 2018) and with the 
general positive outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that there is potential for further 
progress in the next elections.  
In 2017 the first televised presidential debate happened in Somaliland, a 
landmark also for the region as a whole, since it was the seventh presidential debate in 
all sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 (Pegg and Walls 2018, 9). It was live-broadcasted on 
Facebook and on nine Somali-language television channels, attracting around 8-
9,000,000 viewers (Pegg and Walls 2018). Furthermore, the sustainability of democratic 
institutions progressed in these elections: in 2008-2009, support from EU countries 
represented 75% of elections’ budget; in 2017, this ratio almost inverted, as Somaliland 
government covered more than half of the budget (Hoehne 2018, 11-12).  
4.4.3. Endogenous statebuilding, external influence and the formation of the polity 
Scholars have stressed, in this way, that the fact that the statebuilding process 
has been embedded in society in Somaliland, on its social practices, meanings, forms of 
social cohesion and organisation, is key for explaining the considerable success 
achieved in the country. As noted by Richards, “In grounding the state in society and by 
157 “In total, 555,142 voters cast ballots, a turnout of 78.85 percent of those who picked up their  
registration cards and 63.57 percent of all those who registered to vote.” (Pegg and Walls 2018, 12). 
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utilising a familiar governing structure, those involved in the creation of Somaliland 
found their key to success" (Richards 2012, 162).  
Despite the problems and shortcomings, the process of formation of political 
institutions is connected to society, speaks its language and is grounded on fundamental 
shared beliefs and values, which evolved over time with the development of political 
institutions and with the contact with the external world, through the contact and 
returnees from the diaspora, international aid and solidarity, as well as the international 
relations promoted by Somalilanders in their struggle for international recognition 
(Hoehne 2018; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Schwoebel 2018). 
Furthermore, without external interference, local political actors need to 
dialogue, negotiate and compromise, without the distortions that international 
interventions very often create, such as in the case of Somalia, where international 
interveners empowered certain warlords and excluded others, fuelling violence and 
fragmentation instead of supporting peacebuilding (Richards 2012, 160). As seen in the 
previous cases, these distortions produced by international interventions are very 
common and produce damaging and long-last political outcomes. The political conflicts 
in Somaliland are common to any democratic country, and the ups and downs of the 
hybrid model may be part of a necessary process for the achievement of a local 
accommodation. 2017 elections may demonstrate that there is space for the country to 
improve its political institutions, increase accountability and improve governance 
throughout the country.   
Somaliland also has common problems that affect most democratic polities: 
allegations of corruption, suspicion among the population about politicians, with the 
common feeling that they work more for their own benefit then for society (Hastings 
and Philips 2018, 19; Hoehne 2018, 8), and so on, as well as problems particular to a 
young democracy, as described above. Somaliland also faces specific challenges for the 
fact of not being internationally recognised, despite the solidarity it was able to attract 
along the years of independence (Hoehne 2018).  
The main challenges identified for the country are: the limited economic 
performance and very high unemployment,158 especially among younger people, who 
                                                          
158 According to the World Bank: “Based on initial GDP analysis -to be updated as data improves and 
further data becomes available- Somaliland’s GDP for 2012 is estimated to have been $1.4 billion 
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often migrate seeking educational and job opportunities; the economic challenge posed 
by Saudi Arabia ban on imports of livestock from Somaliland, one of its main sources 
of revenues; the droughts, which have been more frequent in the last decades, 
something that tends to get worse with the advance of climate change, which leads, in 
turn, to internal migration to already overcrowded and resource stressed cities; and the 
difficult and fragile political relation with Somalia (Hoehne 2018, 27); the conflict with 
the region of Puntland over the disputed territory, that also generated internal conflicts 
with local leaders in the region – despite being frozen at the moment, it is still a possible 
source for destabilisation (Hoehne 2013). The economic dependency on diaspora 
remittances, the first revenue source of the country, and the danger of the country to fall 
in the resources curse, with its oil reserves, are also pointed as main challenges (Pegg 
and Walls 2018, 15-16). 
But the fact that Somaliland reached impressive progress for democratisation 
considering the difficult conditions is a sign that it can avoid the danger of resources 
curse, and may use it for the creation of public goods, social programmes and economic 
development, as in the case previously analysed of East Timor. Somaliland also has a 
good opportunity with the Berbera Port, which can benefit from the economic 
prosperity of Ethiopia (Pegg and Walls 2018). The high turnout in 2017 elections may 
point to the development of a democratic culture and that Somalilanders are willing to 
hold their leaders accountable.  
4.4.4. Endogenous statebuilding aiming challenging conditions - when social 
cohesion and political agency endure  
In Somaliland, a combination of conditions enabled local society to maintain 
their social and cultural infrastructures and retain their political agency, contrary to the 
cases of Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan analysed here, as well as Somalia (Pegg and 
(current US$ prices)[1], with GDP per capita estimated at $347.  This would be the fourth lowest in the 
world, ahead of Malawi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. 
Almost 30% of GDP is derived from the livestock industry followed by 20% from wholesale and retail 
trade (including the informal sector); 8% from crops and 6% from real estate activities.  In 2012, 
Somaliland’s trade deficit was approximately $496 million, which was financed through a combination of 
remittances and external aid.  Somaliland has very low levels of investment, ranked approximately 180th 
in the World for gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP.  Furthermore, Somaliland has very 
low employment-to-population ratios, with 28% for males and 17% for females (15-24 year olds in 
Borama, Hargeisa and Burao).” New World Bank GDP and Poverty Estimates for Somaliland, 29 January 
2014, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/29/new-world-bank-gdp-and-poverty-
estimates-for-somaliland, Accessed on 04 September 2019.   
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Walls 2018). The fact, for instance, that the British protectorate worked with existing 
governance structures instead of transforming or manipulating them has been pointed as 
an important juncture that helps explain why Somalilanders were able to maintain social 
cohesion and civil order after 1991 (Hoehne 2011). 
Despite the experience of colonisation, and the mass violence that affected the 
territory, as in the previous cases analysed here, also connected to geopolitics of the 
Cold War,159 Somalilanders were able to keep essential elements that enable social 
reproduction, cohesion and human agency – a shared moral sense, in sum, a shared 
world, where language and values have common meaning and enable humans to 
elaborate their past, present, and imagine and build their future  (Arendt 1998; 2006), a 
solid identity and self-perception, and with it, the ability to develop peaceful 
mechanisms to address conflict, as well as to take advantage and incorporate external 
influence when deemed positive for local society. As pointed by Richards: 
As Beck et al. note, tradition involves organising the past in relation to the present '[t]radition 
represents not only what "is" done in society but what "should be" done' (Beck et al. 1994). The 
prominent placement of a ‘backwards’ traditional institution or structure, as Somaliland shows, 
can be a crucial bridge in statebuilding or state-strengthening projects and therefore should not 
be excluded from consideration (Richards 2012, 160).  
As already somehow suggested, political institutions can only have legitimacy to 
their constituencies if there are certain basic shared values and ideas of what is 
appropriate, moral and desirable (Beetham 2013; Fossen 2013). In the case of 
Somaliland, local society was fortunate enough to be able to maintain their identity and 
shared moral sense, as well as social and political mechanisms through which these 
shared ideas can evolve and change over time.  
Human needs beyond the material ones: social recognition, sense of belonging 
and a shared understanding of the world (or a cosmology), social, cultural and linguistic 
means that enable us to make sense of our past and of what came before, of our present 
and possible future, have been considerably neglected in the research field, as well as in 
the policy world, of peacebuilding, humanitarianism and international interventions. In 
this sense, not only standardised procedures and models, but also the sole consideration 
of material needs, not the human, immaterial ones, ended up contributing for unintended 
outcomes (Beckett 2017).  
159 Siad Barre was first supported by the Soviet Union, and after the Ogaden War, by the United States, 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, switched its sponsor in the opposite way (Hobsbawm 1999, 448). 
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The case of Somaliland can be understood not as evidence that societies affected 
by violent conflict and mass human rights violations can only solve their problems by 
themselves, but that social and cultural infrastructures are an essential part of any 
process for the solution of violent conflict, political instability and for the building of 
political institutions; that these processes need to be locally owned, embedded and 
meaningful.  
As pointed by Richards, Somaliland should not be seen as a model or serve as 
guideline for new peacebuilding practices (Richards 2012, 159) since each case 
demands a careful consideration of its specific conditions, historical background as well 
as position in regional and international geopolitics. In the case of Somaliland, despite 
the fact that its independence is not internationally recognised, least of all by Somalia, 
the country has been able to secure its de facto sovereignty without major threats by 
more powerful countries, which was not the case, for instance, of East Timor.  
In societies where a shared world (Arendt 1998, 2006; Fossen 2013, 450) has 
been roughly eroded, in turn, where individuals cannot engage in productive ways to 
solve conflicts and act collectively to solve problems and produce public goods, 
international interventions should seek to support the re-establishment of a basic 
common ground, something that, as already pointed, individuals struggle to accomplish 
in their daily lives, however difficult might be the situation they face (Autesserre 2017). 
And international interveners should avoid, by all means possible, ending up 
contributing for even more fragmentation, conflict and dispute over the resources they 
bring, as it happens in Haiti and Somalia, as we have seen.  
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5. Conclusion
The hope for man in his singularity lay in the fact that not man but men inhabit the earth and 
form a world between them. It is human worldliness that will save men from the pitfalls of 
human nature.  
(...) 
Closely connected with this is an insight into the nature of human power. In distinction to 
strength, which is the gift and the possession of every man in his isolation against all other men, 
power comes into being only if and when men join themselves together for the purpose of action, 
and it will disappear when, for whatever reason, they disperse and desert one another. Hence, 
binding and promising, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in 
existence; where and when men succeed in keeping intact the power which sprang up between 
them during the course of any particular act or deed, they are already in the process of 
foundation, of constituting a stable worldly structure to house, as it were, their combined power 
of action. There is an element of the world-building capacity of man in the human faculty of 
making and keeping promises. Just as promises and agreements deal with the future and provide 
stability in the ocean of future uncertainty where the unpredictable may break in from all sides, 
so the constituting, founding, and world-building capacities of man concern always not so much 
ourselves and our own time on earth as our 'successor', and 'posterities'. The grammar of action: 
that action is the only human faculty that demands a plurality of men; and the syntax of power: 
that power is the only human attribute which applies solely to the worldly in-between space by 
which men are mutually related, combine in the act of foundation by virtue of the making and 
the keeping of promises, which, in the realm of politics, may well be the highest human faculty. 
(Arendt 2006, 166-167, emphases added).  
The conditions of chronic crisis, instability and insekirite came into being in 
Haiti, as we have seen, through a historical process marked by extreme violence and 
inequality, and with the continuous interference of foreign actors. From the very origins 
of the country, with the transatlantic human trafficking and the plantation system based 
on the exploitation of the slave labour of people who were systematically dehumanised, 
through disaggregation of families and communities, and practices aiming at 
transforming human beings in mere working animals (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990; 
Mbembe 2001, 2003).  
After it, the persistent actions aiming to reverse the inevitable, but for European 
powers of that time, unthinkable Haitian Revolution (Trouillot 1995). The US military 
occupation that lasted from 1915 to 1934, with a paternalist and civilising discourse, 
despite its brutal violence (Renda 2001). The heavy US support to one of the worst 
totalitarian regimes of the Cold War era. And subsequently, the continuous external 
interference in the country, which, as we have seen, even when with the intention of 
supporting Haiti, often ended up contributing for maintaining its chronic crisis, being 
one more gear in the reproduction of instability and insekirite.  
192 
The tricky thing for Haiti and other places affected by chronic crisis, violence, 
political instability and insekirite, such as DR Congo and Afghanistan, analysed in the 
previous chapter, in this way, is that the functioning and reproduction of political and 
economic webs of power are regionally and internationally intertwined, are strongly 
influenced by forces these societies cannot control, and that shape the behaviour, bring 
resources and legitimation to political actors, decisively weakening the power of these 
societies to pressure and influence politics from the bottom-up.  
At the same time, a path to overcome violence, instability, economic stagnation 
and insekirite can only be pursued by local agents and societies themselves, with their 
protagonism. Following externally imposed, ready-made recipes and procedures, 
undergoing externally-driven social and political engineering, have proved not only to 
be ineffective, but also to contribute for the reinforcement of local power imbalances, 
populations’ disempowerment and alienation, and corrupt and predatory political orders 
(Autesserre 2010; Barma 2017; Jones 2013; Parra 2019; Veit 2010).  
The objective of the research has been to assess the legitimacy of the UN 
stabilisation mission in Haiti to the local population, and what were the implications of 
it for the outcomes achieved in the country. Over the course and with the progress of the 
investigation, I came across even more complex questions, with fundamental 
implications for the first one: what is considered legitimate by Haitians in the first 
place? What are the local notions about political legitimacy? What if local populations 
do not support democracy?160  
The previous chapters somehow presented how the main research questions 
firstly presented evolved, involving other fundamental questions to understand the 
social and political contexts with which we are concerned here, and the role of 
international interventions on them. In the following, I summarise the main conclusions 
that derived from the first main research questions as well as the puzzles that emerged 
along the research, the takeaways of the case study of Haiti, and of the comparative 
analysis with the cases of DR Congo, Afghanistan, East Timor and Somaliland, for the 
concept of political legitimacy; concerning what one needs to take into account while 
160 These questions were actually presented to me during my presentation in a seminar of the PhD 
Programme of the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, where I spent a semester as 
visiting PhD fellow in 2018. At that time they seemed very challenging, and even threatening to my work, 
but they ended up being fundamental for the progress of the research.   
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applying this concept in contexts of violent conflict and chronic political instability in 
postcolonial societies, so it can indeed elucidate the prevailing factors that lead to the 
reproduction of these conditions. 
With it, the aim of the thesis is to contribute for further insights on the tricky 
impasse mentioned above, which is a sticking point for the societies concerned. While I 
presented normative considerations in the theoretical chapter and throughout the thesis, 
I believe one needs to be extremely careful while presenting policy recommendations in 
complex and precarious contexts such as of Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan, since in 
politics, one can hardly predict the future outcomes of present actions, (Arendt 2006, 
56), especially in cases of social upheaval and violent contest. Academic research may 
be more helpful seeking to produce knowledge so as to support actors in societies 
affected to pursue solutions as well as to exert pressure on those with great power of 
influence and interference in their countries. 
All in all, I sum up below what I consider the key points of the thesis’ 
contribution, some of which have normative and policy implications concerning the 
international humanitarian apparatus and its prevailing assumptions, paradigms and 
policies.  
5.1. Violent conflict, chronic crisis and conditions for consent and human agency 
The extremely limited scope of agency of populations living under chronic 
political instability, widespread violence and insecurity has been pointed in Chapter 2, 
as well as illustrated by the case study of Haiti and, to some extent, the cases of the 
comparative analysis. Individuals’ choices in such conditions are limited; the time and 
energy spent every single day to access basic means of survival – water, food, 
medicines (Beckett 2019; Braum 2014; Farmer 2004); the stress of living everyday with 
insekirite (Beckett 2019; Marcelin 2015), limit the chances of these populations to reach 
sustainable achievements to hold politicians accountable and to improve the social and 
economic conditions around them. Haitians insist in struggling to do both things: to 
survive and promote political change, as demonstrated by the last wave of protests 
against corruption and the extreme inequalities in the country. The struggle is, 
nonetheless, a very hard one.   
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The portraying of populations affected by civil conflict as mere passive victims 
has already been criticised as inaccurate (Kalyvas 2006). They often cooperate with 
insurgent armed groups if the government or international intervention is perceived as 
illegitimate and perpetrate arbitrary violence; they may cooperate, on the other hand, 
with international interveners if armed groups themselves have intense predatory 
behaviour and perpetrate widespread arbitrary violence (Becker 2011); civilians often 
actively seek forms of protection, being under strongmen, militias or cooperation with 
governments and interventions, or seeking to create ‘Zones of Peace,’ promoting civic 
engagement and articulation to remain independent and avoid violence both from armed 
groups and governments, such as occurred in Colombia, El Salvador and Philippines 
(Hancock 2018).  
In the case of Haiti, the reality is highly complex, and dwellers of 
neighbourhoods dominated by urban armed groups have diverse behaviours. As we 
have seen, it varies according to evolving conjectures, in some cases with identifiable 
patterns in different territories, but with a general environment of immense instability 
and uncertainty, something that worsened after the departure of Minustah and the 
decrease of foreign aid and investment in the country. Individuals struggle to survive 
and to have some level of agency in these territories, as they permanently live between 
life and death (Beckett 2019, 151-192), something that entails important social and 
psychological consequences (Marcelin 2015).  
The portray of civilians as mere victims is part of the discursive apparatus of 
what have been named liberal peace (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam 2011), and, 
we can say, it is the other side of the coin of international policies that often end up 
further disenfranchising these populations, as we have seen in the case of Haiti and in 
the cases of DR Congo (Autesserre 2010; Veit 2010) and Afghanistan.  
On the other hand, as pointed in Chapter 2, one needs to be realistic while 
considering the actual ability of agency and of making choices of these extremely 
disenfranchised populations (Spivak 2012). This realism, beyond being essential to 
understand the social and political realities in these societies, is important for a proper 
understanding of the socio-historical processes marked by colonialism, slavery and 
following extreme wealth and technological inequalities and their consequences until 
present times (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Kapoor 2008; Prashad 2008). It is a 
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realism needed so more solidaric and just policies can be sought at the international 
level, for the pursuit of  real redress of a past marked by systematic violence and 
injustice, and to deal with the pressing problems and crises of the present.  
I emphasised in the cases of East Timor and Somaliland the importance of strong 
leadership – with a significant basis of legitimacy – for the relative success of 
statebuilding and democratisation in these low-income countries. My hypothesis is that 
the presence of strong and legitimate leadership in these places is due to the existence of 
social cohesion, local social and cultural infrastructures that make political agency 
possible, which endured over time in these cases despite disruptive events, for the 
specific conditions and historical path these societies underwent (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012), which I sought to elucidate in the previous chapter. Despite the 
internal conflicts, challenges and important constraints these countries face, mainly 
limited economic development, they were able to endogenously build political 
institutions, and considerable social and political stability. 
In the cases of Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan, on the other hand, the political 
dynamics involving these countries in regional and international geopolitics, the 
historical path they went through, with colonialism, slavery (in the first two cases) and 
during the Cold War, with sponsorship of brutal dictatorships in the first two cases and 
the perpetuation of a bloody civil war in the latter with external sponsorship, and 
following that, the foreign interference and international interventions, favoured the 
reproduction of dynamics of extraversion (Bayart and Ellis 2000) between local 
political leaders and foreign actors, the reproduction of predatory, clientelist and 
unaccountable politics to local populations, and the reproduction of violent contestation.  
In the case of Haiti, this violent contestation, which is often blurred with 
common criminal activity (Beckett 2019, 158; Braum 2014), is actually connected with 
the institutionalised predatory politics through precarious clientelist relations (Cockayne 
2009, 2014). In the case of DR Congo, it has been found that the state is also connected, 
or responsible for the creation of armed groups (Stearns 2013), with the aggravating 
factor that Rwanda also has sponsored and may still sponsor armed groups in the 
country.161 In Afghanistan, we have seen that the predatory and clientelist politics that 
                                                          
161 In the case of Haiti, foreign actors have sponsored armed groups in the recent past, especially the 
United States and the Dominican Republic, which exert political influence until the present (Muggah 
2013; Cockayne 2009, 2013). More research on this aspect is needed to better ascertain the role of foreign 
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developed, strongly influenced by the US-led intervention in the country, also 
perpetuates the dominance of strongmen and violent entrepreneurs, as well as did not 
work in a productive way for the dismantling of the Taliban, on the contrary.  
In the case of Haiti, it is important to note that the very precarious economic 
condition of the country is mostly responsibility of the Haitian economic and political 
elite, who have historically exerted an almost purely predatory role against Haitian 
peasants, the backbone of the country’s economy (Dubois 2012; Trouillot 1990). 
Despite the common unintended impacts on the local economy, such as rising of prices, 
especially rents, the United Nations have been developing policies to mitigate these 
impacts and support local economies, such as giving preference to local contractors and 
suppliers (Autesserre 2010). In Haiti the mission implemented projects to compensate 
for the social and economic impact of their departure, for instance, with an initiative for 
professional reinsertion of their local staff.162  
Nonetheless, as the international intervention ended up contributing for the 
reproduction of the undemocratic and predatory logics of Haitian politics, for the very 
mandate and design of the operation from the beginning, with its “security-first 
statebuilding approach” (Muggah 2013); with the perpetration of arbitrary violence; the 
absence of a peace process and political settlement; the creation of a political void that 
only fuelled violent contestation and conflict; and later its controversial role in 2010 
elections, we can say that, overall, the mission contributed for the reproduction of the 
predatory political economy present in the country, and with it, for its long-running 
economic stagnation, instead of tackling these problems.  
As concerns the work of aid and humanitarian organisations, who often worked 
under the umbrella of Minustah projects, to alleviate the daring consequences of the 
lack of economic opportunities, with programmes of ‘cash for work,’ or the numerous 
jobs offered, for instance, by Viva Rio in Port-au-Prince ‘ghettos’ (Braum 2014), as 
much as they aimed to remediate a situation of emergency and pressing needs of a 
disenfranchised population, they often ended up fuelling an environment of competition 
                                                                                                                                                                          
actors on the reproduction of violence and political instability today in Haiti. This story is one example of 
what comes out to public from time to time: ‘Why were former members of the U.S. military driving 
around Haiti heavily armed?,’ Miami Herald, 19 February 2019, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article226475635.html.   
162 MINUSTAH : Soutien aux staffs retranchés, UN Peacekeeping, 16 August 2017, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/minustah-soutien-aux-staffs-retranches, Accessed on 20 August 2019.  
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among Haitians, in a context where social fragmentation and distrust are already 
prevalent (Braum 2014; James 2010; Marcelin 2011).  
The research of countries affected by chronic crisis and political instability, 
violence and insekirite takes us out of comfort zones, of moral and ethical certainties. It 
certainly does so if we are willing to face the reality we are investigating, to better 
understand and to turn more understandable, as well as to generate insights and ideas 
that can help the construction of alternatives. In this sense, a very troubling question we 
reach at this point is: if the ‘band-aids’ offered by humanitarian organisations end up 
contributing for the reproduction of the extreme precariousness and insecurity with 
which the majority of Haitians live in the long term, what would be then the alternative, 
or alternatives? 
There is, of course, an important literature on the collateral damage of 
humanitarianism (Anderson 1999; Barnett 2005; Beckett 2017; Sen 2018; Zanotti 2010) 
on the transformation of humanitarianism in the last decades, taking into account the 
evolving problems and challenges, mainly for the question of neutrality, and in 
situations of prolonged crisis, such as Haiti (Ferris 2011). As developed on Chapter 3, 
despite the bad reputation NGO’s gained in Haiti, especially in the 1990’s, there are 
organisations who work with local actors to bring humanitarian relieve, and at the same 
time seek to create lasting and sustainable positive impact (Zanotti 2010).  
To overcome the difficult question, which seems to present an insurmountable 
conundrum, we can then turn to a more productive one: How can humanitarian aid and 
foreign actors work to support the progressive increment of the social and political 
agency of populations affected, of their economic independence, their ability to make 
choices and act politically? This is certainly still a difficult and complex question, 
without simple answers, but that researchers and practitioners alike should make, as the 
need for change has been made clear (Autesserre 2017; Barma 2017; de Guevara 2012; 
Paris and Sisk 2009), and becomes increasingly relevant, as the conditions in countries 
such as Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan continue to aggravate. 
In this sense, reinforcing the idea already developed in the thesis: the progressive 
increment of the social and political agency of populations affected is the only way for 
the achievement of accountable and democratic political institutions in these contexts, 
as only bottom-up pressure, coming from citizens in general, or from a sufficient critical 
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mass, can promote checks and balances and control the power of the ‘Leviathan’ 
(Arendt 2006; Mansbridge 1996; Mouffe 1996).   
We need to take into account, though, how challenging this task is, and that it 
will require, indeed, more (and better) investment by the international humanitarian 
apparatus. When people live permanently between ‘life and death;’ when numerous 
individuals only find a way of retaking some level of agency over their lives and the 
conditions around them through violence, something that came into being through 
generations of systematic dispossession, dehumanisation, tyranny and 
disenfranchisement, the task of reconstructing new grounds in which communication, 
reasonable dialogue and argumentation prevail over violence (Mbembe 2018) is a hard 
one. This transformation can enable that the wish for security for oneself follows a logic 
of common understanding and civil order, instead of the destruction of the enemy, of 
making maximum immediate profit to ensure one’s own security, what unfortunately 
become prevailing with the vicious circle of violent conflict and political instability in 
postcolonial countries. 
As already pointed in the literature, significant changes in the international 
humanitarian apparatus certainly need to involve the overcoming of international 
interveners’ stubborn a priori assumptions, better local knowledge and to better take 
into account and work with local agents (Autesserre 2010, 2014, 2017; Pouligny 2006), 
aiming, instead of bringing knowledge that locals lack, to redress a history of injustice 
and systematic violence and its consequences in these societies until the present. 
5.2. The needed transition: From basic legitimacy and security-driven behaviour to 
trust and collective action 
The concept of basic legitimacy developed by Popitz (2017), presented in 
Chapter 2, is instrumental, as we have seen, for studying countries affected by chronic 
crisis and instability, civil conflict and decentralised violence. The author developed it 
focusing on stable regimes, and the potential for them to survive, despite authoritarian 
practices, for the value of order they create, the predictability they produce in everyday 
life, for common people. We have illustrated how this concept is useful in situations of 
civil conflict with the case of communities who lived under the rule of the FARC in 
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Colombia, and now have expressed the feeling of being worse off because of the 
insecurity and unpredictability brought by different sources of criminal violence, with 
the end of FARC’s rule (Masullo 2017).  
Besides, we have extrapolated Popitz conceptualisation, reflecting on how brutal 
civil wars often bring hard choices to civilians, and that there were cases where 
populations supported groups who were already presenting signs of extremist 
behaviour, with the aim of ending the condition of total insecurity and unpredictability, 
such as in Afghanistan with the rise of Taliban and Cambodia with the rise of Khmer 
Rouge. In these cases, unfortunately, the wish for security, in contexts with few choices, 
brought a worse evil, in both but especially in the latter case (Etcheson 2005; Power 
2013). 
Beckett ethnographic study of Haiti (2019) also brings further insight on this 
dimension of individuals’ behaviour in contexts of widespread insecurity and 
unpredictability. As we have seen in Chapter 3, after the second government of Aristide 
and the subsequent social unrest and political crisis that swept the country, many people 
came to understand democracy as synonymous of chaos and disorder (Beckett 2019, 29-
32), or even affirming that “the Haitian people are not ready for democracy” (Beckett 
2019, 144). In this context, the support for the restoration of the Haitian army is also 
common in the country (Beckett 2019),163 with the idea that this is the only possible 
solution for the problem of insecurity and instability. 
Mbembe and Roitman have noted a very similar pattern in the 1990’s in the 
context of African societies (1996). Focusing on a study in Cameroon, they note that: 
“The decline of public authority and its dereliction of duty has led to a situation of 
confusion and chaos that people impute not only to the crisis but also to “democracy”: 
‘Now everyone does what they please’” (Mbembe and Roitman 1996, 178) – a phrase 
very similar to those one could hear with the crisis of Aristide’s second administration, 
and also nowadays (Beckett 2019). 
As previously reflected, nonetheless, these opinions need to be analysed taking 
into account the socio-historical process through which these societies passed, and the 
163 This idea has been often expressed by locals during my field research. Pedro Braum, Viva Rio’s 
project coordinator in Port-au-Prince, also affirmed this is a widespread opinion, independently of social 
class or group.   
200 
 
fact that these countries had authoritarian experiences in the past that actually produced 
the very present conditions of chronic crisis and instability, certainly in the cases of 
Haiti and DR Congo. Unsuccessful political transitions, nonetheless, have contributed 
for the development of these ideas, in the case of Haiti, amidst a context of severe 
insecurity in everyday life, not only as concerns violence, but also subsistence and, one 
may say, identity/ subjective security (Mbembe and Roitman 1996).  
In Haiti, the disorder, insecurity and violence, especially from 2004 to 2006, 
created a feeling of nostalgia among many people, especially for a supposed ‘golden 
age’ of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s government, when there was a boom in tourism, with 
dollars and more prosperity in the capital. As Beckett describes:  
Wilfred was telling me about the golden years, when the city was full of tourists. “You could 
walk through the city at any time, day or night,” he said. “We used to dance through the streets, 
from downtown to Carrefour [today hardly affected by gang violence] in the middle of the night. 
No problem.” (Beckett 2019, 189).  
The author focused his ethnographic study mainly on adult middle-aged males who 
migrated from the countryside or are descendants of peasants escaping the collapse of 
the agrarian economy during the 1980’s, many of whom supported Aristide and the 
Lavalas movement, but then became frustrated, in a general environment of political 
apathy that still prevails in the country.  
Far from being anecdotal, Beckett’s ethnographic study illustrates a general 
trend of disillusion with the possibility of change through democratic institutions and 
elections, something demonstrated, as we have seen, by the continuous decrease in 
elections turnouts and the general feeling of disillusion and hopelessness in Haiti (which 
has recently been broken with the protests against the corruption scandal of the 
PetroCaribe programme). The high number of people who try to migrate, even risking 
their lives, looking for better living conditions elsewhere, also attests this general 
feeling of hopelessness with the possibility of change in the country.  
The support for the return of the armed forces, despite its historical role of 
actually destabilising politics in the country, and the fact that the personnel involved are 
individuals connected to the 1992 coup against Aristide and the subsequent government 
of a military junta that committed mass human rights violations, is not limited to the 
group studied by Beckett, but it is widespread in Haiti. Moïse’s administration already 
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re-established the armed forces,164 but with very limited results, few personnel and 
resources.165 
Today, gang violence is epidemic in the capital, and as already stated, it is often 
fuelled by precarious clientelist relations with Haitian politicians, where criminal and 
political violence are blurred (Beckett 2019 158; Braum 2014), a phenomenon present 
since the crisis of Aristide’s second government (and even before, with the state 
sponsored militia of the tonton makoutes during the Duvaliers’ era, who had a predatory 
behaviour towards common people, small businesses, etc.). But this blurry evolved over 
time, with new generations of disenfranchised young males engaging in violent 
activities not only as a way of guaranteeing their subsistence, but as a way of affirming 
themselves, of forming their subjectivity and dealing with their environment of extreme 
constraints and precariousness (Braum 2014, 2019; Marcelin 2015). 
The present political impasse and crisis, furthermore, demonstrates that we can 
have little hope for incremental and progressive improvement of Haiti’s democratic 
institutions. Politics in Haiti are dominated by self-interested actors, often with serious 
criminal records.166 
As pointed in Chapter 3, although a process of transitional governance back in 
2004 could have supported Haiti in finally accomplishing its failed political transition to 
democracy after the end of Duvaliers’ totalitarian regime, today the possibilities of more 
international interventionism in the country to achieve any better results than it has in 
the past are certainly low, with the high risk, besides, of generating more dependency 
(economically and politically), and of remaining as one more source of opportunities for 
the predatory behaviour of the local economic and political elite. 
164 Haiti installs new high command for planned 5,000-strong army, Reuters, 28 March 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-military/haiti-installs-new-high-command-for-planned-5000-
strong-army-idUSKBN1H40CV; Haiti has a new army with much of the old leadership. Some in the U.S. 
aren’t happy, Miami Herald, 26 March 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/haiti/article206915699.html, Accessed on 22 August 2018.  
165 As informed by Pedro Braum, projects coordinator at Viva Rio in Port-au-Prince, on 6 September 
2019.  
166 Something expressed in several interviews during my field research in Haiti in 2016. See, for instance: 
It took 12 years and 10 attempts to arrest ex-Haiti rebel leader Philippe, feds say, Miami Herald, 16 
March 2017, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/haiti/article139020393.html; Haitian senator opens fire during protest near 
parliament – video, The Guardian, 24 September 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2019/sep/24/haitian-senator-opens-fire-during-protest-near-
parliament-video.     
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How can then Haiti be supported to overcome its deep-rooted and complex 
social and political problems? How can humanitarian and development aid actors 
support the building of trust, social cohesion and productive political agency, in such 
daring conditions? 
The wide mobilisation demanding accountability from the Haitian government 
concerning the PetroCaribe corruption scandal, where different social groups joined 
forces, and some asked Moïse’s resignation (a possibility international organisations 
and foreign countries influent in Haiti discarded167) is a hopeful sign that there is still a 
vivid democratic force in the country. The fact that this mobilisation against corruption 
indirectly prompted a wave of violence in the capital (state sponsored violence and 
criminal/ decentralised violence alike) also demonstrates how complex and hard things 
are at this moment in the country, and that there will be no easy path for the 
achievement of normalcy, economic prosperity and democratisation in Haiti.  
During the years of Minustah’s presence in the country, especially after 2006, 
when Preval’s government started tackling the problem of gang violence, the mission 
supported the work of local and international civil society organisations to promote 
peacebuilding in the territories affected by violence (Braum 2014; Schuberth 2017; 
Kolbe 2013). Braum shows that several former or current gang (or Baz) members, or 
communitarian leaders (titles that often overlap) are versed in the discourses of 
humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations, are trained to write ‘projects’ to require 
funds to promote ‘peacebuilding,’ cultural activities and economic opportunities 
(Braum 2014).  
As already pointed, what I also noted in the field research was a certain fatigue, 
especially among foreigners living for a long time in the country, concerning the idea of 
a ‘national dialogue’ to finally solve the political problems and instability in the 
country. The fact is that Haitians very constantly talk about politics; it is a common 
topic in daily conversations, across different classes and social groups. The socio-
historical path taken by the country, the reproduction of its economic and political 
dependency and crystallisation of predatory and undemocratic logics of politics, 
nonetheless, turned this political activism sterile.  
                                                          
167 OAS tells Haiti opposition to back off — and tells president to start governing, Miami Herald, 19 June 
2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article231731618.html, 
Accessed on 20 August 2019.  
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Moreover, the deep local social and class cleavages difficult the achievement of 
real progress. Numerous people classify ghetto dwellers, especially the poorest and 
worst hit by violence, mainly Citè Soleil, as ‘bad people,’ or even terrorists, 
unredeemable criminals (Beckett 2019, 181). Their lives or deaths are pretty much 
ignored by most of the rest of the Haitian society. As most of my interviewees belong to 
a certain educated middle class present in the country, the majority of them had little 
reaction or gave me laconic answers when I asked about the arbitrary violence 
perpetrated by the MIF and latter Minustah military incursions in the ghettos, when 
innocent civilians were killed. 
I had the opportunity to interview ghetto dwellers twice, one of them at the Viva 
Rio headquarters, where one of the locals, participant of Viva Rio’s projects, strongly 
emphasised that the “people of Pétion-Ville don’t consider us humans,” even referring 
to them as foreigners. The “people of Pétion-Ville” were not necessarily inhabitants of 
the richer neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince, but all those from the middle and upper 
class outside the ghetto (although most of them live there), even lawyers and politicians 
connected to the Lavalas movement who work with and, theoretically, in favour of the 
“ghetto people.”  
There are Haitian human rights organisations working to report and denounce 
cases of gross human rights violations committed in the ghettos of the capital, the worst 
of the last months was a massacre reported in the impoverished area of La Saline.168 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Haitian society is marked by these deep social and class 
cleavages, dug through years of political instability and economic decline, the US 
military occupation, Duvaliers’ totalitarian era and the failed transition to democracy, 
and that these cleavages are an important part in the vicious circles that reproduce 
chronic crisis, insecurity, economic stagnation, political instability and unaccountable 
politics. 
In this sense, international interventions, and in the case of Haiti, foreign actors, 
humanitarian and development aid organisations need to avoid, by all means possible, 
to promote further fragmentation and distrust within local societies. In the case of Haiti, 
a peace process could have created a common ground from which the intervention could 
168 Haiti facing worst crisis since 1986?, AlterPresse, 5 April 2019, 
https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article24204#.XXakYCgzbIU, Accessed on 20 August 2019. 
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have departed to support a process of disarmament of the armed groups, as well as 
contributed to address the unsolved conflicts of the troubled political transition after the 
fall of the Duvaliers’ regime, supporting to build a basis from which a productive 
process of democratisation could have developed.  
The priority of stabilisation through the use of force and the absence of a peace 
process and political settlement, nonetheless, created a political void from 2004 to 2006, 
with the establishment of an illegitimate and inoperative transitional government. 
Minustah, and the most influent countries in Haiti that were part of its decision making 
process (often releasing joint public communications), in this sense, have not supported 
the building of trust and of collective action but, on the contrary, contributed to worsen 
social distrust, deep divisions and political apathy among Haitians. The several 
problems of the UN mission analysed in Chapter 3, mainly concerning its role on the 
elections and the collateral damage it provoked, further worked to produce even more 
distrust, social and political fragmentation. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, in East Timor and Somaliland, despite internal 
conflicts, these societies were able to maintain a minimum ground of common 
understanding and social cohesion, which are essential for the ability of collective 
action and political agency. These societies were resilient to the process of colonisation 
and through the Cold War period, or actually differently impacted by these macro 
political phenomena in the international level. East Timor worked mainly as trading 
post for Portugal from the XVII century (Devia Garzón 2016, 78), and Somaliland, a 
British protectorate since 1884, was a provider of livestock for the British colony of 
Aden, in turn, related to the control of the Suez Canal (Pegg and Kolstø 2015). Both 
colonial powers did not have interest in transforming or manipulating local social and 
political structures, but mainly worked with them to extract the benefits they wanted.  
As for the geopolitics of the Cold War, East Timor remained as a ‘forgotten 
case’ for decades because of the US support to Suharto’s regime. After the end of the 
Cold War, nonetheless, the East Timorese had an opportunity to finally have 
international attention and support for the referendum and the end of the Indonesian 
occupation. 
In both cases, local leadership, an external enemy or threat that strengthened 
internal union, and considerably preserved social and cultural infrastructures facilitated 
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more productive processes of statebuilding and democratisation, even with the 
important challenges and shortcomings. In the case of East Timor, even if the country 
meets factors pointed in the literature as conductive to lack of stability and 
democratisation, namely: low income (Boix and Stokes 2003); heavy dependency on 
extractive economy (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015, 4); and recent civil conflict and 
political transition (Flores and Nooruddin 2012).  
In the case of Afghanistan, furthermore, the US-led intervention’s ‘tactic’ of 
buying peace, or ‘bribery for peace’ and to ‘keep the warlords happy’ (Braithwaite and 
Wardak 2013a, 185) only contributed for the creation of a predatory state and the 
maintenance of a war economy, where the Taliban, even perpetrating arbitrary violence 
against civilians, is able to present itself as alternative security provider, in face of 
violent entrepreneurs (warlords, strongmen or mere criminals alike), maintaining its 
social basis and power of recruitment (Sharan and Bose 2018). The US-led intervention, 
in this sense, contributed for the maintenance of a context where civilians have only 
hard choices to make, and remain powerless concerning the future of their country.  
In the DR Congo, likewise, civilians remain having hard choices and few 
possibilities to productively engage in politics and social change, as the UN intervention 
keeps its focus on strengthening Congolese state capacity, on holding national elections 
that have little effect in the lives of those most affected by violence, not dealing with the 
causes of violence, being at the local level (Autesserre 2010) or among elites and with 
the vicious circles of violence escalation with mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, as 
well as the general incentive to engage in violent activities, as it remains the (perhaps 
only) way to achieve political and economic gains in the country (Stearns 2013). 
In sum, with the case study of Haiti and the comparative analysis with the cases 
mentioned, we can conclude that international interventions and the international 
humanitarian apparatus in general need to make all possible efforts to avoid promoting 
even more fragmentation among societies affected by chronic crisis, violence and 
instability, and work to support local agents in (re)building social trust, a common 
vision and understanding of their past, present and possible future, of their identity and 
potential as collective.  
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5.3. The peace-as-statebuilding paradigm, state violence and the conditions to 
(re)build the world in-between  
The theoretical chapter have stressed the question of the violence of state 
formation, and the fact that the peace-as-statebuilding paradigm of international 
interveners entails violent features connected to it and to state violence (Newman 2013; 
Jones 2013). It does so mainly through the following dynamics: 
(a) The support for the establishment or reproduction of clientelist and predatory 
political economies (Barma 2017; Sharan and Bose 2018) or of extractive political and 
economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) with the reproduction of vicious 
circles of political instability, economic stagnation, massive disenfranchisement and 
decentralised violence.  
(b) International interveners offer economic means and external legitimation to 
local political actors, for which they can maintain their power without being 
accountable to their own subjects, nor seeking to yield some form of legitimacy towards 
them. International interveners end up supporting and reinforcing the power, in this 
way, of unaccountable political institutions, in a reverse formula of the motto “no 
taxation, no representation.” In Afghanistan, the US-led intervention supported violent 
entrepreneurs to maintain parallel or war economies, weakening the capacity of the 
Afghan state to develop, gain independence and produce common goods. In Haiti, in 
turn, the international intervention and humanitarian apparatus in general created (and 
still creates) further incentives for the predatory and unaccountable political and 
economic elite of the country. Humanitarian ‘band-aids,’ in this sense, end up 
contributing for the reproduction of Haitian’s chronic crisis. 
(c) International interveners’ top-down approach and priority of working with 
local elites end up, in this way, giving more power to the powerful, as well as to violent 
entrepreneurs, reinforcing a logic in which the use of violence is the main, if not only, 
means to achieve economic and political ends – something that is essentially abortive of 
collective action and political power (Arendt 1970, 2006; Canovan 1994). International 
interveners need to reconsider, in this way, not only their top-down approach, but also 
the considerable focus and funds spent with violent actors and entrepreneurs. The 
redirection of funds to grass-roots and bottom-up initiatives, for economic development, 
alternative and local forms of governance, as well as support for civil societies, with the 
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creation, for instance, of Zones of Peace (Hancock 2018) are alternative possibilities so 
the international humanitarian apparatus can stop supporting the reproduction of state 
violence and the disenfranchisement of common people, helping, instead, the 
development of the conditions needed for the establishment of accountable and 
democratic state institutions, tackling, at the same time, state and decentralised violence 
– a needed convergence, as one feeds the other.
The three points above imply both direct and structural violence, that is, massive 
dispossession and disenfranchisement (Farmer 2004). 
The point b is especially critical concerning the conceptualisation of political 
legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 4, Weber’s assumption that systems of domination 
always seek to yield legitimacy is a questionable one (Wedeen 2015), especially in 
cases of postcolonial countries affected by violence, political instability, foreign 
interventionism and international interventions, but also postcolonial countries with 
rentier political economies and authoritarian (or totalitarian regimes), as the case of 
Syria under Hafiz al-Assad’s regime, of which Wedeen presents an enlightening study, 
with reflections that have important implications beyond the case of Syria.  
Wedeen analyses how Hafiz al-Assad regime ostensibly portrayed the image of 
an all powerful government, the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, identity 
and culture, through the glorification of his own image. Syrians, on the other hand, 
often performed obedience to the regime, even among close people, but often also 
expressing disguised and subtle criticism to the regime, through means such as sarcasm, 
satire and figures of speech (Wedeen 2015) – a kind of resistance also common in the 
context of past African dictatorships (Mbembe 2001). Although the regime probably 
actually sought to yield legitimacy among a group of closer loyal supporters, it is 
questionable to assume that it did so among the population in general, as its 
performance was self-validating, without engagement with the general public.  
Nonetheless, it is possible that Weber’s assumption is actually still helpful to 
understand social and political phenomena in postcolonial countries, since his son, 
Bashar al-Assad, could not properly sustain the regime, with the outbreak of the Syrian 
Revolution in 2011 (Saleh 2017). He is still in power thanks to external support to the 
regime, but we can say that the price for “regime survival” – the immense destruction, 
death toll and number of refugees, one of the worst humanitarian crises ever seen, was 
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the country itself.169 If only the regime survives, but not the country and its people, can 
we say it was victorious? Although I did not select Syria as a case study, it is certainly a 
fundamental case to be studied concerning the question of political legitimacy, violence, 
power and domination (Popitz 2017), and the role of foreign interventionism and 
international geopolitics on it in contemporary world. 
Concerning rentier regimes, which do not depend on the cooperation of their 
subjects to sustain their power, on the other hand, Beetham (2013) may bring reflections 
that help us understand the question of political legitimacy and its implications, as the 
author points that the more political authorities depend on their subjects, the more they 
will seek their legitimation, and the more bargaining power the subjects will have. He 
develops this rationale concerning the level of workers expertise required. If a regime 
does not depend on its subjects’ labour at all to extract wealth, the latter group is in a 
considerable disadvantageous position. Weber’s theory may still remain valid, since as 
much as subjects have little power, they may choose to revolt, something that depends 
on a series of conditions to happen (Petersen 2001).  
Nonetheless, Beetham (2013) emphasis on the effects of power inequalities (a 
possible limitation in Weber’s theory), and their cumulative effects over time, for the 
fact that power structures create the very conditions for their own legitimation, is 
fundamental to take into account in the contexts with which we are concerned here. As 
emphasised in Chapter 2, these power inequalities and their cumulative effects need to 
be taken into account not only domestically, but also in the international level, as 
powerful and hegemonic countries, like domestic regimes, create the very conditions for 
the legitimation of the order they create at the international level.  
In cases of postcolonial countries affected by chronic crisis and political 
instability, decentralised violence, and predatory political economies, such as Haiti, DR 
Congo and Afghanistan, on the other hand, we have a very different scenario, since 
these countries do not count on minimally stable regimes. State domination, in these 
cases, is heavily contested by armed groups, and civilians often need to live with 
multiple authority claims. 
169 It is common to hear among Syrian refugees that there is no more Syria, no country left (See, for 
instance: ‘We do not have a country called Syria any more. There is nothing left’, The Irish Times, 24 
November 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/we-do-not-have-a-country-called-syria-
any-more-there-is-nothing-left-1.3708457, Accessed on 09 September 2019.  
209 
In these cases, it does not matter much if they think these actors are legitimate or 
not, since, as says a Haitian adage, “Konstitisyon se papye, bayonet se fè” – 
constitutions are made of paper, but bayonets are made of iron” (Beckett 2019, 179), or, 
in more ancient terms, what mostly counts is the “Rufio’s scabbard argument” 
(Hancock and Mitchell 2018, 8). As we have seen, individuals often need to make hard 
choices to keep making a living, to remain alive and protect their families – their 
behaviour and set of options cannot be compared to that of situations where civil and 
political order prevail. 
Even if we assume that in these circumstances states and armed groups alike still 
depend on certain support and cooperation of civilians, who could have, with that, 
certain power of bargaining and influence, nowadays most conflicts are heavily affected 
by regional and international geopolitics, perhaps more than in any previous era, in a 
context with the most extreme economical and technological inequalities. And this is 
why the point b is a key one for the study of political legitimacy in postcolonial 
countries affected by violent conflict and chronic crises. In these cases, Weber’s 
assumption mentioned above is especially at stake. But especially in these cases, we 
really need to ask not only if political actors are really interested in cultivating 
legitimacy among their subjects, but if they are interested, at all, in establishing political 
domination. 
In this sense, Fossen notes, on his propositions for a pragmatic approach for 
political legitimacy: “Taking my cue from Weber, I suggest that the kind of practical 
situation in which ‘legitimacy’ has a distinctly political significance revolves around the 
attempt to rule” (Fossen 2013, 435). Are political actors in Haiti, and also DR Congo 
and Afghanistan, necessarily attempting to rule? In the case of Haiti, Beckett’s article 
"The Art of Not Governing Port-au-Prince" (2014) is very insightful in this sense, 
focusing on Haiti’s capital, the political centre and stage of the country where, at the 
same time, the state is absent in the everyday life of the majority of the population, and 
political (and economic) actors are able to retain their power, as much as tension, 
conflict and instability are main characteristics of this reality.  
Bayart and Ellis’ concept of extraversion (2000) is, in this way, useful to 
understand how social and political scenarios like Port-au-Prince endure over time, as 
not only local political actors, but also individuals in general, seek to extract benefits 
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from the exchanges they have and establish with foreign actors (Braum 2014; Beckett 
2019; James 2010), while local social cohesion, civil and political order are jeopardised.  
As we have seen, the heavy power of dominant countries and international 
institutions within developing countries is something that affects not only extreme cases 
such as Haiti, DR Congo and Afghanistan, but a broader group of countries, in different 
levels, something Schlichte elucidates through the idea of ‘international states’ 
(Schlichte 2017).   
Bayart and Ellis, as well as Schlichte, emphasise the role of local actors in these 
exchanges and power relations. Schlichte emphasises that:  “as Norbert Elias reminds 
us, power is a feature of social relations working in both directions, or as an 
experienced diplomat put it: ‘Cameroon needs the World Bank as much as the World 
Bank needs Cameroon’” (Schlichte 2017, 118). Bayart and Ellis, in turn, affirm that 
dependency theory failed to grasp the “historicity of dependency” as: “For dependence 
is a historical experience in which people create themselves as subjects.” (Bayart and 
Ellis 2000, 264).  
The problem with these assertions is that they fail to take into account power 
inequalities, its cumulative effects over time and the creation of material and immaterial 
conditions for their own legitimation (and naturalisation), as developed by Beetham on 
‘The legitimation of power’ (2013). In this sense, in the postcolony, people are indeed 
agents in the creation of themselves as subjects, but it is a process of creation marked by 
a long crisis (Mbembe and Roitman 1996), massive dispossession, as well as severe 
limitations for individuals’ agency, as this thesis sought to demonstrate – if we take into 
account local realities beyond local elites.  
We have seen that international interventions, in turn, often reinforce instead of 
tackling state violence and the violence often inherent to the process of state formation 
(Newman 2013), with the competition for power, resources and hegemony among 
different political groups (Jones 2013), and populations under these circumstances count 
on very unfavourable conditions to exert bottom-up pressure for the creation of more 
inclusive political and economic institutions. 
Peacebuilding researchers, policymakers and practitioners often point to the 
(often astronomical) amount of resources spent in these countries, and to the local 
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problems as responsible for the lack of positive outcomes. What they seem to fail to see 
is that international interveners often are actually the ones funding the local ‘problems,’ 
directly or indirectly.  
In cases of countries with extractive economies, the question remains of why 
international interventions are not designed as programmes to support economic 
recovery and local governance structures that could make the exploitation of natural 
resources accountable to local populations at the municipal level. Autesserre (2010) and 
Stearns (2013) alike point that the argument that international interveners and powerful 
countries involved are interested on the exploitation of resources in the DR Congo lacks 
any empirical ground, and they present convincing arguments and evidence to say so. 
Nevertheless, the fact is that the natural resources exploited in the country and that feed 
violence reach global markets, and much more effort should be invested to clean these 
value chains, to hold all those responsible accountable (for instance, the Rwandan 
government, as pointed by Stearns), and revert the wealth of the exploitation of these 
resources to the solution of the many and complex problems of the country.  
In the case of Haiti, while the majority of the Haitian population live in inhuman 
conditions of poverty, all money invested to ‘fix’ Haitian state institutions has been, in 
the end of the day, mostly wasted, resources that could have helped, for instance, 
Haitian peasants improve their productivity and infrastructure to sell their surplus 
production. A development plan with international funds for Haitian peasants could be a 
proper compensation for the years of policies that destroyed their economy, not only by 
the local political and economic elite, but also by foreign interventionism in the country, 
especially from the United States (Farmer 2004, 2012; Muggah 2013).  
Decades (if not centuries, as in the case of Haiti) of colonialism, slavery, foreign 
intervention and interference crippled many peoples’ social, economic and political 
capacities to maintain their subsistence, as well as their identity and culture, around the 
world. As much as these populations kept resisting, have often very rich cultures, such 
as in Haiti, they are, as pointed by scholars and by individuals involved themselves, 
submerged in a long crisis (Braum 2014; Beckett 2019; Mbembe and Roitman, 1996). 
Many Haitians understand their country live in a state of permanent crisis (Beckett 
2019; Braum 2014, 208), and this consumes individuals’ hopes for a better future, as 
well as their ability to cooperate with each other and act collectively to achieve it.  
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5.4. Chronic crisis in postcolonial societies, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the 
foundation of the polity  
Through the case study of Haiti, and also the comparative chapter, especially 
concerning the case of DR Congo, we have seen that the interaction of local political 
actors with foreign countries and international interventions can create a political void, 
in which local leaders and state institutions, or foreign countries and international 
interventions, have control over local populations through violent means, but do not 
hold responsibility to govern, are not accountable to the subjects of their power, neither 
rely on traditional forms of domination. 
In the case of Haiti, this happened with the 2004 UN intervention, first with the 
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), composed by US, Canadian, French and Chilean 
troops, and then with Minustah, until 2006, when Preval’s government was 
democratically elected and responsive to popular pressure (Braum 2014; Seitenfus 
2014; Schuberth 2017). The UN intervention was established amid a severe social and 
political crisis, with which an important part of the population (not only the business 
elite) was contesting Aristide’s government, and part of it violently contested his 
government (in this case, supported by part of the business elite as well as foreign 
actors) assaulting the country from the Dominican Republic to forcefully overthrow 
Aristide.  
Nonetheless, instead of restoring a minimum sense of order, the intervention 
worsened the social and political conflict, as it perpetrated arbitrary violence in the 
territories of the capital Port-au-Prince controlled by armed groups supporters of 
Aristide, something that ended up increasing the mobilisation by different factions in 
the conflict (Kolbe 2013; Muggah 2013), and with the establishment of a transitional 
government connected with the economic and political group responsible for Aristide’s 
forceful oust.  
We can say that what happened in Haiti with 2004’s intervention was the reverse 
of what the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, as the report by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty from 2001 upholds, since instead of 
promoting the sovereign’s responsibility to protect its own population, it created a 
sovereignty in suspension, with the absence of political responsibility, and where only 
the use of force prevailed. The intervention ended up, in this sense, reinforcing the 
213 
logics of the use of force for political ends that was already prevalent in the country 
(Cockayne 2009; Dubois 2013; Trouillot 1990), instead of helping transform it towards 
a process of democratisation.  
In the case of DR Congo, in turn, Veit analysis of indirect rule (2010), which 
evolved from colonial times until the present context of international intervention, 
somehow also elucidates a context in which physical coercion is exerted without 
political responsibility, as local political actors developed an extractive behaviour 
connected to colonial rulers. Bayart and Ellis concept of extraversion (2000) further 
explains such political dynamics, as local rulers respond to foreign sponsors instead of 
being or becoming accountable to their own subjects. As Veit demonstrates, the 
contemporary international intervention (the UN operation and the whole apparatus 
around it) did not transform the logic of indirect rule, but reproduce it through other 
means and mechanisms. As already pointed, the other side of “no taxation, no 
representation,” has been updated, instead of transformed, from colonial times until the 
present in DR Congo. Responsibility to protect neither has been bolstered in this case, 
but, on the contrary, power structures connecting local and foreign actors that are 
unaccountable to local populations. 
In Afghanistan, the US-led intervention supported (and still supports) violent 
actors and entrepreneurs with a predatory behaviour towards locals (Barma 2017; 
Sharan and Bose 2018; Suhrke and De Lauri 2019), something that ends up, as already 
pointed, fuelling Taliban’s power, and weakening the capacity of the Afghan state 
institutions to develop and grow independent economically and militarily (Sharan and 
Bose 2018; Suhrke 2009).  
As pointed in Chapter 2, the process of the ‘foundation of the polity’ (Arendt 
2006) is often a violent one, not only concerning modern state institutions, but also 
previous political models; foundational myths often are marked by disruptive and 
violent events, which symbolise the emergence of a new political body (Arendt 2006). 
Nonetheless, I do not uphold any teleological and deterministic understanding of 
History (neither Hannah Arendt did), so the element of violence is not a necessity. An 
essentially endogenous process among local agents aiming to reach a political 
equilibrium, where the basic rules of the game are established is, nonetheless, a 
214 
necessary condition for the achievement of stable political institutions and, furthermore, 
democratisation.  
The case study of Haiti, as well as the comparative analysis with the cases of DR 
Congo, Afghanistan, East Timor and Somaliland in this thesis, bring evidence that 
contemporary international interventions did not create favourable conditions for the 
development of this endogenous process in the first three cases but, on the contrary, 
systematically hindered it.  
In the case of East Timor, we have seen that a conjunction of internal and 
external conditions enabled a different story of statebuilding and democratisation with 
the support of a UN mission; even if its problems and shortcomings have contributed 
for the resurgence of violent conflict, local political actors were able to establish a new 
consensus and ensure stability. 
In the case of Somaliland, a locally-driven and hybrid process of statebuilding 
and democratisation essentially entailed an endogenous and substantially successful 
political process, despite the challenges they faced and still face (Hastings and Philips 
2018; Pegg and Kolstø 2015; Richards 2012; Schwoebel 2018). 
Haiti, as well as in DR Congo and Afghanistan, in contrast, are cases that 
demonstrate that contemporary international interventions are ill equipped to support 
postcolonial societies affected by violent conflict in their struggle to refound civil and 
political order. In these cases, they systematically contributed, intentionally or 
unintentionally, for the maintenance and reproduction of the violent features of state 
formation (Newman 2013) and of the state (Malešević 2013), and for hindering the 
development of more accountable and democratic state institutions, with the 
maintenance of vicious circles of decentralised and state violence, economic stagnation, 
clientelist and predatory politics and massive disenfranchisement.  
As these societies did not reach the condition of chronic crisis, political 
instability and economic stagnation by themselves, but through socio-historical 
processes marked by extreme unequal power and economic relations, and these 
conditions are maintained through webs of power that connect local, national, regional 
and international political actors and dynamics, the intellectual reflection and practical 
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work to support local agents in achieving civil order and economic prosperity is a 
fundamental one in contemporary world.  
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine as a normative baseline, in this sense, 
should not be abandoned, but further developed so as to avoid its authoritarian (Orford 
2011) and paternalist dangers, and so as societies can be shielded from the immensely 
destructive power of the involvement of regional and international geopolitics in local 
conflicts, as the cases of Syria and Yemen tragically demonstrate today, as well as have 
proper support to get back to their feet. In a globalised and technological world with 
increasing inequalities, there is no “way back” to societies and cultures disrupted by 
economic and (geo)political processes beyond their control. If there is any hope for a 
different way forward, it must involve fundamental changes of paradigm and a priori 
assumptions by international interveners and the international humanitarian apparatus, 
as this thesis sought to demonstrate.  
For future research agenda, I would emphasise what other authors have already 
suggested, concerning the need to overcome the state-centric position on the study of 
violent conflict, decentralised violence and chronic political instability, as well as the 
possible solutions for societies affected (Von Trotha 2009; de Guevara 2012). A 
productive way of doing this is asking: What actually produces civil order? Although 
it seems a simple question, it is a fundamental one, which requires a deep change in the 
paradigms and assumptions dominant in the academic field, and even more in the policy 
world. 
In the latter case, even though the need for change seems to be clear for 
international civil servants, professionals and experts involved, the way the machinery 
of international institutions work, as well as the foreign policy of sponsoring countries, 
seems to turn meaningful transformations a very difficult task. I believe the role of 
academic research is to keep pushing for it. 
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Appendix I 
List of interviewed persons in Haiti 
Name Date(s) of interviews 
Consultant for business and international organisations (anonymous) 09/04/2016 
Ronald Fareau, journalist 09/04/2016 
Yvon Kernizan, politician linked to Lavalas 10/04/2016 
Tonny Joseph, then policy advisor at Oxfam 11/04/2016 
Carine Roenen, Executive Director, Fonkoze Foundation 12/04/2016 
Florence Jean Louis, Fonkoze 12/04/2016 
Minustah employee (anonymous) 13/04/2016 
Etant Dupain, journalist and documentarist (*) 14/04/2016 
Carla Pessanha Loque, Comité de Coordination des ONG Internationales 
en Haiti 
15/04/2016 
Michèle Duvivier Pierre Louis, former primer-minister, president of the 
NGO Focal 
15/04/2016 
Regine Dupuy, then representative of the American Friends Service 
Committee 
16/04/2016 
Irvyne Jean-Baptiste, Partners in Health 17/04/2016 
Pauline Lecarpentier, lawyer, Bureau des Droits Humains en Haïti 
(BDHH) 
25/04/2016 
Colonel Ricardo Pereira de Araujo Bezerra, then Commander of the 
Brazilian Battalion of Minustah 
25/04/2016 
Deborah Cham, Concern World Wide Haiti 27/04/2016 
Rocco Messina, Chief Border Management Section, Minustah 27/04/2016 
Gauthier Dieudonne, CLM (Chemen Lavi Miyò) Program Director, 
Fonkoze (Mirebalais) 
28/04/2016 
Fernando Vidal, then Brazilian Ambassador for Haiti 29/04/2016 
Employee of a regional organisation (anonymous) (**) 29/04/2016 
Arnaud Dandoy, professor and consultant, Université d'Etat d'Haïti 02/05/2016 
Franck Seguy, Professor, Université d'Etat d'Haïti, he also organised the 
discussions with his students, with 3 different groups 
02, 04, 09/05/2016 
Azaad Alessandro Alocco, Mission Chief, MSF 03/05/2016 
Pedro Braum, anthropologist and projects coordinator, Viva Rio (***) 03, 05/05/2016 
Saint-Pierre Beaubrun, Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés – GARR 
(Haitian NGO) 
04/05/2016 
Jean Mark Rodney, employee, Viva Rio 05/05/2016 
Fritz Rameau, employee, Viva Rio 05/05/2016 
Junior Jerome, employee, Viva Rio 05/05/2016 
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Jocie Philistin, Kofaviv, Haitian NGO dedicated to support victims of 
sexual violence, which received support from Minustah.  
06/05/2016 
Francesco Ingarsia, Terre des Hommes 06/05/2016 
Thomas Noreille, Troupe Les Rescapes (French national living in Haiti for 
decades) 
06/05/2016 
Gary Lubin, Tamise Cultural Association, cultural organisation supported 
by Minustah. On this day I attended a cultural activity supported by 
Minustah, ‘Chanter pour la paix.’ 
07/05/2016 
Pierre Esperance, Secrétaire Général, Réseau National de Défense des 
Droits de l'Homme - RNDDH 
09/05/2016 
Mourad Wahba, Deputy Special Representative, Minustah, and director of 
the UNDP in Haiti 
10/05/2016 
Jose-Angel Gomez Fernandez, Rule of Law, Model Jurisdiction, Minustah 10/05/2016 
Darius Celigny, Directeur National, SOS Village d'Enfants Haiti 11/05/2016 
Camille Chalmers, general coordinator, Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer 
pour un Développement Alternatif’ (PAPDA) 
11/05/2016 
Giuseppe Calandruccio, Chief, Human Rights Section - Minustah 11/05/2016 
*I kept in touch with Etant Dupain, especially during 2019, via telephone and social media.
**I did a follow-up interview with this person via telephone on 2 May 2019. 
***I kept in touch with Pedro Braum since 2016, especially since November of last year, aiming to 
follow the evolution of the crisis in Haiti. We had three conversations via telephone for around 2 hours, 
on 13 November 2018, 17 December 2018 and 8 March 2019, and exchanged messages during this 
period.  
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Appendix II 
Interview guides 
Haitian civil society organisations: 
1. Introduction
 I'm PhD candidate in Human Rights at the University of Deusto, in Spain. My
research concerns the relation of United Nations peace operations with local
peoples, and how this affects their legitimacy and ability to actually contribute to
peacebuilding.
 My objective, in this way, is to comprehend to what extent UN peace operations
respect and guarantee democratic procedures in the countries in which they
intervene, studying the forms in which peace operations are accountable to local
people and what they do to promote dialogue and participation of local
populations as well as to listen to their grievances.
 I study the literature on UN peace operations extensively, and Haiti, especially,
is my case study.
2. Background discussion - view on the history and political context of Haiti
 Could you summarize your view on the historical and political background of
Haiti, of its social, political and economic situation, and on the role of the
position of Haiti internationally in this situation, of the foreign interventions in
the country?
 That is to say- how Haiti has arrived here - the social and political processes
through which Haiti has been built.
3. The role of the international community/ foreign action in the country
 I'd like to know your opinion about the role of the international community in
Haiti. Taking into account the history of the country, how the foreign
interventions, as well as the international cooperation, have influenced in its
social, economic and political development?
 Do you think that the Haitian people have a voice in the intervention of
international actors in the country, concerning actions that affect directly their
lives?
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 Do you think that Haitians have the right to decide about the plans and actions 
concerning the economic development of the country? Sometimes, analyzing 
texts and materials of the international cooperation for development, seems like 
it is clear that the voice of the local populations doesn't matter (with questions 
like: what would be the best way to advance development in Haiti - this question 
shouldn't be answered by Haitians themselves?)  
The role of Minustah:  
 What is your opinion about the political process that culminated in the 
establishment of Minustah? 
 Do you think that Minustah has delivered the job it promised?  
 Do you think that the action of Minustah to stabilize and bring security to Haiti 
has helped to enhance the rule of law? Do you think that the country is more 
stable and safe now?  
 What is the kind of insecurity and of criminal activity/ violence today in Haiti, 
and how it could be combated in a sustainable manner, in the long term? (taking 
into account, for instance, that the war on drugs around the world is a complete 
failure, costing thousands of lives every year...)   
 What do you think about the role of Minustah, as well as of other international 
organizations, in the electoral processes in Haiti? There are accusations that 
international organizations have helped to legitimize elections with huge 
irregularities, and also of the involvement of foreign governments in the 
electoral process (including with the episode of Ricardo Seitenfus resignation of 
his position as OAS representative to Haiti). What do you think about it? 
 Do you think that Minustah is accountable to the Haitian population? Do you 
think that Haitians have a voice in the actions and decisions that directly impact 
their lives?  
 Has Minustah promoted processes or even events, seminars, etc., to hear the 
opinions of Haitian civil society and of Haitians in general concerning its work? 
 Do you think that there are adequate grievance mechanisms to receive 
denounces of misconduct of the UN troops and denounces of human rights 
violations, and adequate mechanisms to address possible cases?   
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 What is your opinion concerning the cases of human rights violations 
denounced? Do you think that the operation and the United Nations acted 
properly?  
 What is your opinion on the question of cholera? 
 Taking into account the recent history of mass human rights violations in Haiti, 
with the years of the Duvaliers dictatorship and also with gross human rights 
violations in a context of political instability and political violence, with the 
control of armed bands by politicians and economic elites, don't you think that 
the UN mission and the international community broadly should have supported 
the establishment of a truth commission? 
 Is there a debate on this issue in Haiti today? 
4. The current situation  
 What do you think about the permanence of Minustah and of the UN troops in 
Haiti? Do you think that the operation still can contribute for the situation of the 
country, for the improvement of the rule of law, for the promotion of peace, 
development and democracy?  
 Do you think that there is still a justification for the permanence of the UN 
troops? (There are accusations that there is no justification, and, besides, that the 
money spend with the troops is a waste, a scandal in the context of poverty and 
lack of resources in the country).  
 Do you trust in the ability of Minustah and of United Nations to make a proper 
transition for the withdraw of the UN troops?  
 Do you have some opinion on the police force that Minustah is helping to train, 
that will keep the responsibility for the security after the Minustah withdrawal?  
 Could you summarize your views and opinions on the current political crisis? 
What would be the best way to solve this apparent deadlock, in short and also in 
long term?  
 Do you think that it is possible to create more participatory politics for the 
development of the country, for the promotion of the economic and social rights 
of the Haitian people, and also for the promotion of stability and rule of law? 
5. The vision and work of the organisation 
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 Could you summarize the organisation’s vision concerning the Haitian context,
the focus and objectives of your work, and your expectations for the
development, improvement of the political situation, of the human rights, etc.?
International NGOs: 
1. Introduction
 I'm PhD candidate in Human Rights at the University of Deusto, in Spain. My
research concerns the relation of United Nations peace operations with local
peoples, and how this affects their legitimacy and ability to actually contribute to
peacebuilding.
 My objective, in this way, is to comprehend to what extent UN peace operations
respect and guarantee democratic procedures in the countries in which they
intervene, studying the forms in which peace operations are accountable to local
people and what they do to promote dialogue and participation of local
populations as well as to listen to their grievances.
 I study the literature on UN peace operations extensively, and Haiti, especially,
is my case study.
2. Background discussion - view on the history and political context of Haiti
 Could you summarize your view on the historical and political background of
Haiti, of its social, political and economic situation, and on the role of the
position of Haiti internationally in this situation, of the foreign interventions in
the country?
 That is to say- how Haiti has arrived here - the social and political processes
through which Haiti has been built.
3. The role of the international community/ foreign action in the country
 I'd like to know your opinion about the role of the international community in
Haiti. Taking into account the history of the country, how the foreign
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interventions, as well as the international cooperation, have influenced in its 
social, economic and political development? 
 Do you think that the Haitian people have a voice in the intervention of
international actors in the country, concerning actions that affect directly their
lives?
 Do you think that Haitians have the right to decide about the plans and actions
concerning the economic development of the country? Sometimes, analyzing
texts and materials of the international cooperation for development, seems like
it is clear that the voice of the local populations doesn't matter (with questions
like: what would be the best way to advance development in Haiti - this question
shouldn't be answered by Haitians themselves?)
The role of Minustah: 
 What is your opinion about the political process that culminated in the
establishment of Minustah?
 Do you think that Minustah has been originated with an appropriate process, in
the best interest of Haiti and of Haitian people, or other (foreign) interests
played a more important role?
 Do you think that Minustah has delivered the job it promised?
 Do you think that the action of Minustah to stabilize and bring security to Haiti
has helped to enhance the rule of law? Do you think that the country is more
stable and safe now?
 What is the kind of insecurity and of criminal activity/ violence today in Haiti,
and how it could be combated in a sustainable manner, in the long term? (taking
into account, for instance, that the war on drugs around the world is a complete
failure, costing thousands of lives every year...)
 What do you think about the role of Minustah, as well as of other international
organizations, in the electoral processes in Haiti? There are accusations that
international organizations have helped to legitimize elections with huge
irregularities, and also of the involvement of foreign governments in the
electoral process (including with the episode of Ricardo Seitenfus resignation of
his position as OAS representative to Haiti). What do you think about it?
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 Do you think that Minustah is accountable to the Haitian population? Do you
think that Haitians have a voice in the actions and decisions that directly impact
their lives?
 Has Minustah promoted processes or even events, seminars, etc., to hear the
opinions of Haitian civil society and of Haitians in general concerning its work?
 What is your opinion on the Minustah's and UN role for the development in
Haiti, do you think they help in the sustainable development of the country, in
the development for the improvement of the life of people?
 Do you think that there are adequate grievance mechanisms to receive
denounces of misconduct of the UN troops and denounces of human rights
violations, and adequate mechanisms to address possible cases?
 What is your opinion concerning the cases of human rights violations
denounced? Do you think that the operation and the United Nations acted
properly?
 What is your opinion on the question of cholera?
 Taking into account the recent history of mass human rights violations in Haiti,
with the years of the Duvaliers dictatorship and also with gross human rights
violations in a context of political instability and political violence, with the
control of armed bands by politicians and economic elites, don't you think that
the UN mission and the international community broadly should have supported
the establishment of a truth commission?
 Is there a debate on this issue in Haiti today?
4. The current situation
 What do you think about the permanence of Minustah and of the UN troops in
Haiti? Do you think that the operation still can contribute for the situation of the
country, for the improvement of the rule of law, for the promotion of peace,
development and democracy?
 Do you think that there is still a justification for the permanence of the UN
troops? (There are accusations that there is no justification, and, besides, that the
money spend with the troops is a waste, a scandal in the context of poverty and
lack of resources in the country).
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 Do you trust in the ability of Minustah and of United Nations to make a proper
transition for the withdraw of the UN troops?
 Do you have some opinion on the police force that Minustah is helping to train,
that will keep the responsibility for the security after the Minustah withdrawal?
 Could you summarize your views and opinions on the current political crisis?
What would be the best way to solve this apparent deadlock, in short and also in
long term?
 Do you think that it is possible to create more participatory politics for the
development of the country, for the promotion of the economic and social rights
of the Haitian people, and also for the promotion of stability and rule of law?
5. The vision and work of the organization
 Could you summarize the organisation's vision concerning the Haitian context,
the focus and objectives of your work, and your expectations for the
development, improvement of the political situation, of the human rights, etc.?
MINUSTAH Employees 
1. Introduction
 I'm PhD candidate in Human Rights at the University of Deusto, in Spain. My
research concerns the relation of United Nations peace operations with local
peoples, and how this affects their legitimacy and ability to actually contribute to
peacebuilding.
 My objective, in this way, is to comprehend to what extent UN peace operations
respect and guarantee democratic procedures in the countries in which they
intervene, studying the forms in which peace operations are accountable to local
people and what they do to promote dialogue and participation of local
populations as well as to listen to their grievances.
 I study the literature on UN peace operations extensively, and Haiti, especially,
is my case study.
Confidentiality 
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 What is your preference concerning the confidentiality of the interview? Do you
prefer not to be mentioned?
2. Background discussion - view on the Haitian context and of the UN presence
 Could you summarize your view on the Haitian context, on the social, political
and economic situation of the country, and on the role of the UN mission and
other agencies here?
 Why United Nations agencies consider important their presence here, how they
think they can contribute for the improvement of Haitian situation, for
development, human rights and democratization, etc?
3. The role of the international community/ foreign action in the country
 I'd like to know your opinion about the role of the international community in
Haiti. Taking into account the history of the country, how the foreign
interventions, as well as the international cooperation, have influenced in its
social, economic and political development?
 The role of Minustah: 
 What is your opinion about the political process that culminated in the
establishment of Minustah?
 Do you think that Minustah has been originated with an appropriate process, in
the best interest of Haiti and of Haitian people?
 Do you think that Minustah has delivered the job it promised?
 Do you think that the action of Minustah to stabilize and bring security to Haiti
has helped to enhance the rule of law? Do you think that the country is more
stable and safe now?
 Do you think that Minustah acts to promote stability and rule of law in a
sustainable manner, in the long term, addressing the root causes of violence and
of criminal activity?
 What do you think about the role of Minustah, as well as of other international
organizations, in the electoral processes in Haiti?
 There are accusations that international organizations have helped to legitimize
elections with huge irregularities, and also of the involvement of foreign
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governments in the electoral process (including with the episode of Ricardo 
Seitenfus resignation of his position as OAS representative to Haiti). What do 
you think about it? 
 Do you think that Minustah is accountable to the Haitian population? Do you
think that Haitians have a voice in the actions and decisions that directly impact
their lives?
 Has Minustah promoted processes or even events, seminars, etc., to hear the
opinions of Haitian civil society and of Haitians in general concerning its work?
 What is your opinion on the Minustah and UN role for the development in
Haiti, do you think they help in the sustainable development of the country, in
the development for the improvement of the life of people?
 Taking into account the history of repression and violation of labor's rights, that
for long time the unionization has been forbidden in the country (mainly during
the dictatorships), has the UN mission and other agencies done something to
promote labor rights and to ensure the right of unionization?
 Do you think that there are adequate grievance mechanisms to receive
denounces of misconduct of the UN troops and denounces of human rights
violations, and adequate mechanisms to address possible cases?
 What is your opinion concerning the cases of human rights violations
denounced? Do you think that the operation and the United Nations acted
properly?
 What is your opinion on the question of cholera?
 Taking into account the recent history of mass human rights violations in Haiti,
with the years of the Duvaliers dictatorship and also with gross human rights
violations in a context of political instability and political violence, with the
control of armed bands by politicians and economic elites, don't you think that
the UN mission and the international community broadly should have supported
the establishment of a truth commission?
 United Nations and UN operations have supported the establishment of truth
commissions and transitional justice mechanisms in many countries around the
world, with contexts very similar to the Haitian, why not here?
4. The current situation
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 What do you think about the permanence of Minustah and of the UN troops in
Haiti? Do you think that the operation can still contribute for the situation of the
country, for the improvement of the rule of law, for the promotion of peace,
development and democracy?
 Do you think that there is still a justification for the permanence of the UN
troops?
 Do you think that United Nations is working properly to plan and execute the
withdraw of the UN troops in a sustainable manner?
 Do you have some opinion on the police force that Minustah is helping to train,
that will keep the responsibility for the security after the Minustah withdrawal?
 Could you summarize your views and opinions on the current political crisis?
And what do you think it is the UN role in this context?
5. Your work
 What do you think about your own work here in Haiti and in the United
Nations? Do you think/ feel that you are collaborating for the improvement of
the Haitian's situation?
 How do you see the mission of your agency/ department? Do you think this
work could be improved?
 What do you consider the biggest challenges and barriers to United Nations help
indeed for the promotion of peace, development, human rights and democracy?
Do you think there are structural problems that hinder the organization of doing
better its job?
